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BOOKS BY EDWIN LEWIS

GOD AND OURSELVES

JESUS CHRIST AND THE HUMAN QUEST

God and Ourselves

A Plea for the Reality, Adequacy
and Availability of God

EDWIN LEWIS

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PREFACE

PREFACE

TWENTY years ago, Rudolf Eucken was able to startle a good many people by the mere title of a book, *Can We Still Be Christians?* There are doubtless those who will remember James Denney's somewhat caustic review of the book. Denney felt that the word "still" was unnecessarily ominous, and he was not at all favorably impressed with the kind of Christianity that Eucken thought we could "still" accept and live by.

Whether Eucken's title were justified at the time, or not, there are few who would dispute that the question of questions respecting religion to-day is *Can We Still Believe in God?* While, speaking for ourselves, we may have a confidence resembling the stalwart Denney's, we should still have to admit that our most urgent problem is to create that confidence in others. A few years ago we were being treated to discussions of "Christianity Without Christ." To-day the discussions have to do with "Religion Without God." What kind of Christianity it was that purposed to dispense with Christ hardly needs now to be described. It has already revealed—as it was bound to do—its own intrinsic fallaciousness. We shall hope that the present uncertainty concerning God will have a similar issue. Nevertheless, it is by no means clear to a good many sincere and earnest people to-day that God is necessary to religion. Or if God is retained, it is a God very difficult to recognize. God is Value—God is Process—God

is Change—God is Space-Time—God is Idealized Reality—God is Principle of Concretion—God is Idea—God is a Projection—God is Yourself—God is Nature's Upthrust—God is Tendency to Good—contemporary discussions are full of characterizations such as these; and in many cases those who offer them seem quite convinced that religion can be "saved" only as one or other of these substitutes for the God of "the Great Tradition" shall be accepted, and the older view be entirely surrendered.

The writer believes that this is all wrong, and he has written this book to say why. He has considered the positions of such extremists as Krutch, Barnes, Samson, Sellars, Max Otto and Bertrand Russell, and the positions of men less extreme such as Julian Huxley, Haydon, Schmidt, Murry, S. Alexander, Overstreet and Joad—the positions, too, of men like Ames, Wieman, Montague and Brightman, friendly as the last-named scholars are to the theistic emphasis. He is frank to confess that he has found in the writings of these men nothing which seems to him to render untenable that view of God which Christianity has always assumed, namely, Purposive Mind and Creative Will, infinite in Goodness, Wisdom, and Power. As much can be said for the view to-day as ever has been said, and nothing is being said against it that has not been said already. Neither theism nor atheism can expect to be original. The case for both has been stated long ago. We can do little more than state the same case in our own way, and advocate our choice as best we may.

But we might as well face the fact that the attack on God in the sense defined—and that is the only

kind of God that really matters—is in the end an attack on religion. There is no need to question the sincerity of those who think otherwise. They were brought up in the theistic faith, and the religious attitudes thereby produced have remained even when their original support has been withdrawn. But to assume that these same attitudes may be produced in others who are told from the outset that the theistic faith is false and unnecessary, reveals an amount of optimism which one person at least believes to be unwarranted. If no one else is logical here, Krutch is, when he declares that a Godless world will mean a loveless world—and a loveless world will hardly be religious.

The issue is drawn. The threat to Christianity to-day is not at the point of this or that dogma. The threat is at its very foundation—God. If we cannot keep theism, we cannot keep Christianity: Leuba told us that some fifteen years ago. Every great Christian idea requires God for its validating. But it must be an adequate God. A half-hearted, apologetic theism will get us nowhere. Only a thoroughgoing theism will suffice. Nothing is to be gained by compromise in a life-and-death struggle for religion. The introduction of a conflict into the very bosom of God such as Brightman proposes will hardly win our philosophical atheists—the wild beast who is waiting to devour you will simply sniff contemptuously at the nice bone you throw him, and go on waiting—it will not help the difficulties of the great host of perplexed and earnest seekers, and to the convinced theist it will appear as little short of fantastic, with all the drawbacks and none of the advantages of

Zoroastrian dualism. What the nature of things necessarily puts asunder—God and Evil—let not man join together. The belief in *any* kind of God—Wieman's as much as Inge's, Montague's as much as Sorley's, Brightman's as much as Hocking's—involves the exercise of both reason and faith. Since in order to find God at all, we must go—Wieman notwithstanding—beyond the bounds of sense-experience, why not go all the way? It costs a lot to have God, but the cost of a little one is the same as the cost of a great one. And if this be denied, then let it be said that a God every way adequate makes a less demand on reason and faith than is made by any one of the discrowned gods now being introduced into the modern Pantheon.

Can We Still Believe in God? This book has been written in the confidence that we can—if we will. It is a frank and unabashed statement of the faith of our fathers concerning a God who is real, a God who is adequate, a God who is available. There is probably nothing in it that has not been stated before. To many this will seem fatal; they will have nothing that is not new. Perhaps not—but in that case they will have very little. They may turn to the writings of the men whose names were mentioned above. Indeed, thousands have already done so, and they have been captivated by their cleverness, their wit, their brilliancy, their plausibility. The nontheistic humanist and the *quasi*-theist can present a good case, and oftentimes they reveal a deadly earnestness which one cannot but respect. But there is here, after all, no great answer to the greatest of questions. As always, men are asking, "Is there God?" and too

often the answer is either a downright "No!" which is at least intelligible, or a half-hearted "Yes—a sort of one!"—which only more deeply confounds the confusion. There are, however, still those who have not bowed in the house of Rimmon. Such living voices as those of Hocking, Sorley and Temple, of Inge, Pringle-Pattison and Knudson, of Leighton and Streeter, of Lyman, Bell, Raven and W. R. Matthews, of Titius, Heim, Barth, and among the last but by no means the least the voice of A. E. Taylor, are still to be heard in the land. The present writer acknowledges to them, and many others like them, his own deep obligation. He can only hope that their voices will continue to be heard, and that they will be followed, and that they will help us to

"Fill up the gaps in our files,
Strengthen the wavering line,
Stablish, continue our march,
On, to the bound of the waste,
On, to the City of God."

Much that is written in this book has been discussed by the writer with the members of "The Drew Seminar Club of New York," a group of men organized for graduate theological study. It has been his great honor to be their leader for nine consecutive years. They are men beset by all the difficulties of ministering to churches under the present conditions. We have had our differences, but we have all agreed that the modern danger is not that there shall be "too much God," but that there shall be too little. There could have been no greater privilege than that of association with men such as these—

men who are bearing the heat and the burden of the day, and the privilege is here gratefully and humbly recognized.

The notes appended to each chapter are intended as helps to the professional student. In the case of foreign works, the references are to the standard translations, where these exist, although in one or two instances the translations have been made directly from the originals.

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CHAPTER I
THE RIGHT TO BE CERTAIN

THE ARGUMENT

FAITH in the reliability of experience is indispensable as a condition to arriving at truth. We exercise it at one point: then why not at another? If God is only a "probability," then we have no right to claim absolute certainty of any other fact. On the other hand, if certainty on the ground of experience is a possibility at all, there is no proper reason for excluding religious experience as yielding certainty. Experiences differ because realities differ. The nature of the experience is congruous with the nature of the reality. The experience of God is a real experience, but it is unique in kind because God is himself a unique form of reality. The truth of the experience does not necessarily involve the truth of all the deductions that have been drawn from it, but it is self-sufficing for those who have it, and it has empiric support in the fact of all else that it may bring to pass. The God who is only a "probability" to philosophy therefore becomes a "certainty" to religious faith. Skepticism may continue to offer its objections—as serious as they are for reason as for faith—but though the objections may be difficult to answer, the man who has met God in experience can always say, "I have known."

CHAPTER I

THE RIGHT TO BE CERTAIN

CERTAINTY concerning God is our human right, but the entrance upon the right is not an easy matter. It is by much tribulation that we enter the Kingdom. There is, of course, the short and direct path to God offered by religious faith. But while such a faith yields its own kind of certainty, it necessarily involves many other considerations which it becomes the province of reason to explore. Faith and reason must work together if the mind is to have complete satisfaction, and if its convictions concerning God are to be placed beyond the reach of successful assault. Reason can always question faith, but faith can always supplement reason. Reason can create a probability, but faith can transform the probability into moral certainty. When Brightman says that belief in God is at most "a rational working hypothesis," and when he supports his position on the ground that "there is an element of faith and of logical completeness in all human knowledge," the second statement—although it is apparently not intended to do so—takes all the sting out of the first statement.¹ If the most we can get *anywhere* is "probability," as Brightman, following Carneades and Butler, is quite willing to concede, then the fact that we can get only probability concerning God is not in the least surprising. But we may very easily concede too much. Great names to the contrary notwithstanding, probability is not the final resting-place of the human mind,

for it does not represent the limit of its achievement. The man who says there can be no certainty because the mind arrives at its goal by the help of faith and takes steps beyond the power of pure logic either to follow or to support, introduces a fatal and quite unnecessary skepticism into the very heart of existence. He says, in effect, that there is always a possible question mark after the loyalty of his best friend; that every human deed, by whomever performed, may have a different significance from that which it is claimed to have; and that the experiences which have given him the deepest satisfaction may always be supposed to rest on false assumptions. Anyone who has made only the most elementary study of the process of human experience can see that *theoretically* we all ought to be skeptics, just as *theoretically* we all ought to be "solipsists"—that is, ought to believe not even that "we have only each other," but that "I have only myself." No man can "prove" the existence of anybody else: for that matter, he cannot prove his own. To whom would you prove your own existence? To another? But you cannot prove *him*. To yourself? But to prove your existence to yourself you have to assume the very self you seek to prove. The circle is simply unbreakable—in strict logic. But who really worries about that? Who does not realize that these theoretical difficulties are dispensed with for all practical purposes by the actual business of life itself? Who says that you are not you, and that he is not he, and that stars are not stars, and that prayers are not prayers, just because the philosopher can come along with his "metaphysics" and his "epistemology" and propound a lot

of unanswerable riddles? I "probably" exist. You "probably" exist. This is "probably" a book. You are "probably" reading it. You are "probably" wondering what it is all about. This all sounds very silly. If experience yields us no certainties, why waste our time in canvassing experience? If we cannot believe or know or act until we have answered satisfactorily every question the philosopher or psychologist can think to ask us about the proposed belief or knowledge or action, why bother trying to believe or know or act at all? The business is altogether too complicated. And then to think that for all our pains we get only a question mark!²

There is no intention here to deny the large place that probability must necessarily hold in human life. All that is being claimed is that there are degrees of probability, and that in innumerable cases the probability is enough of a certainty that we can live by it without the least uneasiness, without any disturbance, without any fear that we may turn out to be mistaken. It would be an interesting spectacle to watch a thoroughgoing skeptic (except that there is no such creature) and an individual who makes the ordinary presuppositions about experience, sit down together at a well-spread table—say at the annual banquet of a philosophical society. The skeptic is determined to take no chances. He looks first at one dish and then at another. How does he know that *this* is not tainted, or even that *that* has not been deliberately poisoned by some unkind "experimental empiricist" who is unwilling to accept any "truth" on the ground of mere tradition, but will find out for himself? Since he does not know, and since "proba-

bility" is not sufficient as "a guide to life," the skeptic turns sadly away from the table, while his neighbor, entirely disregarding of such theoretical scruples, satisfies his hunger—and lives to return to his classroom. The second man treats the probable as the certain, and the event supports him. There may be occasions when this will not be so. Life is full of hazards. But this does not mean that we have no right ever to be certain. We do have that right. We exercise it continually. We could not live on any other condition. We do not live by mere postulates, and hypotheses, and hopes. We do not live even by probabilities. We live by certainties, and the evidence that they are certainties is just in the fact that we do live by them. Again and again we say, "I know." And if we be asked by the theorist, "How do you know that you know?" we are justified in replying with some impatience, "How do you know that I don't know?"³

It is not being suggested that the case for God is as simple as the case for the most casual of objects or facts. If the case were as simple as that, the value that God has for life would largely disappear. That is worth the most for which we have to fight the hardest, but it does not follow that that for which we have to fight the hardest remains therefore the most uncertain. "Hardly ourselves we fought through." But that only means that there were difficulties to be overcome. Does the prize decrease in value according as the contest increases in severity? "Must I be carried to the skies on flowery beds of ease?" If God is the most real of all facts—as he is—then there may be most said against him, for the more a truth increases

in its range the more the considerations it must take account of. God is the Last Fact: therefore all other facts exist relatively to him. God is the Ultimate Truth: therefore all other truths derive their truth from him. To explore God is, therefore, to explore everything. To be certain of him is, therefore, to be certain of much else besides him. And—if we dare say it yet—to be certain of just one fact or of just one truth is to have taken the first step toward certainty respecting that great Fact and that great Truth which are God. The mind that can know a little can know much. The mind that can believe one thing can believe many things. Certainty respecting God is a rational possibility. But it involves the use of all of our powers—"mind and heart according well." Man rises to his height when he affirms God and knows what kind of God he affirms and why he affirms him. The affirmation is his consummation, his "Everlasting Yea."⁴

There is reality and there are realities. Reality is the sum-total of realities. Realities differ in their character, and the process of experiencing them likewise differs. We do not come at all things in the same way. There are diversities of experiences because there are diversities in their causes. We find one thing in one way, another thing in another way. But the certainty can be equal even although the route be different. The certainty that fire burns is not arrived at by the same method as the certainty that the arithmetical total equals the parts, or the certainty that the colors are beautiful, or the certainty that the sounds are melodious. When it is said that in each case the method is experience, that is allowed,

but it will be added that experience involves interpretation. The mind has to pass judgment on the meaning of the experience. One experience is held to witness to one set of facts, another experience to a set of facts of a different kind. If we say with Kant that all that we are sure of is the experience itself, and that its causes forever remain hidden, well and good. Only, the consideration applies to experience of every type—as much to the experience of the objects on the table as to religious and æsthetic experience. Or if we take the much sounder position of Lotze, and regard the nature of the cause as revealed in our very experience of its effects, then we shall say that different types of experience call for different causes—more exactly, for different kinds of reality.⁵ *Is there a type of experience of which the correlative is that reality we call God?* It is on that question that the issue finally hangs. If we eliminate the experience, then it becomes true enough that “God is only a hypothesis,” and, as a matter of fact, philosophy as well as science has shown itself very well able to get along without the hypothesis. It is true that philosophical and even scientific reasoning may be advanced in behalf of the hypothesis, as will be shown later, but reasoning of this kind can never get farther than the offering of two alternatives. The counter-argument can never be entirely done away. Or if it is done away, it will be because of the testimony of a type of experience that falls outside the province of philosophy and science. One who never gets beyond the “hypothetical” God never gets beyond the philosophical realm. One who says that he “declines to be forced into the position of finding

either a God whose existence is completely certain or no God at all,"⁶ is, in effect, saying that he declines to give full weight to the testimony of religious experience. Either there is a God or there is not. That there *may be* a God can be shown by reasons that would be called good respecting any other fact: we therefore get our "probability." That there *is* a God is the testimony of religious experience, the experience being held to require a correlative in reality just as much as any other type of normal experience: we therefore get our "certainty." The philosophical hypothesis becomes the religious reality when the conditions for the transformation are met.

Lippmann is therefore right when he says that a religion that is not completely certain is in process of disintegration.⁷ Brightman takes issue with him, but not successfully, because of his entirely wrong assumption that complete certainty requires complete proof. All that complete certainty requires is *sufficient* proof; proof comes by experience; and while, as was said before, experience requires interpretation, the interpretation may be as fully warranted in the case of religious experience as in the case of any other. We shall see later that many things have been held to be "proved by religious experience" which were very far from that. Statements made *about* God are not to be put on the same level as the indubitable certainty of the fact of God as yielded by the process of religious experience. A man may be certain that he loves his wife and just as certain that she loves him, and yet be quite unable to pass an examination in "the physiology of love," while another man may pass the examination and still know nothing what-

ever of what it means to love or to be loved. Love brings its own certainties, and love is an experience involving and justifying its own interpretation. The blindness of the lover to the imperfections of his beloved does not invalidate his love. We may smile at his rhapsodies, but we cannot deny his experience nor its correlate in reality. God is as he is. We may be guilty of all kind of error in our attempt to characterize him, at the same time that we may be absolutely certain of the fact we are trying to characterize. Men of religious faith, therefore, need to be wary of taking too seriously the attacks on the reality of God made by those who admittedly have not that faith. It is true that many earnest-minded thinkers to-day are endeavoring to keep some semblance of faith—"faith in value"—and some semblance of religion—"the religion of humanity"—while yet utterly repudiating the fact of God in any adequate sense.⁸ But these men, on their own showing, do not find in such faith and religion "complete consolation"—to use Lippmann's phrase. Anyone who reads Krutch, Russell, Holmes, Huxley, Sellars, Barnes, Otto, and Haydon, and many others who write in similar vein, cannot fail to detect the note of poignancy in their utterances. It is with them exactly as Lippmann says. But why should those who have come to religious certainty have to surrender their certainty at the behest of those who not only do not have it themselves, but calmly assert that it is impossible? "I know until you ask me." Is there anything wrong about that? We are repeatedly certain beyond the range of our power to state to another the reasons for our certainty which would be—as reasons—convincing to him. Be-

cause we cannot convince him does not prove that we are wrong. Instead of our being disturbed in our certainty by his uncertainty we ought to see to it that he is disturbed in his uncertainty by our certainty. The positive always has an advantage over the negative. The very fact that there can be a man who declares himself to be "very sure of God," and whose assurance is evidenced in his whole demeanor, so that instead of prating about "building on a foundation of unyielding despair" he builds upon a foundation of buoyant confidence—the very fact of even one such man ought to suffice to give pause to the unwilling unbelievers, in spite of their numbers. They at least might inquire—especially since they are so scientific—whether he does not actually have something that they have not found. It is not fair to dismiss the case with a gesture, the more so when it is not simply one man, but great hosts of men who are so sure of God. *For we have evidence.* The evidence may be of a peculiar character. It may have about it an esoteric quality which the hard-headed regard with suspicion. But there are some places in life where man must stand alone. There are some experiences which must be immediate if they are to be known at all. One inner fort there is, wrote Francis Thompson, whose key only God holds, whose gates open only to his nod, whose floor he alone can tread.⁹ When God takes possession of that inner fort, the soul knows it, and there is nothing more to be said.

"Whoso hath felt the Spirit of the Highest

Cannot confound, nor doubt him, nor deny;

Yea, with one voice, O world, though thou deniest,

Stand thou on that side, for on this am I. •

"Rather the earth shall doubt when her retrieving
Pours in the rain, and rushes from the sod,
Rather than he for whom the great conceiving
Stirs in his soul to quicken unto God.

"Ay, though then thou shouldst strike him from
his glory,
Blind and tormented, maddened and alone,
Even on the Cross would he maintain his story,
Yea, and in hell would whisper, 'I have known.'"¹⁰

God merely a working hypothesis? For philosophy—*yes*. For religious faith—*no*. God a complete certainty? For philosophy—*no*. For religious faith—*yes*. "The God who answers, let him be God."

Nothing that has so far been said is intended as a reflection on the philosophic temper and purpose. Far from it. In what is to follow, the fullest use will be made of what help philosophy can give. Indeed, the very reason for the insistence on religious certainty is that philosophy may be compelled to attend to a fact that is too often overlooked. The philosophy that cannot find God should treat fairly the religious faith that can. If we follow Plato in describing the philosopher as not merely "a lover of wisdom," but also as "a spectator of all time and existence," then the philosopher who ignores the testimony of religion and fails to consider its significance is less philosophical than he claims to be. Philosophy is inclined to treat rather lightly the religious view of things on the ground of its being credulous and dogmatic. Religion has had its share of credulity, but it has hardly monopolized it. The most astounding single claim the modern world has been asked to accept is that human intelligence has emerged as the

final issue of a process which becomes less intelligent the farther back it reaches, until eventually it is lost in a chaos where there is neither life nor feeling nor thought. 'This may be acceptable enough as a mere description of the surface facts: it is as far as we have a right to expect science to go. But what shall we say of the philosophy that takes it as a *sufficient* account? Hobhouse is mild when he says that regarding such a description as a final explanation is "due to an imperfect development of critical method."¹¹ What many men do not seem to appreciate is that the descriptive statement simply cannot be true unless much else is true as well. And yet they will believe without apparent effort the statement which, standing alone, is so utterly incredible, and stigmatize as mere credulities the other statements—especially those concerning a creative and purposive God—which are necessary to save their own belief from being the most complete *naïveté*. For certainly there can be no more serious indictment of human intelligence than that it should be satisfied to explain itself in terms of the unintelligent!¹²

There are, fortunately, an increasing number of thinking men who are coming to realize that an interpretation is not adequate which consists simply in refunding what is admittedly higher back into what is admittedly lower. The scientific materialism of a past generation was less worthy of the mind of man than the crude supernaturalism against which to some extent it was directed. For the supernaturalist did at least believe that a man was bigger than the world in which he found himself: to quote a famous description from a somewhat similar connection, he

was "a being to whose fate a mysterious and terrible importance belonged, on whose slightest action the spirits of light and darkness looked with anxious interest, who had been destined, before heaven and earth were created, to enjoy a felicity which should continue when heaven and earth should have passed away."¹³ Anything even approaching such a dignified conception of man's ultimate significance was quite beyond the materialist. Popular thinking always lags behind the scientific, so that while there are many encouraging signs that contemporary science is coming over to the side of the angels, or at least is beginning to recognize that there may be such a side, the popular mind is still very largely under the influence of the older scientific point of view. Others sowed the wind, and we are reaping the whirlwind. It is useless to blink the fact that we live in a time when a cheap view of human life prevails. Not necessarily a cheap view of life as an economic or political or biological entity, but a cheap view concerning its ultimate reference.¹⁴ The arriving at an adequate view of this ultimate reference is a philosophical undertaking. The man of religious faith, indeed, may come upon it as an intuition; but even then, the intuition itself will still need some validating if it is to be used as a clew to a larger interpretation. Our age has no greater need than for the wider dissemination and acceptance of that philosophy which, taking note of all time and existence, offers an interpretation of the whole according to its highest discoverable term, and finds that term in the human person conceived as a rational and ethical being and the possible subject of religious experience. Such

an interpretation leads to God, himself rational and ethical, as clearly as that may ever be done by pure thought.¹⁵ Is God the proper implicate of man? Is the life-process at one and the same time human upreach and divine down-reach? Are there moments of mutual discovery as between God and man—moments when God has the man and the man has God? These, surely, are questions of far-reaching import, and there are still those who are prepared to answer them affirmatively. Such affirmations do not necessarily mean mere dogmatism. They do not mean that the difficulties have not been considered. The theist knows where the question marks may be put just as well as the atheist or agnostic or humanist does. "The specters of the mind" do not appear only to doubters and unbelievers. It may very well be that the man who has gone the highest in these matters has also gone the lowest. "In that he went up, what is it but that he first of all went down?" To lead captivity captive requires that you shall yourself have been a captive. The price of an *anabasis* (ascent) is a *katabasis* (descent).¹⁶ It has more than once been said that the atheist is led by his reason and the theist is not. Not only is that not the entire truth, but it overlooks the fact that many a man has at last, after much tribulation of mind and heart, come to the belief in God because he could see no other way of saving the rationality of the universe. In that case, God is a conclusion arrived at by ordered thought. Alone, that may not be enough, as we have already shown, but it at least gives "probability." For some men it gives more than even probability: they are as sure as they can be of anything that the ration-

ality of the universe and the fact of God stand or fall together. Thus the much-discussed statement of so keen a contemporary thinker as W. E. Hocking, that "the ontological argument is the only proof of God," the only argument which is "wholly true to the history, the anthropology, of religion."¹⁷ Explanation involves a reference to something other than what is being explained. The reason for any "this" is in a "that," and the "that" must always be adequate to the "this." The principle involves finally the self-explanatory and hence the self-existent. It is, of course, often urged that while the idea of necessary existence is inescapable, the universe in its entirety is such an existence: in its parts it is contingent, as a whole it is absolute.¹⁸ The reply to this can be drawn from scientific thought itself. For are we not being told to-day that the characteristic of the universe is change? Nothing "stays put." The Heraclitean flux meets us everywhere. Change in the parts means a changing whole, and a changing whole changes with reference to something not itself. Stated simply, a changing universe is a dependent universe, and therefore cannot be an absolute. Yet an absolute we must have in order to be able to give an intelligent account of things. That absolute is God who, himself self-existent, self-sufficient, and, as Spinoza would say, "self-caused" (*sui causa*), maintains all else. Knowing no law but the law of his own being, he gives the law to all else. Himself the utterly independent, on him all else depends. He knows no change. A changing God would be a dependent God, and a dependent God would not be God. Something apart from his will would control him—some Fate, some necessity,

some "eternal givenness," as Brightman puts it, which at once irritates and limits him—and such a God is not only philosophically unsatisfying, but he cannot be the object of man's absolute trust and devotion.¹⁹ There are eternal laws of reason because there is an Eternal Mind. There are eternal laws of right because all-knowing Eternal Mind is also all-holy Eternal Will. The words of Antigone expressed a great truth:

" . . . The infallible unwritten laws of Heaven,
Not now or yesterday they have their being,
But everlastingly, and none can tell
The hour that saw their birth."²⁰

Separate these laws from God, as was attempted by even so great a Christian thinker as R. W. Dale, who makes God "the first Subject" of eternal law, in whom "the eternal law of righteousness" in particular is "made alive," and the result of the false abstraction is a quite unnecessary confusion.²¹ There would be no eternal laws if there were no eternal God, no unchanging laws if there were no unchanging God, no absolute laws if there were no absolute God. The first great Fact is God: all else is commentary. We follow Lotze: God is the universal Lawgiver, hence must "transcend" the law that he gives at the same time that he must be its unchanging and inexhaustible source.²²

In all this we are but anticipating what will be said later at greater length. Its immediate reference is to the claim that God can be nothing more than "a rational working hypothesis." Thought and faith combine to affirm that *God is Fact*. The religious

faith that does not go that far does not go to the full length of religious possibility. One would not wish to be unkind, but it is difficult to understand why men who neither believe in a Beyond nor believe in the possibility of conscious commerce with it should still claim to have a practical interest in religion. "A Religion of Humanity" is a contradiction in terms, if "humanity" is used as excluding all reference to or belief in "Deity."²³ Modern nontheistic humanism is either not a religion at all or it includes more than simply humanistic elements. One suspects that the humanistic head lags behind the humanistic heart—which is a fault one finds it not difficult to forgive, even in men who make a fetish of being "rational." Better an error of the understanding than an error of the fundamental purpose. Loving men, serving men, living "the good life," is not the same as being religious, although a religion that does not include all these is sadly deficient. Religion means God: we shall speak later of the so-called nontheistic religions.²⁴ Certainly, the higher ranges of religious life and experience are impossible where there is ignorance as to God or uncertainty about him. Prayer, trust, submission, service, worship, communion—these are of the very essence of religion, and they all proceed with reference to a Reality—shall we now say a Personal Reality—an "Other." You can hardly pray to a hypothesis, worship a postulate, confide in a process, serve an abstraction, and hold fellowship with a law. Or at least, if the time should come when you suspect that this is what you are really doing, you will at once cease doing it. Religion is nothing if not sincere. "A man cannot cheat about faith," says Lippmann,

with characteristic incisiveness and unanswerable finality.²⁵ This insistence on the relation of religion to life and reality is not made because of any supposition that men will surrender all their idealisms if they should cease to believe in God. The supposition would be as untrue as unkind. Many of the normal fruits of religion may grow from other than religious roots. "Grafting" is not confined to the greenhouse and orchard. What was originally nourished by religion may enter into the social heritage and be accepted by those who ignore the origin or even repudiate it. Nevertheless, many of the most precious fruits of religion must cease to flourish when God is surrendered—God, that is, in the sense of a Reality upon which man may lay hold and which may lay hold upon him. The proof of the statement is in the present condition of affairs in religion, and in the confessions which one meets on every hand concerning the real religious loss arising from allowing uncertainty to take the place of certainty.

The modern religious teacher needs nothing so much as to recover the note of assurance. There is a deadly menace to the very thing he is presumably seeking in the apologetic note that too often creeps into his utterance. He can hardly expect to convince others when he himself exhibits a manifest uncertainty. Nothing is quite so pathetic—or quite so futile—as a man recommending a cause in which he does not himself wholeheartedly believe. "He that doubteth is damned"—to ineptitude. When the blind follow the blind, the ditch awaits them both, and to-day the ditches are full. Nobody cares to be in a ditch—not even the ditch-digger himself. The posi-

tion limits the activities and restricts the horizons. Besides, after a time ditches become putrid. "Much offal of a foul world comes their way." It takes little acquaintance with contemporary life and thought to convince one that men are becoming weary of the ditches. They will follow those who will show them a way out. The much-acclaimed indifference to religion covers a deep wistfulness. When one reads such typical books as those which profess to glorify "the modern temper," or to give instructions to those who would engage in either "the quest of the ages" or "the quest for certainty," or to point out how we may have "religion without revelation" or "religion without God," or to assure us that "the gods" have come to their "twilight"—"and after that the dark," or books which profess to tell us that religion has at last "come of age" and what "the next step" is to be, and how "the free man" may still "worship" and how the disillusioned may still engage in "the conquest of happiness" while momentarily threatened by "omnipotent matter"—when one reads such books as these, one is not impressed that they will do very much to help the fallen out of the ditch. And when one adds to these such assertions, coming from the same general sources, as that "God is evolution," and that "God is process," and that "God is the principle of concretion," and that God is compact of "space and time," and that "God is the social consciousness universalized," and that "God is a problem to himself" as much as he is to us or as we are to ourselves, and that "God is a struggling Prometheus," and that "God is the upthrust in nature," and so on *ad infinitum*—when one considers assertions such as these one is

still more convinced that *not this way lies man's hope*. The modern wistfulness finds no great encouragement here. "Put our feet on the highway, restore to us our sight, give us sandals and a staff for the journey, show us the clear-shining goal!"—this is the cry that one hears arising from every side. Who will respond to the cry—successfully? Only those who themselves have found the confidence which others seek—confidence as to God.

Deep-seated human need is on the side of the man who speaks for God with the note of certainty. Even the most "modern" of men has moods when he realizes that the ancient questions still stand, and that the so-called new answers are not only not new, but are not really answers at all. For death is not the answer to life, the material is not the answer to the spiritual, the counsel to build manfully on despair is not a counsel promising much success. Not that the case cannot be presented with a certain impressive plausibility. If one were looking for an easy task, one would certainly defend atheism rather than theism before an unthinking audience. The greatest brilliancy goes with the superficial: mere brilliancy becomes less and less possible the deeper you go. Some of the cleverest contemporary minds are rehabilitating "the theistic disproofs"—if there can really be such. The religious teacher—indeed, every other man to whom God is real—has to take account of that fact. It takes less brains to point out difficulties than it does to deal with them, when the difficulties concern such facts as creative purpose, providential control, and the supernatural generally. These difficulties have always been known to exist;

they are as ancient as the faith itself. They have been expressed in one form or another from the beginning of reflective thought. Skepticism, cynicism, agnosticism, atheism, the lower naturalism—call it what you will—can never again be original. It has all been said. Let him who doubts that turn again to his Lucretius, his Celsus, his Lucian,²⁶ his Omar Kháy-yám. But not only has it all been said: it has also all been answered. All that can ever be said by men on the earth against God or for God has been said already, times without number. *And still men want God*—let the religious teacher remember that. No scientific advance can adduce a single new fact which can strengthen the case for unbelief. Even if J. B. S. Haldane's fantastic prediction should become true, and the human children of a hundred years hence be produced by "ectogenesis" (that is, independently of the mother's body),²⁷ an ultimate creative source could still not be dispensed with. A God who was able to survive a heliocentric universe and the theory of evolution will be able—if we may take our place among the prophets with Saul and Haldane—to survive even ectogenetic babies, for while they may not have woman for their mother they will still have God for their Father. Nothing that we can discover within the universe or that we can learn about the universe can change the character of its final testimony. The snug little universe of our fathers needed a God: is ours so big that it does not need one? That were strange logic. From one point of view, we know more about ourselves than our fathers knew about themselves, but no study of himself by man can change human nature, or the order of human experience, or

his insatiable curiosity concerning his origin and his destiny; it cannot take out of man the power to discriminate between the *is* and the *ought*; it cannot make him sufficient unto himself. The vast symbolism inscribed on the unfolding scroll of time and space will still continue to challenge him, and he will still continue to spell out its reference as being to something "numinous," to something that is awful, to something ineffably great. Philosophy is born of wonder, and because man cannot cease to wonder, he cannot cease asking questions and trying to answer them. But even although we say this, and even although we believe that man carries within himself the guarantee of his own final discovery of God, we still have to confess that there is no lack of popular skepticism. There is a feeling abroad that the bases of religious faith have been rendered intellectually useless. This is the challenge of the age to the religious teacher, but it is the teacher's opportunity as well—because the heart of man still cries out for God, and he who speaks for God, knowing whereof he speaks, will find a response.

But will the word be spoken. W. R. Matthews believes that the main question before the world to-day is "whether or not the majority of men shall continue to believe in God."²⁸ If they are so to continue, it will be by the help of the testimony of those other men who can say, "I know." The most convincing man is the man who is himself most convinced. Men will follow a confident leader—as the soldiers of Italy once followed Garibaldi. Are there still a few men who are as certain of the fact of God as they are of the fact of themselves, who know why they are cer-

tain, and who can tell others so? Then let them speak. "The spirit of the Lord is upon them, because he hath anointed them to preach good tidings." They will need that divine endowment, for theirs is no easy task. Where they are so certain, others are uncertain, and they have not only to vindicate their own certainty, but they have to make it contagious. They have not only to affirm the fact of God, but they have also to show what the fact must mean for life—if it be accepted. They will have to risk the criticism of the unbelieving. They will have to remember that the one Man who was most sure of God paid for his certainty with a cross, and was still sure of God—of his love, of his wisdom, of his power—even when for a brief moment he could not find him near, and cried out that he was forsaken. They will have to affirm that there is no human interest on which the reality of God does not bear, no questions for which that reality does not have its own implications. The man who is sure of God, and who is set in the world to help others find a similar assurance, will claim the right to scrutinize all philosophy, all science, all art, all education, all morals. The one thing he cannot do is to treat his belief as though it made no practical difference. Again and again his belief will compel him to command men, "Go not that way; go rather this way." He will oppose a philosophy that leaves no room for God—saying quietly, but finally, even dogmatically, "*It is wrong.*" He will oppose a science that so far forgets itself as to declare that man is wholly of the earth. He will oppose all art, whether it be of painting, of sculpture, of music, of drama, of literature, that offers an interpretation of life which

degrades or discounts Goodness. He will oppose an education, whether in theory or in practice, which claims to be adequate while yet nowhere making provision for the spiritual interests.²⁹ He will oppose a morality which sees in a man only a biological specimen, or only a social nexus, or only a political entity. He will not offer this opposition in the name of a set of dogmas, man-made as they are, and temporal as they therefore must be. He will offer it in the name of the God who has spoken to him by the sign of the burning bush, and who by such a sign commissions his messenger to go to whatsoever tyrant keeps God's people in chains, and cry, "Let God's people go!" And if it be charged that the claim thus to speak for God and interpret his will is still dogmatism, let it be so. What else than dogmatic can that man be in whose soul the voice of the Eternal—"I Am That I Am"—has been heard? He will be as dogmatic as atheism, as dogmatic as materialism, as dogmatic as naturalism, as dogmatic as nontheistic humanism, as dogmatic as any of the numerous contemporary voices which are being raised in behalf of the degradation of man. Only, he will be dogmatic with greater right than any of these. He has a better case. He has the support of more facts. He drops a deeper plummet and he flies a higher kite. He ventures farther and he takes greater risks; and because he ventures farther he has more to say, and because he takes greater risks he comes back with greater gains to share with less venturous souls.

Such a religious teacher as has been described will be challenged, and properly so, to vindicate his stand. The severest intellectual effort will be none too good

for this. In the pages that follow more will be said as to how this vindication may proceed. But through it all, let it not be forgotten that intellectual effort alone will not yield the certainty of God. The certainty must come—if it come—through an indubitable experience of God himself. Without it, the religious teacher is handicapped: he is weak at the point where he most needs to be strong, and no strength elsewhere will make up for this weakness. But if he have this certainty for himself, then, indeed, does he have something to present and something to defend. He will speak as one having authority, and not as the scribes; and he will bring forth out of his treasures—treasuries of the mind which “hold like rich garners the full-ripened grain,” treasures of the heart “whose beating blood is running song”—he will bring from such treasures “things new and old.”³⁰

Yes! as to God, the most inescapable of all presences, the most real of all facts, we have the right to be certain.

NOTES ON CHAPTER I

¹ *The Problem of God*, pp. 25-26.

² See the philosophical writings of A. J. Balfour, *A Defense of Philosophic Doubt*, *The Foundations of Belief*, and *Theism and Humanism*, for a clear statement of this predicament. The danger of forcing it, however, is very clearly shown in A. S. Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy*, pp. 59-65.

³ Cf. Krutch, *The Modern Temper*, chap. vii, on "The Phantom of Certitude," for a criticism of the idea that men may attain certitude in high matters.

⁴ "Love not pleasure: Love God. This is the EVERLASTING YEA, wherein all contradiction is solved; wherein whoso walks and works, it is well with him." Carlyle, *Sartor Resartus*, bk. ii, chap. ix.

⁵ *Microcosmus*, Eng. trans., vol. i, bk. v, pp. 552-553. "For however unknown, yea, unknowable, we may pronounce the quality of anything to be, if the name 'quality' is not to be a quite meaningless arbitrary designation of the essential content of things, but to denote it (at least formally) with precision and significance, the unknown quality of beings must possess the characteristics peculiar to every quality as such. But we know only the qualities of sensation; from them alone is the universal notion abstracted. . . . We form our conception of supersensible qualities entirely on the model of the sensible ones with which we are familiar."

⁶ Brightman, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

⁷ *Preface to Morals*, p. 49.

⁸ Cf. Joad, *The Present and Future of Religion*. Joad retains the term "God" but empties it of all definite content, equating it vaguely enough with "values which are divine" (pp. 277ff.). See also his *Matter, Life, and Value*, pp. 353-368. How much may be embraced under the magic

term "value" is shown in pointed fashion in Ward, *Philosophy of Value*, chaps. ii and iii. See the section on "Is God Value?" (pp. 199-212), for Ward's strong constructive conclusion. Schmidt, in *The Coming Religion*, doubts if theism can continue, and in his description of "The Religion of the Future" (pp. 250-259, and cf. below, pp. 216-221, etc.) he says not one word as to God; yet the book contains a moving appeal for the preservation and deepening of all those "values" which in the past men have generally supposed required the fact of God. Cf. Höffding, *Philosophy of Religion*, Eng. trans., closing words of paragraph 89, where God is defined as "the principle of the conservation of value within existence," and where the conclusion is drawn that in that case any man who works to maintain value is "a child of God."

⁹ *The Fallen Yew*.

¹⁰ F. W. H. Myers, *St. Paul*.

¹¹ *Development and Purpose*, first edit., p. 244. Haeckel stated and defended the view a generation ago in *The Riddle of the Universe*, but it was characteristic of what passed in the nineteenth century for scientific naturalism or materialism. Its roots are in the Greek Atomists (see *A History of Science*, by Dampier-Whetham, pp. 23-28), and among the ancients Democritus gave it classic expression in *De natura rerum* (see introduction to Eng. trans. by Cyril Bailey—Oxford Press). Many contemporary scientists are raising their voices against the view, for example, Whitehead, in *Science and the Modern World*, chaps. i and vi (cf. Overstreet, *The Enduring Quest*, chaps. i-viii), but that there are many who still accept it may be inferred from the whole temper of such a book as that of Krutch, *op. cit.*

¹² See Lynn Harold Hough, *Personality and Science*, espec. chap. ii, for a brilliant criticism of this paradox.

¹³ Macaulay, *Essay on Milton*, the section describing the Puritan.

¹⁴ Cf. the remark of Krutch, *op. cit.*, that human nature must continue to exist precariously and upon sufferance "in a universe not made for it" (p. 82).

¹⁵ See Knudson, *The Philosophy of Personalism*, for the best study we have of the history of this claim in philosophic thought.

¹⁶ For a striking contemporary illustration of this, see C. A. Raven, *A Wanderer's Way*. The caliber of Canon Raven's mind in other respects is revealed in his *Creator Spirit*. See also Loisy, *My Duel with the Vatican*, but cf. W. M. Horton, *The Philosophy of the Abbé Bautain*, the chapter entitled "The Odyssey of an Ardent Soul."

¹⁷ *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, p. 307. Cf. what is said on the same page about the movement of the mind to God consisting in "some leap from idea to reality."

¹⁸ Hume, *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, discusses this question. See *Works*, A. and C. Black edit., Edinburgh, vol. iv, pp. 489ff. Höffding, *op. cit.*, defends the thesis that it is impossible for human thought to close the series of concepts or causes. The causal series may as well be infinite as not (see pars. 5-10). The curious work of W. H. Gillespie, *The Necessary Existence of God*, is an argument based on the infinity of space and duration as conceptions which we cannot escape but yet which are unintelligible without an Infinite Being, God. See espec. part xi.

¹⁹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 126-138. Cf. Knudson, *Doctrine of God*, pp. 272-275.

²⁰ Sophocles, *Antigone*, lines 450-458. Eng. trans. by Lewis Campbell.

²¹ *The Atonement*, lect. ix.

²² *Op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 377-382.

²³ The great religions that conceive the Beyond impersonally, and the Neo-Platonists and medieval mystics who refused to attach to the Beyond any specific determinations, do not fall under this stricture. The Beyond is

for them simply too great to be defined in human terms. Schmidt, *op. cit.*, p. 16, seems to overlook this.

²⁴ See below, pp. 216-221.

²⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 49.

²⁶ For a well-informed discussion of the *Dialogues* of Lucian of Samosata (2nd cent., A. D.), Lynn Harold Hough, *The Artist and the Critic*, lect. iii.

²⁷ See *Dædalus*, pp. 65-68.

²⁸ *God in Christian Experience*, p. xi.

²⁹ Cf. H. H. Horne, *This New Education*. Horne argues cogently that an education which does not include religion is deficient and gives an incomplete life. "We conclude that we have religion in education because it belongs there, and it belongs there because it belongs in life" (p. 204).

³⁰ See Heim, *The New Divine Order*, Eng. trans. by E. P. Dickie, espec. the introduction, for a brief but striking statement of the possibility of moral certitude. Heim has caught the Barthian emphasis, but has avoided the extravagant Barthian paradoxes.

CHAPTER II
THE UNIVERSAL SOVEREIGN

THE ARGUMENT

ANY attempt to "explain" the universe must begin with the assumption that it need not have been. We ourselves are so many facts, and the universe as a whole confronts us as a fact with which we have organic relations, so that but for it we could not be. But just as no one part, animate or inanimate, of the whole may be said to be necessary, so neither may the whole be said to be necessary. In that case, the whole—the universe—is dependent, and a dependent universe calls for a Creator. But the Creator must be free if his act is not necessary, and a free Creator will also be sovereign. His own nature is the final determinant of all his action. His will in greater or lesser degree is everywhere expressed. But for him, nothing could be; but for his will, nothing could come to pass. The difficulties arising from this are to be admitted, but the only final solution of the problem that these difficulties raise is in holding fast to the sovereignty of God, and in adding that the sovereignty is allied to Goodness, since a universe that has in it both evil and good will exist primarily for the sake of the good.

CHAPTER II

THE UNIVERSAL SOVEREIGN

THE only God who can be made finally intelligible is a God who is absolute Sovereign. Even polytheism had eventually to make provision for one God who gave the law to all lesser gods.¹ Similarly in the Vedantic philosophy there is recognized, as Höffding expresses it, "that which makes the gods," the final principle of existence. Western thought has for the most part believed that there is—indeed, that there must be—an ultimate Will, with reference to which all else is to be understood. The one indubitable fact about any life is that it had no choice in the matter of its own existence. Life is pure gift, and the truth of the statement is in nowise changed by any knowledge we have as to the process whereby a given life comes to be. From one point of view the most significant things about ourselves are just those things we do not choose—and life itself is only one of these. There is a determinism that is profound enough: all that redeems it from being absolute is the fact that it is a determinism within which are set the conditions for responsible and deliberate choice.² Life at the level of self-consciousness is the most challenging of all realities, yet with a pitiable blindness we tend to take it for granted, and to lose our sense of its wonder. When we consider all else that it makes possible it is amazing enough, but its intrinsic nature is always more impressive than its own achievements or its own

influence. That there can be an amœba is a fact full of deep mystery. Connect that amœba how you will with the human mind, it still remains that the mind is as much more mysterious than the amœba as it is greater in the range of its powers.

The scientific description of the life-process as a movement from lower to higher has fostered a tendency to explain the higher wholly in terms of the lower.³ Coleridge, who set himself against the materialistic philosophy of his day, saw the fallacy here. He described it as "a sophism," consisting in "mistaking the conditions of a thing for its causes and essence."⁴ The slightest reflection will show that Coleridge was right. Because there cannot be life except as there are certain conditions, including in more or less degree the nonliving, does not mean that these conditions can be equated with life. Indeed, we shall come far nearer to a true philosophy if we say that it is life that explains these conditions rather than these conditions that explain life. If, as Lawrence Henderson says, the environment is fitted to life, why may we not believe that the final reason for the environment is that life also might be?⁵ It is the principle of classical Greek thought—that the goal sought is determinative of the method used. Certainly, the very least we can ask of the cause of all things is that it shall not be lower in kind or quality than what is admittedly the highest feature of the "all things" that are to be accounted for. This ranking place must be assigned to mind, and, as far as we are concerned, to mind arrived at the human level. Mind is either to be explained by Other Mind or to be explained by that which is not mind.⁶ We have to

make a choice, and the choice will reveal our whole philosophical outlook. What is being claimed here is that the first alternative is more rational than the second. The theist may not be able to "prove" God, but he can at least say that the supposition of God offers a reasonable explanation of the fact and the course of the world, whereas the denial of the supposition forces the nontheist to some other explanation which simply does not explain. Atheism is the supreme irrationality.

If mind requires Other Mind to account for it—more exactly, if man is inexplicable without God—then man is the issue either of God's free will or of his necessitated will. No adequate philosophy of creation is possible on the ground that creation could not but be. Only a dependent universe can be philosophically construed, and a dependent universe means a creative God whose act the universe is.⁷ If God is not free, then he is not God; and if he is free, then is he sovereign as well. As unfree, he would be subject to something other than himself, and such a God would be less than we could conceive God to be, and this we cannot accept. A free Creator is one who knows no will but his own, and who recognizes no obligation except that which arises from his own nature. "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven" is a prayer that touches bottom not only religiously, but philosophically as well. It is easy enough to say things about the divine sovereignty which make God out to be essentially a despot. The great theological necessitarians like Augustine, Duns Scotus, Calvin, and Edwards—and their modern successor in Karl Barth—may have gone to extremes of statement

which to us seem repellent. Yet at the center of their thought was an undeniable truth—the truth that man has nothing which he does not owe to Another, and therefore that he has no rights except those which are secured to him by the very nature of that Other to whom he owes his all.⁸ In the end the rights of man will have to be seen to have their ground in the rights of God. The case for man and the case for God are parts of one and the same great whole of thought. One does not improve man's case by getting rid of God. There is nothing that cannot be asked of man and for man if God be surrendered that cannot also be asked of him and for him if God be retained—except that in the latter event there is a promise of fulfillment which in the former event is entirely lacking.

Nor does it follow from this claim as to a free and sovereign God who made us without our consent, and who even, as Matthew Arnold expressed it, "gave our choice the law,"⁹ that we are entitled to "talk back" to him—and this is said with full appreciation of the great "questioning spirits" of the race. Rebellion against God is utter futility. The rebellion of Prometheus was against one whom he believed to be in effect a usurper—against a false God in behalf of the true God. In that respect, Prometheus is the noble prototype of a noble line. We may properly enough rebel against what we regard as a false idea of God, or against a false claim made in the name of the God we take as true, but rebellion against the God whom one actually believes in, if it be possible at all, involves an inner self-contradiction, and must end disastrously. In principle, this is "the sin against

the Holy Spirit": it is treating contemptuously that which at the same time we believe claims and deserves our reverence. The God against whom we rebel is proven thereby to be a deposed God, so far as we are concerned—and a deposed God is no God. As Höffding points out, gods are abandoned only when they have ceased to be effective.¹⁰ Which is to say that a God must be sovereign or nothing. When you can rule your God, your God has ceased to rule you. To induce divine action by meeting the prescribed conditions of that action is to make the most complete recognition possible of the divine sovereignty. Was not one of the chief arguments of the Old Testament prophets against idolatry the fact that idols—"strange gods"—were sometimes fickle and sometimes helpless?¹¹ The tragedy of a deposed God is a common theme of the poets, and the poets, with characteristic insight, have always seen that the deposition of one went with the coronation of another: the new God was more truly God than the old God.¹² The young English woman who, having seen the horrors of the World War, is represented to have said: "If God could have prevented all this, and would not do so, then when I see him I'll spit in his face," said something that was bizarre rather than courageous. Her real thought was that she did not believe God could have prevented it. A God in whose "face" one could "spit" would by that sign have ceased to be one's God, and the act would have no other significance than that. You could spit in the face of your devil, or even in the face of somebody's else God, but not in the face of your own God. What is all this but another way of saying that the only God one can

completely believe in and completely trust is a sovereign God, or at least a God believed to be sovereign?¹³ The illiterate but shrewd countryman who, having listened to a thoroughgoing Calvinistic sermon which robbed men of all control over their destinies, replied emphatically, "But the people won't stand for it," spoke very much to the point. For it was not sovereignty that he was objecting to, but a God unworthy of sovereignty because he misused it, and the listener simply would not have such a God as that.

The idea of divine sovereignty, however, even in the true sense, is admittedly not popular at the present time. God must apparently be elected by human suffrages. It is true, as has already been intimated, that as the man so the God, and more will be said later as to the necessity we are under to choose our own God—but for what other purpose would one choose God except to crown him? To choose him for any less purpose than that would be to choose him for something for which he would not be needed. An uncrowned God is an ornament, and hardly that, whereas God is justifiable only as a necessity.

It is difficult to understand the motive for modern speculation on a God who is adequate neither to the total cosmic facts nor to the full sweep of human nature nor to the highest reaches of religious experience. Why should a God who is complete Sovereign of the universe and of all human life be supposed to make a greater draft on either reason or faith than a God who never has the situation quite in hand, who is never quite sure as to what is going to happen next, and who, if he could be suddenly called upon to

give an accounting of his ways and means, might be found wanting? That there are perplexing problems born of the belief in the divine sovereignty goes without saying, and we shall need to give them serious consideration, but they are much less perplexing than the problems which are born of its denial. The theory of a "finite" God or of a "growing" God or of a God in any real sense impotent is not a sign of intellectual daring, as is so often assumed, but of intellectual hesitancy; at least, it is not, as Urban says, "an intelligible conception."¹⁴ Men come upon a wilderness in their thinking, and instead of resolutely setting themselves to find or make a trail across the wilderness, they throw up their hands in despair. Instead of conquering the wilderness they allow the wilderness to conquer them. Modern Manichæism, as represented in even such high-toned thinkers as H. B. Alexander and Brightman, is a sign that men have found certain aspects of the world too much for them. Practical difficulties and intellectual difficulties have this in common—that they exist to be overcome. In the words of Arthur Hugh Clough, they alike "Call to us, 'Come and subdue!'"¹⁵ But a traveler has not subdued a mountain who simply turns his back on it, nor has a thinker subdued, say, that formidable Mountain of Difficulty, "the problem of evil," who at last despairingly concludes, "God cannot help it." God would indeed be "a problem to himself"—Brightman's curious phrase—if he is involved in a situation whose conditions he did not originally prescribe and whose outcome, therefore, he does not certainly know. The modern situation respecting belief in God will not be helped by men who trim and veer and edge, fearing to

make large claims, affrighted by the voices that shriek all around them, building for themselves a hut on the sand when they might build a castle on the rock, failing of the dauntless spirit that sets the slughorn to its lips and blows the blast of victory, reversing the noblest utterance of one of the world's most tested souls to make it read, "I will not trust him, lest he slay me." Perhaps in the end it will be the untrusting who make up the number of the slain! If somewhere amid the uncertainties of life there is not a point of absolute certainty, then are we of all men most miserable. Is not Hocking right, that it is only "the presence of a Changeless Absolute" that could "set us wholly free to grow"?¹⁶ A sovereign God not only answers more intellectual questions than a God who is not sovereign, but he makes possible to those who believe in him an inward peace and certitude such as the soul of man has ever craved. The philosopher may, of course, reply that so far as he is concerned, this latter is no consideration; but such a reply, deeply considered, reveals a most unphilosophical frame of mind. A philosopher need feel no disgrace in confessing that he is a human being, with the characteristic human needs and desires. Has not even Bertrand Russell written a book on *The Conquest of Happiness*? And if it be said that belief in a sovereign God merely serves as an opiate, encourages acquiescence in the *status quo*, cuts the nerve of effort, and the like, the objection breaks on the undeniable fact, so clearly shown by Troeltsch, that the most aggressive nations of the modern West were precisely those nations in which the Calvinistic theology was regnant.¹⁷

A conspicuous feature of our time is the supposition that the older and larger the universe is seen to be, the more difficult the belief in God becomes.¹⁸ Isaiah could write his glowing periods because his universe was "snug" and "friendly." Had he lived to-day, he would have found it less easy to talk of a God who "hath measured the waters in the hollow of his hand, and meted out heaven with the span, and comprehended the dust of the earth in a measure, and weighed the mountains in scales and the hills in a balance,"—one who "sitteth above the circle of the earth, . . . and stretcheth out the heavens as a curtain, and spreadeth them out as a tent to dwell in." This, we are told, was easy and natural rhetoric in a prescientific age, but the geologist, the astronomer, and the biologist have conspired together to render it impossible for us. We look back, and there is no discernible beginning; we look up, and there is no discernible limit. "How," men ask, "can there be a Will equal to all this?" They do not seem to realize that it is a question of choosing between alternatives, and that the denial that "all this" is accounted for by a Will only forces us to another choice which may be much less rational—unless, indeed, we refuse to choose at all. But apart from that, what shall we say to the logic that contends that it would be easier to believe in God if there were less for God to do? We need to see that whatever explains the small also suffices to explain the great. The problem of the burning coals in the fire-grate, around which we gather to find warmth and cheer, is in the end the same problem as that of the sun itself whence the earth draws its light and heat. Heat is heat and

light is light, whether it be little or much: the mystery is not as to the quantity, but as to the quality—the thing itself. The dance of electrons that yields the flashing jewel on a lady's hand is just as challenging a fact as that dance of electrons that yields Betelgeuse. Why should our minds be staggered by a millennium, and then take an hour for granted? It is no more wonderful that there could be the one than that there could be the other. The problem of time is the same whether we are dealing with æons or with seconds. Or why is distance supposed to become more baffling according as it grows greater? Whether two objects in our experienced world are, as we say, a yard apart or a million light-years apart, the fundamental principle involved is identical in each case, and that is true on either an "objective" or a "subjective" theory of space. The microscopic and the macroscopic are equally challenging, and the law of the one, so far as mere existence is concerned, is the law of the other. It is difficult to see why minds of the caliber of S. Alexander should be unable to postulate God, conceived as the Primal and Creative Intelligence of which all other existences are forms and expressions, but should be able to postulate with the most complete intellectual ease an original principle called "Space-Time," and treat it, sheer abstraction as it is, as the "raw stuff" whence all else, including finally God himself, proceeds.¹⁹ Certainly, not all the credulity belongs to traditional views. Making the purely formal aspects of the universe, space and time, the creative power of the universe is little different from making the stage-furniture the cause of the play. Or what is mere bulk and magnitude? Size is neces-

sarily relative, and whether we call anything big or small depends entirely on what we judge it by. A towering mountain may arouse in us emotions of awe and wonder, and this is as it should be, but a single rock, a handful of coral, a tiny hillock is, each in its own way, as much an expression of absolute wisdom and power, as much a challenge to reason, as is a mountain—it “teases us out of thought as doth eternity.” We cease to be astonished by that which we can control, forgetting that any kind of control involves the discovery and application of law. The limitations here are the limitations imposed by our own nature and its permitted knowledge and power. It is neither scientific nor philosophical to deny that that kind of control which we in our small way continually exemplify could be extended to include the whole universe.

It is, therefore, equally fallacious whether we say that our fathers believed in a sovereign God because they did not know so much as we do, or that the universe has become so big that there cannot be a God equal to it.²⁰ What is significant is not the mere size or age of the universe, but the fact of it. The God who is equal to the so-called little is also equal to the so-called great. Indeed, it would be just as true to say that only a God who was equal to the great—the very greatest—would be equal to the little. And if, as we must do later, we turn our thoughts from planets to prayers, from suns to saints, from æons to anthems, we still find the necessity for a God who is always greater than our greatest thought of him if the most impressive deed of man and therefore the most impressive fact in the universe—man’s

recognition of Another—is not to sink to a mere delusion. Though science has “discountenanced” prayer, nevertheless “men still pray,” as Richard Roberts laconically says, and we shall not only agree with him that “the spectacle of a man on his knees” is the empiric fact with which the study of religion should begin,²¹ but we shall also claim that it is a fact which no philosophy can afford to ignore if it aims to give a complete account of reality.

God, then, like every other existence, has rights, the rights that go with the intrinsic nature. In the case of God, they are the rights which belong to him as the eternal creative source. It is no proper objection to such an idea of God that it is ancient. It is customary to say that the changing ideas of God are due to changes in the social, political, and general cultural status of men. Shailer Mathews has recently developed in a rather striking way the thesis that the idea of atonement is shaped to the “thought pattern” of the given period.²² The principle is being extended to what men have at different times said about God. For example, the idea of God as King is due to the fact that men lived together in kingdoms under an earthly ruler. The idea of a Sovereign whose word was law was possible only because despotisms became actually existent on earth. Therefore, since we are now living in a democratic age, we must have a God who is a democrat and not an autocrat.²³ There is truth in this claim that the known necessarily influences our conception of the unknown, but the application of the truth may easily be exaggerated. Even a democracy endeavors to find a common will, and it invests that common will with authority—on occa-

sion, shall we not say, with absolute authority. "The right of eminent domain" is recognized in the most democratic of states. In other words, the figure under which we express the Ultimate Power, whether father, king, social will, fate, or law, in nowise affects the *reality* of the power we thereby attempt to describe. When one considers the claims that have been made in modern times in behalf of natural law, one hardly needs to apologize for regarding God as a Sovereign Will. Men profess to find the idea of an omnipotent God intolerable, but they appear to have no difficulty in accommodating their mind to the idea of an omnipotent Law. If it comes to that, one would better be subject to the absolutism of a personal God than to the absolutism of an impersonal law, the more so if the central fact in the nature of such a God is that he is good.

If God be rightly understood as the Creative Will, then he has the right to determine the nature of his own creation, and the conditions under which it shall be carried through. "It is he that hath made us, and not we ourselves." One sometimes gathers that there are certain people who feel that God should have consulted with them before he made them! They appear to have a grievance against the whole scheme of things. Few more pessimistic accounts of the world and its ways have been written in recent years than by Joseph Wood Krutch in *The Modern Temper*. He assures us that we have come to the place where we have no more reason to suppose that our life has a purpose than it could be supposed of itself by the insect of a day.²⁴ The curious fact is that those who agree with Krutch in his philosophy of despair seem

quite satisfied to go on living, and he justifies them in it. He himself sees small enough hope for the future, but there are many who follow him in his claim that we are fast hurrying toward "a Godless universe" who nevertheless are hopeful that the world can be "made better." Indeed, on their own showing, a world without God is "better" than a world with God. But anything that can be made better is not wholly bad, and if there is in the nature of things an intrinsic possibility of improvement, it ought not to be so difficult as our modern pagans claim it is to believe not only in a God, but also in a God who has a purpose of good. Meliorism—the doctrine of improvability—separated from theism is no less a faith than theism itself: in fact, without theism it is no more than a hope with small enough promise of realization, as Krutch does not hesitate to admit.²⁵ To accept no other account of man than that he has come to be by impersonal processes, to interpret man's history as itself an advance from lower to higher, to entertain the hope that this advance will continue, and even to labor zealously to that end—to do all this is to suppose that history, the whole life-process, is subject to some law of progress more or less absolute, and those who make the supposition seem to experience no difficulty in doing so.²⁶ But when this law is identified with the will of God, protests begin to arise. An age that can accept without a question a mechanistic philosophy professes to be pained at the suggestion of a universal and sovereign Will whose activity is precisely those laws which, when conceived as self-explaining and self-acting, are so deeply revered. No medieval saint ever worshiped more fer-

vently in the temple of his God than some moderns worship at the shrine in which they have elevated law to be "king of kings and lord of lords." It seems to be permissible to be a determinist so long as nobody is responsible for what is determined, but to equate the deterministic influences with the chosen method of a sovereign God—this is to lay oneself open to ridicule as a hopeless traditionalist. Rights are freely assigned to such mere concepts as law, energy, concretion, integration, matter, process, libido, value, or whatever else you will; but it is incredible that such rights should belong to a Creator who knows what he is about, and why. There is evidently sovereignty somewhere, since there is a coercive and imperative character about life and its experience that can neither be denied nor successfully resisted. At every turn we are confronted with absolutes. "Thou shalt" or "Thou shalt not"—"Thou canst" or "Thou canst not"—"Thou mayest" or "Thou mayest not"—they hammer on our ears incessantly, yet so purely humanistic a thinker as Haydon assures us that amid all these imperatives it is our business, even our privilege, to "make ourselves at home."²⁷ Apparently we are the subjects of a vast tyranny. We are bidden to obey, but no rational account can be given of the authority. We simply find ourselves set down in a world driven by forces utterly blind, utterly unintelligent, continually achieving ends while yet having no ends to achieve. Everything is biological. All that matters is that the vast cosmic machine shall be kept going. There is no reason for man's life. He has just been thrown up temporarily by the favorable conjunction of impersonal forces.

Yet he can "look before and after." He may choose among the imperatives, and some of them he may resist entirely, and some he may subject to others because he regards these others as of higher worth. Nevertheless, ultimately he has no more significance than "the insects of a day," no more even than the insensate sod beneath his feet. He has been produced by that which is less than he; he bows to an authority, but it is of his own making; he builds for what he conceives to be a better, but his fairest achievement will be snuffed out as a candle. Then what a dupe is man—the sport of meaningless circumstance, driven hither and yon like dead leaves before the winds of autumn, "a pestilence-stricken multitude"—the subject of a vast cosmic hoax, a hoax too cruel for smiles and too stupid for tears!

There is a way out of all this confusion—a sovereign God. Believing in a creative Will compels us to retract nothing as to the conditions under which life is lived. We can still appreciate the majestic sweep of the universal movement. We can still speak of the law-abiding character of phenomena, of the universality of the causal relation, of the interdependence of all reality, of the low issuing in the high, of the coercive features in the environment of every life, of the immanence of all the past in all the present, of desirables that are yet impossibles, of inscrutabilities that baffle the keenest insight, of "over-historical" and "over-social" and "over-individual" forces—Eucken's terms—that bring about results which none intended or foresaw—we can still speak in ways such as these, and then we shall make our speech intelligible because we shall see in all this the chosen

method of the creative Will.²⁸ Failing that, these ways of speech are simply *not* intelligible. The jargon of modern naturalism is impressive enough, but it is mere description without underlying explanation. The belief in a sovereign God who has the right to use his creative power in the ways he deems best fitted to achieve his purpose—this answers to every feature of life no less adequately than nontheistic naturalism, and in addition explains those higher reaches of existence and of experience as naturalism never can. And if the demand be made, “But *explain* your sovereign God,” the retort courteous will be proper: “*Explain* your proposed substitute for him.”

One thing at least is done by belief in a sovereign God which is not done and cannot be done by naturalism—the introduction into the scheme of things of the element of hope as defensible and rational. Bertrand Russell made no mistake when having bowed God out he took despair in.²⁹ Certainly there is nothing but despair to build on if there is nothing but impersonality at the basis of existence. Consistency is not the greatest of virtues, but a little of it may reasonably be looked for. Yet what measure of consistency is there in cultivating hope in the midst of an impersonal world, in believing in moral values and working for them in a situation held to be wholly mechanistic, in offering judgments of either approval or disapproval on the course of events at the same time that the existence of an absolute moral standard is being flatly denied? The man who, like Harry Elmer Barnes, believes in “the good life,” but who has no proper view of the profound organic relation between the good life and the body of conditions

which make it possible and by which it is actually achieved, is to be commended much more for his heart than for his head.³⁰ He believes in an idealism for which he can find no adequate ground in the nature of things. His idealism is therefore an alien element. It has no real right in the world. It is literally a "defense mechanism"—a deliberately constructed illusion designed to keep the mind from facing the actual facts. Idealism with such a basis necessarily lacks a final guarantee. Either moral values are intrinsic to the universe or they are fastened upon it as paper flowers are fastened on trees in winter time. But if man is the issue of nature, man's highest capacity is likewise the issue of nature. Man as capable of acting morally—which is the least that can be meant by "the good life"—will therefore be an achievement of that great whole out of which man has come. So that Sorley is right when he says that the claim that moral values have no cosmic reference is inherently fallacious.³¹ Whatever can happen in the world, whether it is called good or whether it is called evil, can happen only because there is provision for it in the very conditions of existence. But because evil is provided for does not mean that evil is the final purpose of the conditions that make it possible. The final purpose is good. You can explain evil by good, but never can you explain good by evil. Von Hügel admits that evil in the world is the greatest theoretical difficulty for theism, and yet he rightly insists that it is this same theism which evil seems to deny which alone holds any real promise for the final defeat of evil.³² While, therefore, the presence alike of good and evil in the universe com-

plicates our problem, it complicates it much more for the man who does not believe in a sovereign God than for the man who does. The unbeliever recognizes good, and often himself desires it, but he is quite without any ultimate philosophy of goodness. In fact, he can only speak of evil as well in a purely relative way. If the world is Godless, what is the point of railing against its inequity? In what sense can the impersonal and the mechanical be unjust and cruel? It is incredible that good can have final significance in a universe that is not grounded in good, but it is not incredible that a universe that is grounded in good and that seeks good should have evil as a by-product or an accompaniment of the process. If, however, good is assigned this ultimate character, then a teleology of good is inescapable, and a teleology of good without God—that is, a theory that makes good the purpose and goal of existence, but has no mind that projects the purpose and no Will that moves toward the goal—such a teleology is possible only on condition that we stubbornly refuse to think clearly. If naturalism, the explanation of all things by reference to natural law, charges theism with being blind to the significance of evil, is not theism entitled to charge naturalism with being blind to the significance of good? The quite generally accepted hope that “somehow good will be the final goal of ill” is rational only as there is a sovereign God. The very fact that men work for the good is evidence that they believe in the good and that the forces of life may be harnessed to their aim. Then why is not the conclusion justifiable—that the hope of the persistence of the good and of its final triumph

must lie in the fact of a God who purposes it and provides for it and supports it, and who constitutes men so that they desire and seek it? Meliorism, the doctrine that life and its conditions are intrinsically improvable, is made rational only by belief in God. Still to hope after such a belief has been surrendered is rather a tribute to a certain fine indomitableness in the will than evidence to any marked clarity of thinking. A striking illustration of this is in Joseph Wood Krutch's call to us to "die as men" rather than "live as animals," even although he assures us that "our cause is lost and that there is no place for us in the natural universe."³³

The choice, therefore, seems to be between allowing the dark facts of life to rule out altogether the idea of a sovereign God who is also good, or regarding these facts as but part of a larger whole and to be interpreted in its light. The first alternative still leaves the facts themselves untouched, except that it shrouds them in a yet deeper gloom. The second alternative lets fall on at least the edges of these dark facts a little light—enough to save reason from staggering, enough to prevent hope from quite falling by the way.

NOTES ON CHAPTER II

¹ See A. E. Taylor, *Plato*, pp. 489-493, for the sense in which Plato, working on a background of polytheism, is "the creator of philosophical theism." Cf. Glover, *Progress in Religion to the Christian Era*, chap. vii, on "The Great Century of Greece."

² See Hocking, *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, rev. edit., for a clear discussion of the two factors of determinism and choice, espec. chaps. iii, vii, ix, xi, xiv, xxi, xxvi, and xxxvi.

³ See Sellars, *Religion Coming of Age*, pp. 173-177, for a good example of this tendency. "Modern thought," says Sellars, believes that it is "entirely feasible" that the lifeless may explain the living. The case is stated in a much more satisfactory fashion by Lloyd Morgan, in *Life, Mind, and Spirit*, in which, espec. in chaps. iii and x, he works out more fully some of the implications of his *Emergent Evolution*, chap. x dealing with "Divine Purpose," which Morgan allows.

⁴ See *Biographia Literaria*, chap. vi, Coleridge's discussion, anticipating much modern criticism, of Hartley's materialism.

⁵ See *The Fitness of the Environment*, the closing pages, for a summary of Henderson's position. Cf. also the introductory chapter of his *Order of Nature*.

⁶ For a statement of this position that stands as a classic, see John Caird, *Philosophy of Religion*, chap. viii. Caird's thesis, that of the Neo-Hegelians in general, is that "Finite Spirit or Mind presupposes Infinite Spirit or Mind."

⁷ See W. R. Matthews, *God in Christian Experience*, chap. x, for a suggestive treatment of the thesis that God is independent of creation because, while he is under

necessity to create, being a Personal Spirit, he yet freely chooses *what* to create (p. 208).

⁸ See W. P. Tolley, *The Idea of God in the Philosophy of Augustine*, chap. v, for a clear statement based on a firsthand study of Augustine at this point. On Duns Scotus, see Etienne Gilson, *La Philosophie au Moyen Age*, pp. 225-244. With Duns Scotus, says Gilson, "la conception chrétienne du Dieu infini et créateur arrive pour la première fois à une pleine conscience d'elle même" (p. 241). As to Calvin, anyone who has read his *Institutes* will realize that his main difficulty is in his acceptance of the authoritarian view of Scripture: his severely logical mind did the rest. See the whole of bk. i.

⁹ *Self-Deception*, stanza iii.

¹⁰ *Philosophy of Religion*, par. 45.

¹¹ See 1 Kings 18. 20-40; Psalms 115; Isaiah 44. 12-20; Jeremiah 10. 1-16, etc.

¹² Cf. Keats' *Hyperion*, which tells of the fall of the Titans—"Saturn . . . poor old King"; Shelley's *Prometheus Unbound*, which shows how the bound and suffering Prometheus at last deposes the tyrant Jupiter, who cries despairingly, "The elements obey me not"; and Mrs. Browning's *The Dead Pan*—"Gods discrowned and desecrated, disinherited of thunder."

¹³ Brightman (*The Problem of God*) is therefore right in saying that a God who is "a problem to himself" is also "a problem to us"; but when he still wants this doubly problematical God to be religiously adequate (as he does—see pp. 189ff.), he overlooks the fact that such adequacy needs just the metaphysical basis of a God entirely sovereign which he has surrendered.

¹⁴ *The Intelligible World*, p. 195. It is, of course, very far from being implied that books of the caliber of James, *A Pluralistic Universe*; H. B. Alexander, *Nature and Human Nature*; S. Alexander, *Space, Time, and Deity*; W. P. Montague, *Belief Unbound*, and Brightman, *op. cit.*, all of which defend such ideas of God, are lacking in

intellectual power. It is their thesis, not their treatment of it, that is being criticized.

¹⁵ *Hope Evermore and Believe*, stanza i.

¹⁶ *Meaning of God in Human Experience*, p. 187.

¹⁷ See Sleigh, *The Sufficiency of Christianity*, a study of Troeltsch, pp. 159-162, and the literature there cited.

¹⁸ Carr, in *Changing Backgrounds in Religion and Ethics*, pp. 73ff., states the case as it appears to one who, though he writes that natural science has made God more remote, even "more problematical," nevertheless still holds a form of theistic faith. Cf. Sheen, *Religion Without God*, chap. ix, on "The Fallacy of Inverted Relations."

¹⁹ *Op. cit.*, vol. ii, bk. iv, chap. i. For a brief criticism of Alexander, see Harris, *Pro Fide*, 4th edit., pp. xxxiv-xxxvi.

²⁰ Julian Huxley's autobiographical chapter, "Personalism," in *Religion Without Revelation*, makes it plain that it was his "biological training" as much as any other one thing that led him to his complete repudiation of a personal or, as he says, "supernatural" God.

²¹ *The Christian God*, p. 11.

²² *The Atonement and the Social Process*.

²³ Beckwith, *The Idea of God*, has much to say as to the idea of God "deriving its meaning from social experience" (p. 61). Cf. Ames' chapter in *My Idea of God*, ed. J. F. Newton, and chap. ix, on "God and the Self," in his *Religion*.

²⁴ See above, chap. i, notes 3 and 14.

²⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 52-53.

²⁶ See Haydon, *The Quest of the Ages*, espec. chap. v, and cf. Schmidt, *The Coming Religion*, chap. xii.

²⁷ *Op. cit.*, pp. 171-176.

²⁸ See Fairbairn, *The Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, pp. 55-60, for a concise statement of this position as held in philosophical idealism.

²⁹ *Mysticism and Logic*, pp. 55-57.

³⁰ See *The Twilight of Christianity*, pref. and chap. ix. Cf. the debate in the *Forum*, Sept., 1929, between T. W. Darnell and S. Parkes Cadman, on "Is Anything Left of Religion?"

³¹ See *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, espec. chaps. vii, viii, xi, and xx.

³² See *Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion*, first series, pp. 93-94.

³³ *The Modern Temper*, p. 249, the concluding words of the book.

CHAPTER III
THE INEVITABILITIES OF LIFE

THE ARGUMENT

THERE is no necessary antagonism between the conditions of life and the Sovereign Goodness of God. Things are as they are because God is as he is and because his purpose determines his procedure. The "end" accounts for the process by which it is being realized. Certain features of the process, especially the mal-adjustments that result in suffering and death, have led men either to deny God altogether or to regard him as "finite," "growing," "struggling," or otherwise "limited." The denial of God leaves these features as they are, and in addition is quite helpless in the presence of the intrinsic good of life. The limitation of God in any derogatory sense has the result of vesting with uncertainty the whole outcome of the cosmic travail. The God who is not sure of himself can guarantee nothing. The theistic faith does not deny the biological facts, but it sees in these facts super-biological possibilities, and takes the second as providing the meaning of the first. The inevitabilities of existence, therefore, whether of thought or of action, whether of the conditions of life or of the results of these conditions, are determined by God according to the requirements of a freely-chosen purpose.

CHAPTER III

THE INEVITABILITIES OF LIFE

WE have spoken of the rights of God as the creative Will, and of this as involving his complete power. But what is the *character* of the God who has these rights? The question has been answered by the affirmation that he is perfectly good.

Few men to-day who believe in God at all would claim that he was in any sense vindictive, or that there was in his nature some essential evil that on occasion came to activity. There are those, however, who while still believing in God deny to him perfect goodness on the ground that, like all other life, he is a learner in the school of experience. His imperfection is the necessary imperfection of a growing God — of “a changing God,” as Holmes says, “fulfilling himself in the changing processes of life.”¹ He is never quite equal to the total demand on him. While his goodness at a given time may be as great as his goodness could then be, conditions being as they are, it is still a goodness that falls short of absolute perfection. Thus W. P. Montague, while he is willing to allow an all-inclusive cosmic mind, nevertheless insists that as will it is finite: there is more knowledge than power.² God knows what to do but he cannot do it. A God who undertakes more than he can accomplish is hardly perfect in goodness.

It is not difficult to make out a plausible case for this claim, and it has been done many times.³ The

original reaction of any reflective mind to the varied web of existence is naturally one of this sort. The skeptic is entirely wrong if he supposes that his mood is unknown to those who are not skeptics. Many a saint has been driven almost to desperation by the insistent voices of doubt. The difference between the skeptic and the saint is not that the saint knows nothing of those "specters of the mind" which has produced the skeptic, but that he has "faced" them and "laid" them. Life is full enough of hazards. They confront equally the most favored and the most unfortunate. It requires no great gifts of imagination to discern them. *Sunt lachrymæ rerum, et mentem mortalia tangunt*: tears flow, however, not merely for some Æneas, but for all the millions of mankind. Many a man feels that he could have done a better piece of work with the universe than the Creator himself has done. If he does not believe that he could have made one free from all flaws, he at least believes that he could have made one in which the flaws would be far fewer. In any event, a better universe is conceivable and describable. The critic would have nowhere any conflicts or maladjustments. All natural phenomena would move along in perfect harmony. There would be no earthquakes, no tidal waves, no volcanic eruptions, no extremes of heat or cold, no physical hardships which men must overcome or perish. There would be no disease germs, no pain, no accidents, no death. There would be no limitations on the human reason and will—those limitations whence come the whole dark brood of error and sin. Every man would see in every other man his brother, so that such things as competition, jealousy,

hostility, war, would never even be dreamed of. This, in effect, is presented as the ideal world, and when contrasted with it the actual world seems to be a sorry enough piece of work. The world as we know it is described as everywhere shot through with imperfection. There is an evil in all life, and it is preferable to regard it as resulting from creative inefficiency than from creative intention. If the character of the workman is revealed in his work, then, as Hume maintained through the argument of Philo in the famous *Dialogues*, the Divine Workman cannot be held to rank very high.⁴

It should perhaps be observed, as a rather curious fact, that many of the most moving complaints against the world as it is have been written by men who were just as severe in their criticism of the traditional idea of heaven! When Holmes says that the world is characterized by the "maximum of pain" and that it is "evil in process," he is simply saying in a few words what others have taken whole volumes to say.⁵ Men who see only this side of things refuse to believe in the perfect goodness of the God who by the theory of creation is responsible for such a condition of affairs; they offer what they would regard as a desirable substitute for the world as it is, or at least they point out where it might have been improved; but when something resembling this substitute or proposed improvement is offered as the ultimate goal and the final reason for the vast cosmic and human travail, they declare that they could have no interest in personal residence in such a heaven. They are perfectly willing to work that something like this heaven may come about on earth, but apparently they want it only for

other people, not for themselves. These men, finding that life is surrounded by appalling difficulties, picture the desirability of a life from which the difficulties shall be absent. But when the Christian sings of "Jerusalem" as his "happy home," and asks when his labors are to end in its "joy and peace," he forthwith becomes the object of a good deal of scorn and contempt. Perhaps, after all, our chronic cosmic critics are much more satisfied with their lot than they pretend to be; perhaps they do not believe that the world is in quite such a mess as they claim it is; perhaps, on the whole, they are willing to take life as they find it—opposition, hardship, pain, tragedy, and all. To complain at earth because it is too hard, and to complain at heaven because it is too easy, would seem to bespeak a mind difficult to please. And it is always proper to call attention to the very great satisfaction that certain men seem to derive from pointing out how bad things are. Their very satisfaction depends on what they condemn. They could not write as they write nor speak as they speak except there were something to find fault with. Perhaps some day they will realize how wise that God is who guarantees our growth by guaranteeing our discontent. The simple truth is that God does not want us to be content: he "invites our criticism." But he invites it not for his own sake, but for ours, to inspire us thereby to seek that better which is his real will for us. One can believe that God is not disconcerted even by the bitter criticism of a Nietzsche, for did not the criticism inspire two Christian theologians of widely differing schools of thought to a fresh appraisal of their faith? John Neville Figgis, the

Anglo-Catholic, declares that we shall go on loving Nietzsche "even when he hits us hardest," and George Burman Foster, the American Modernist, wrote in a sympathetic study that the world needs Nietzsche as never before, and that the religion he represented—life, beauty, strength—"must not perish from the earth."⁶

Furthermore, whether the alleged imperfection of the world, with its entail of diverse ill for all living things, including man, is held to witness to a certain imperfection and impotency in God, or whether it is held to render invalid the idea of God altogether, in either case all just ground for complaint that the conditions of life are as they are is surrendered. If God cannot help the course of events because he is himself at the mercy of forces and principles and necessities that he cannot control, then he would seem to call for our pity rather than for our blame. Or if there is no God at all, then the bringing of a railing accusation against what is admittedly a blind mechanism is nothing but the most childish petulance—an animistic hangover, as when one curses the stone over which one has inadvertently stumbled. There is much more logic in the position of Bertrand Russell, who, having explained things as the result of "omnipotent matter" as it "rolls on its relentless way," thereupon calls man to a "proud defiance," and to play the part of "a weary but unyielding Atlas."⁷ We find, however, that the critic of the scheme of things quite often recognizes the proper issue of his own criticism, and devotes himself to the noble task of molding the sorry scheme. "nearer to the heart's desire."⁸ In this, as was pointed out before, he necessarily confesses to

the belief that improvement is a possibility. By what will he explain this possibility, if he has ruled out God? He will probably fall back upon the theory of an immanent principle of good—the “fundamental urge to the good life,” as Haydon puts it; or upon a theory of necessary evolution toward the higher, as the same writer seems to mean when he accounts for man’s questing for the good life as “a cosmic process come to consciousness and to capacity for purposive self-control.”⁹ There is no need to emphasize again how astounding a position this is for one to take who, in theory at least, can think this way back to a primitive chaos, itself quite unexplainable, out of which, by virtue of nothing whatever but the passing of time, all that we know to-day has come.¹⁰ What possible meaning can be assigned to either the term “good” or the term “evil” by one who takes such a world-view as that? Or if God be brought into the picture, but God conceived—as by Rolland, Wells, H. B. Alexander, Holmes, Brightman, and many others—as one who is growing in wisdom, power, and goodness, and who will some day attain to completeness in these and all other respects, what reasons can be given for believing such a God to be a future possibility which are more cogent than the reasons for believing such a God to be already a fact, and to have been that “from the beginning”? To suppose that there is “going to be” an all-sufficient God, but that there is not one yet, suggests a naïveté on the part of those who make the supposition which one can hardly credit. It unfortunately no longer means very much to say of a given theory of things that it is “bad metaphysics,” but if ever the phrase could be appropriately applied, it

would be to the position in question. In a word, whether one decides that there is no God at all, or that there is only a "finite" and therefore "growing" God, no light at all comparable to the light of a thoroughgoing theism is thrown upon those very facts to explain which is the reason why God is denied or why his wisdom, power, and goodness are circumscribed.

The denial of God naturally relieves the mind from a good many intellectual perplexities. The general problem, as to how there can be anything at all, still remains, but that remains on any view. The difference is that the theist can give it a rational solution. As was shown in the preceding Chapter, the man who denies God has no logical right to be perplexed by the fact of evil, but whatever benefit accrues to this is offset by the fact that he cannot account for good. It was also said that if he rejects God because he is oppressed by the nature of things, that nature still remains what it was before God was rejected. All the relief he gets is relief from the necessity of explaining how a world like this is compatible with a God of perfect wisdom and power. But such a man gains his relief at the expense of creating for himself the infinitely greater problem of how a being like man—rational and ethical as he is—could be the issue of forces themselves impersonal, mechanistic, nonrational, and nonethical.¹¹ Or if he attempts to make his problem easier, not by wholly denying God, but by circumscribing him—trimming him down, so to speak, until it becomes possible to relieve him from responsibility for the more baffling aspects of life and experience—he is still no nearer an explanation of

"the shadows in the picture." What real help is there in being told that only the good of life can be explained by God, but not its evil? If the evil of the world is too much for God to-day, what reason is there for supposing that it will not be too much for him to-morrow? Brightman's attempt at this point only pushes "the problem of evil" farther back: it does not solve it, any more than Milton, in *Paradise Lost*, solved it by assuming an evil outside of and before the world. Brightman speaks of an "irrational given element" in God, whose presence more or less "retards" his action, and is the real reason for the imperfection of the world, although it is some day to be wholly subdued. If this is so, are we to suppose that God's real motive in creation was to get rid of an "irritant" in his own nature? Or if that is denied, and God's creative act is still held to be entirely free, it is to be assumed that he knew how much he would be hampered by this "given," to what devices it would drive him, and what tragedies it would bring to pass in his world. Then in that case, God is just as responsible for imperfections that he "cannot help" as he would be if he could "help" them.¹² The view involves other difficulties. If God is "bigger" to-day than he was yesterday, does he become "smaller" the farther back we go into history? And if so, do we not necessarily come to a time when he began to be—if not as a bare existence, at least as a moral being? A God who began to be—a Creator who was himself created—what confusion of thought is this!

Still other questions are provoked by the view, but one refrains, except perhaps to ask how a God who has been equal to the vast processes of nature and

history on their supposedly positive and constructive sides is not just as well equal to those processes in their totality. A conception of God that is able to sustain the weight of all natural phenomena, of all historical movements, of all individual experience, of whatever kind they be, is not one whit more difficult to come at and to keep than a conception that carries less than the whole. A God who does not account — ? for everything does not account for anything. We can only revert to our previous claim, and say again that a God who does not account for evil does not account for good, while a God who accounts for good can account for evil as well. We cannot pick and choose among our facts. Existence and experience belong together, and an interpretation must be of the whole or of nothing. The God of a speck of dust is the God of the planets. The God of the baby's breath is the God of the hurricane. The God of the homes of peace is the God of the horrors of the battlefield. The God but for whom there could be no saints is the God but for whom there could be no "damned souls." Sir Henry Jones may have been unduly impatient in dismissing as "not worthy of serious criticism" the view of a limited and growing God, but it is not difficult to understand the mood.¹³ Life is full of inevitabilities, and from the stark horror of some of them we would fain hide our face. But a man is intended to stand up and look about him and report on what he sees, and, much supposition to the contrary notwithstanding, the believer in God seeks to do precisely this. The much-derided "traditional theism" involves no "facile optimism," as is so often charged. What it clings to is belief in a God who makes provision

for those very inevitabilities that seem to deny him, or at least to circumscribe and harass him, but who is at the same time a God whose will, seen in its total reach and purpose, these inevitabilities express and carry out.

God's nature, God's method, God's purpose—these belong together and involve each other, with the nature as the fundamental factor. If God is creative Will, we only say what that fact requires when we go on and attribute to him perfect power, perfect wisdom, and perfect goodness. An adequate interpretation of the total facts of life and experience brings us not merely to the fact of a God, but also to the fact of a God who is every way good. If he is good in himself, his purpose will be good. If he is wise, his method of achieving his purpose will be the best possible. If he is almighty, there can be no frustration of his purpose: any apparent failure at this point or that—for example, a completely reprobate soul—will be due to the essential nature of the method and the purpose. Almightyness and failure are not necessarily contradictions. They would be contradictions if what offered successful opposition to so-called almighty were merely the insensate and inert. But where a moral purpose involving the wills of free beings is concerned, almighty may meet successful resistance and still remain almighty. It may do that because the very resistance would itself be a gift from the almighty power.¹⁴

It has already been said in this discussion that God's motive in creation is to share with other beings the blessedness of existence. This, it must be admitted, is pure theory, but it is theory with practical

implications of great significance. Existence is intrinsically good, as is evidenced by the tenacity with which living things cling to it. The discounting of existence in certain Oriental religions is the result of an *a priori* philosophy which pays no heed to the simple testimony of nature. It is false logic which makes life evil because evil may attend on life. Lessen the evil, and how quickly the intrinsic goodness of mere existence makes itself felt! Then because existence is itself a good, the multiplication of existences involves an increase of blessedness. The more centers of experience there are, the more experiences become possible. There is a limitation, however, on the power of nature to sustain life. Species restrict each other, and nature restricts the species. The people to whom death is the ultimate mystery and the ultimate problem can certainly never have considered that without death the creative method as we know it would be impossible. How can death *per se* be a denial of God, or of his wisdom and love, when it is the very condition to an increasing sum of blessedness? As one considers the very nature of things, two alternatives seem to arise: either that the maximum of existences having been secured they should be kept in being indefinitely; or that provision should be made for the continual passing of individual existences and the continual coming of others. As between the two alternatives, the second is not only the one that is alone compatible with the assumed purpose of creation, namely, the largest possible amount of blessedness, but it is also the one that would carry the more weight even if there were no question whatever of a divine purpose. It were better that many

should live a little while and then make room for others than that a few should live all the time. What, therefore, seems at first sight to be the denial of life and the height of all tragedy—death—turns out on deeper consideration to be the very means whereby life increases. And not only is the increase merely quantitative; it is qualitative as well—unless, indeed, we are to surrender the basic principle in the very idea of evolution itself. But even if we waive the question of an increasing richness of experience in the animal world, we can hardly deny the fact that among mankind each succeeding generation benefits to some extent by its predecessor. An age that makes so much as ours does of the fact of heredity, of the plasticity and educability of youth, of the settling down of maturity into a routine of habit and an increasing inability or at least unwillingness to learn the new—such an age ought to see no great problem in the fact of human individual mortality. If there is to be birth, there must be death as well, and there must be birth if life is to make its fullest attainment. Death, therefore, appears as the very nexus of the cosmic movement, at least on its sentient side. If death were the penalty of an original “fall,” then we should have to say that the “fall” was sheer triumph for the cause of creation. A deathless world would have to be a world without any young in it, and who can imagine that? Who could tolerate it? Who could see in it any hope of improvement?

Life, we have said already, is pure gift. This is true from the lowest to the highest. No life can will its own existence: all it can will is its own death—and to do that is an “unnatural” act, involving the

suppression of the deepest of all instincts. What is given may be taken away. No living thing has a just claim to continue indefinitely. While a given individual may rebel against the limitation on the span of life, that limitation is the very condition on which the rebel would have come into existence himself. "It is hard for thee to kick against the pricks." If those before us had not passed, we could not have come; and if there are to be others besides us in the future, we too must pass for their sakes. The evolutionary process simply could not have continued without death. There must be either death or no birth, and there must be both birth and death as a condition, first, to the mere quantitative increase of the blessedness that goes with existence, and second, to the increase of that blessedness in its qualitative sense. The cave-dweller may have been just as *content* as the most cultured man of to-day, but few would claim that the latter's range of experience was not intrinsically more desirable, more valuable, and more significant than the former's.

It will, of course, be said that the problem is not simply with death as a fact, but with all that concomitance of suffering that goes with death, and, indeed, with life as well. Nor is the suffering confined to the given individual, either in life or in death, but it extends in the form of hardship or want or grief to other life. "No man liveth unto himself and no man dieth unto himself." The force of the objection is undeniable. Yet what have we here, after all, but one of the inevitabilities which is the price of the blessedness of existence?¹⁵ There is every reason to believe that descriptions of the terrible nature

of animal sufferings have been enormously exaggerated. We must assume that animals take for granted, so to speak, whatever happens to them. They never question their own experience; they never challenge the justice of things; they lack the imagination which, in man, pictures the desirability of a painless state or invests the act of dying with a dread significance. No one doubts that animals suffer: what is to be doubted is that their sufferings are the problem to themselves that they are to us.¹⁶ Whatever tragedy overtakes them, they have at least lived, and their death contributes to other life, even as their own life was a contribution made in the death of others. Francis Thompson, depicting himself as being called upon to surrender first one precious thing and then another until his very soul seems stripped, is constrained to cry out, "Must Thy harvest fields be dunged with rotting death?" The question admits of but one answer: "Yes, they must!"¹⁷

In the human sphere, the problem is naturally more urgent. But here, again, a calm survey of the total situation is not without a helpful result. The race of man is here because the life that preceded it made it possible, and made it possible by paying a steady tribute to death. The race makes its progress to richer and fuller life on condition that it continue the tribute. Only a perfect humanity can expect to be beyond the reach of suffering and death. John the Revealer saw a time when "death shall be no more," but first "the former things" will have had to pass away, and "the former things" are the evils of life. The thought tempts to speculation which must be avoided—but one at least gets a glimpse of vistas in-

conceivably long down which humanity must pass, not only as respects the present earth, but also as respects still other spheres of existence, on its way to its destined goal. But so far as the immediate stage of "the education of the human race" is concerned, it is evident that God wants little children. If there is one thing more than another that he has guaranteed, it is that there shall be procreation. We may have become somewhat sophisticated in these matters—another example of the tendency of science to outrun wisdom—but if nothing else will make us wise, we shall be driven to wisdom by the reflection that a childless race is a doomed race. It is on little children—let us even say on babies—that God stakes his whole creative purpose. If the supply of babies were to fail, God would have to resort to a miracle, or, humanly speaking, admit defeat. Little children imply so much. They imply fathers and mothers, brothers and sisters, hence homes, hence teachers, hence all those thousand ministries of each to each in which life finds at once discipline and joy, at once the fulfillment of the past and the promise of the future.¹⁸ A human babe is a new experiment. The ages are behind it to make it possible; still other ages are awaiting its contribution. Here is an original focusing of the universal life. The mold into which it flowed is never used twice. It implies not only the travail of a mother, but the travail of that Mother of us all—the universe. All of cosmic history is required to render a complete account of a human babe. But the babe not only "looks after": it "looks before" as well. It is not only a "consequent": it is also an "antecedent." Influences of incalculable sig-

nificance at once begin to play upon it and to be exerted by it. The most savage mother loves her babe; and what happens to the mother because of that love, who shall say? If mother love is purely "physiological," as we are being assured it is by certain modern psychologists, one can only marvel at the richness of content that can be put into that one word! But as the growing life takes its place in the manifold of existence, much may happen. It will suffer; it will make mistakes; it will experience grief and disappointment; it will find itself in a world full of difficulties. Yet these very experiences will have their own value. By means of them, the life will be learning to stand on its own feet. It grows less dependent, more independent. It learns that if it would receive it must also give. It finds in itself capacity for suffering, but suffering now not only on its own account, but also on account of others. It finds the possibility of existing otherwise than as simply a physical organism—of existing as well as a social and moral being; and it finds that for the purposes of this social and moral experience it may use every bit of its biological heritage in other than purely biological ways.

Now, the more clearly these superbiological possibilities—if we may so call them—come to light, the more the biological facts themselves become intelligible. Pain, hardship, calamity, want, disease, and the like, all fall in the biological order. A human being experiences such things as these because he is organic with what we may call the order of materiality: he is a physical entity, and he must take what goes with that. But the biological necessities

and experiences are the potential basis of a life of a higher rank.¹⁹ Hunger is a biological fact, but take out of the range of human experience all that is there simply because of hunger, and one sees at once that it is better that there should be hunger, with all its many dangers, than that there should be no hunger and, therefore, none of the efforts and achievements and satisfactions that it demands or makes possible. The blessings of hunger are more significant than the terrors of starvation—one must say that, even at the risk of being declared to be utterly callous—and the terrors are among the inevitabilities that attend on the blessings. Pain, too, is primarily a biological fact, but an organism that was painless would be painless because it was without feeling, and an organism without feeling would be condemned to the lowest possible level of existence. It was so great a sufferer as Sir Henry Jones who wrote, shortly before suffering ended his life, that the problem of natural evil is “relatively easy,” and that an affliction may in actual fact be “the most priceless element in a man’s life.”²⁰ There could be no pleasure if there were no pain, for both have the same physical basis—a nervous system. Not only so, but pain sets a condition for the manifestation of some of the greatest human qualities. This is not only true in the case of the sufferer himself: it is true also in the case of those who behold his sufferings or know about them. Suffering challenges men to put it away, and no tongue can describe all that is here because men have responded to that challenge. It would be sheer brutality to minimize the stark tragedy of it all. One would not be as the carefree butterfly “preaching con-

tentment" to the toad impaled on the tooth of the harrow. On the other hand, if we are seeking an interpretation of the facts of life, we dare not be blind to the testimony of all that which has come to pass because men and women and little children must suffer pain. The long story of medical and surgical science, than which nothing is more moving in the annals of mankind, could not have been written if man were simply a biological specimen in perfect adjustment with a physical world. It is proper enough to insist on the desperate character of the conditions against which men must continually fight: but it is no less proper to insist on the fact that *men do fight them*, and thereby promote their manhood. The inevitable maladjustments of life are the conditions to the fuller revelation of all that it is in man to do and to be. In the heart of every "fact" lies a potential "value," and the fact falls short of its final reason unless and until the value is found. We cannot escape the force of Sorley's argument for the essential inseparability of fact and value:²¹ the attempt to separate them, says Taylor, approving Sorley's argument, involves "a false abstraction."²² If Aristotle is right, that tragedy achieves its purpose according as there is an effective *katharsis* or purification of the emotions of the spectator,²³ then while human experience of necessity contains the tragic note, it is not tragedy unrelieved by hope. Indeed, creation seen in its total sweep and purpose is rather "a divine comedy" in Dante's sense than tragedy as ordinarily understood: at least, it is that high tragedy which is redeemed and justified, shall we say, in the very quality of the experience it pro-

motes. If it be true, as we have been saying, that life is intrinsically a good, then life advances in worth as it increases in range. Whatever is required to increase its range and to advance its worth finds in that circumstance its justification. Human life is life containing the potentiality of the fullest and richest experience. To give it that potentiality is the reason for its biological history—that history which makes any supreme experience of the soul continuous with that original act of the Creative Spirit whereby order began to emerge from disorder, life from death. Whether such a potentiality could have been secured under quite different conditions it is not for us to say, for we do not know. What we are faced with is the fact that the life-process in the conditions which have actually obtained have had this issue. If man is “the heir of all the ages,” and if, respecting his future, “it doth not yet appear what he shall be,” except that we have the hope that we shall be “like him” who is “the first-born among many brethren”—if this is so, then the ages are “justified of their children.” Is courage desirable? Then man must encounter hardship. Is service of one’s kind desirable? Then there must be inequalities in the human lot. Is hope desirable? Then life must be beset by uncertainties. Is faith desirable? Then the mind must know less than it is able to believe. Is truth desirable? Then one must be able to lie, since truth is possible only in the same conditions in which a lie is possible; just as heroism is possible only where one could be a coward, or virtue only where one could be vicious, or purity only where one could be impure.

Wherefore it is to be judged that God’s purpose is

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to procure in the highest type of beings the highest quality of life. Even if we accept "the new teleology" as described by Patrick, which in the spirit of Aristotle appears to leave in doubt the existence of an original foreseeing designing Mind, we still cannot doubt what the actual *consequence* of the creative process has so far been.²⁴ Comparing the present with the past, we can but say that the past has been adapted to lead up to the present, and that the present provides a key for the interpretation of the past, and that this is so irrespective of the question whether the past was *in order to* the present. And if we introduce the idea of purpose because it seems to us that the facts in the case justify it, then we shall also say that God's method of securing his purpose is at the same time a vindication of his wisdom. The method carries with it concomitants that, standing alone, may well baffle and perplex us; but we must be content to look at what we do not understand in the light of that which seems clear and plain. We are to remember that we have to do with a God who, as Creator, has rights; but taking the manifest good of life as our clew, we may believe that he exercises his rights in accordance with a nature that is wholly good. In this fact of a good Creator we find a light that illumines our darkness. All the darkness may not be dispersed, for we do not know always how to use the light that we possess. It is but natural that growing minds should not be able to comprehend all the conditions of their growth. But we can at least know that the problems we cannot ourselves solve are yet not without a solution. The believer in God lives in a world he can regard as rational because

for him it is the world of a perfect Mind. The unbeliever who denies the Mind but still accepts the rationality has no good reason for his claim. The believer's admitted inability on countless occasions to understand the connection between a given event and God is not, moreover, without its own value. It has the significance of providing the conditions for the exercise of faith; and man is never so truly great, he never arrives at heights quite so high, he never shows so clearly all that it is in him to be, as at those moments when by the aid of what he learns in the region of the known he ventures into the unknown—and finds that Another has been there before him, not only to blaze a trail, but to be his Companion as he walks it, and the Guarantor of his security.

The familiar question, "Is God Limited?" is to be answered according to the considerations now advanced. The only limitations that God is under are the limitations that arise out of his own self-determined nature and that naturally go with his chosen purpose. Why the nature of God should be as it is—this is one of those ultimate questions to which we can give no answer. To say that his nature as good is self-determined marks no advance in thought, since God must already be good in order to determine himself to the good. We must agree with Whitehead that "no reason can be given for the nature of God"—any more, shall we add, than for his existence.²⁵ If from among many possible purposes God chooses one purpose, and if from among many possible methods he chooses one method—"we speak as men"—then the choice of that purpose and of that method will necessarily determine his specific activities. He having

made his choice, it is but our recognition of simple self-consistency on his part when we say that he "cannot" act contrary to it. "God cannot deny himself." The world is a system: so far as we can tell, it must be that or nothing. A system means coherence, continuity, relationship. In a system, the parts are as they are and where they are because of the requirements of the whole. This surrender to the spirit and the needs of the whole is the price the part must pay for its own existence. The maintenance of the world as a systematic whole is nothing at all but God's respect for his own chosen procedure. Here again it is a simple matter of his right. He has a right to devise a system, and he has a right to maintain its integrity. There is no reason why we should not concede that he has a right also to change his procedure, but so long as we can detect continuity or see evidences of it we shall have to suppose that God is not exercising this right.²⁶ The people who make it a condition to believing in God that he shall perform a miracle—in *their* sense of smashing his order—every time they are in danger or are the subjects of some urgent need, simply do not know what they ask. The inevitabilities of life are those features of life that go with God being what he is and doing what he does for the purpose for which he is doing it. So far, therefore, as his essential being is concerned, God is the utterly unlimited One who himself sets the limit to all else—and then in the very act of doing that he limits himself by, so to speak, "posting a guarantee" that he will deal with "all else" according to the nature he has given it. Of such a God we shall say that he never "began" and that he will never "end."

Respecting his creation, there is no place *where* he is not and no time *when* he is not. There is no rational deed that he cannot perform; no possible fact that he cannot know. It is easy enough to ask inane puzzle questions, such as "Can God reverse the time-process?" "Can God create in a moment a man forty years old?" "Can God make two and two equal five?" and then, because such questions (fortunately!) must be answered negatively, conclude that God is limited. But in what proper sense is the inability to perform an act, whose very description involves in itself a contradiction, a limitation? There are certain rational ultimates which cannot be gain-said. But such ultimates pertain to the very nature of the Eternal Being himself. They are so because he is so. That the first must come before the second, that if one thing is more, it is because another thing is less, that two things cannot be the same thing, and so on—these are fundamental rationalities which do not *limit* the divine nature in some arbitrary fashion, but *express* it. There is a science called geometry and a science called mathematics for just one reason—because the ultimate Reality is an eternal Mind, and the structure of nature reflects this Mind, and created mind answers to it in its own most characteristic processes. "God geometrizes," which is one condition to man himself being a geometer. How could existence itself be rational if there were not the category of the impossible? It is finally God who determines alike all possibilities and all impossibilities, and he determines them not by arbitrary acts of will as Duns Scotus supposed, but by the normal functioning of his own nature. The inevitabilities,

*non
sequitur*

whether they be positive or negative, whether they pertain to thought or to action, whether they have to do with the conditions of life or with the results of these conditions, are determined by God manifesting himself in nature, life, and history, according to the requirements of a freely chosen purpose.

The relation of man's freedom to God's action must be understood in the same way. If man is in some measure free, and if God made him so, then whatever God is led to do because man is free will be itself an expression of the absolute divine will. Here, of course, we touch bottom metaphysically. The God who creates free spirits and then gives their freedom the law, is not thereby any less free himself, nor is the range of his power any less extensive. The freedom of man represents the freedom of God. At the risk of being seriously misunderstood, we would even go so far as to say that whatever man freely wills to do or to be, God is satisfied to have him will it. The volition he does not *approve* he nevertheless *sanc-tions*: the distinction is subtle enough for a Scholastic, but if it is not *valid*, we might as well give up the effort to make the theistic faith rational. The supreme evidence, indeed, to God's absolute power is in the very fact of this his creation of the free. What seems on a superficial view to dethrone him is seen on a profounder view to be most completely his coronal. Only an almighty God would "dare" to create other wills. Because now he has to justify himself to the wills he has made. Through these wills he has to work his own will. He has to reckon with the possibility, even with the certainty, of their opposition. Various "cannots" therefore necessarily enter

into the situation. We saw that this was so even with the unfree: much more is it so with the free. God "cannot," for example, *compel* men to love him. There is, of course, a constraint of love, but always there goes with it the consent of the lover. You cannot "make" a person love, any more than you can "make" him obey—in the real sense of a moral obedience. But here again the "cannot" arises out of the very nature of the case, and the case is of God's own making. Having chosen to *win* man's love and obedience, because a love and an obedience that are won have a worth and significance infinitely greater than that which is coerced (even if there could be that at all), God therefore creates the conditions required for the winning, and this necessarily precludes its coercion. Not that man can finally be a *complete* rebel. Besides the obedience of the son there is the obedience of the slave, and one or the other will eventually be rendered to God by every man. In the striking words of Olin Alfred Curtis, "the rim of destiny is by God's decree, but the personal center of destiny is by man's choice."²⁷ God seeks the type of obedience that is represented by sonship—the obedience of reverence, love, and free surrender. What is to be the ultimate fate of those who, refusing to be his sons, have become his slaves, serving him not from love, but from fear and hate, is a question upon which we may not dogmatize. They may or may not come at last under a law of personal dissolution, passing out of an existence whose deepest reason they have repudiated: we simply do not know. But even if souls may at last be lost, lost everlastingly, reprobate in the most complete sense, even that is no

limitation imposed on God by the will of another. Salvation and damnation are equally of the will of God: Augustine was right in his conclusion there even though he were wrong in his reasoning. God wills the salvation of any soul that wills to be saved, and God wills the damnation of any soul that wills not to be saved: what else can we say but that? There is more moral significance in a soul lost irrevocably and forever as the result of the free operation of its own fundamental law than there would be in its being saved at the cost of the arbitrary violation of that law—if even that were possible. In a sense which the cynic has never comprehended, souls may be “damned for the glory of God”—yes, and damned for their own glory too. For no animal could become reprobate, nor could any creature that was unable to choose what it would be. Only men can be lost. Their chains equally with their freedom are “obtained by a great price.” Let it be granted that these are “hard sayings,” sayings that should be sobbed rather than shouted. But what do they do for the charge of a “facile optimism” sneeringly laid at the door of “traditional theism”?

NOTES ON CHAPTER III

¹ See his chapter on "A Struggling God," in *My Idea of God*, ed. Newton, p. 118.

² *Belief Unbound*. Montague's plea for "a Promethean religion" is one of the best recent statements of the case for a growing God.

³ For a review of these attempts, see Sheen, *Religion Without God*, chap. i.

⁴ Cf. the preface in Huxley, *Religion Without Revelation*.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 114.

⁶ Figgis, *The Will to Freedom*, p. 9; Foster, *Friederich Nietzsche*, p. 195.

⁷ The closing words of the essay on "A Free Man's Worship," in *Mysticism and Logic*, pp. 56-57. How either "man" or "freedom" or "religion" could get into such a world as Russell conceives this world to be it is quite impossible to say.

⁸ Cf. stanza xcix of the *Rubáiyát* of Omar Kháyyám:
"Ah, Love! could you and I with Him conspire
To grasp this sorry Scheme of Things entire,
Would not we shatter it to bits—and then
Remold it nearer to the Heart's Desire!"

⁹ *The Quest of the Ages*, pp. 209, 212.

¹⁰ Bowne, in *Personalism*, speaks caustically of "the grotesque assumption that empty time does something" (p. 184).

¹¹ For example, Huxley, *op. cit.*, categorically repudiates all belief in a personal God, "in any sense in which that phrase is ordinarily used" (p. 30), and yet he writes a description of man's origin, development, and capacities (pp. 355-356) which assumes a power in "the raw material

of substance" which he is constrained to characterize as "miraculous," "wonderful," "surprising."

¹² *The Problem of God*, pp. 186-193. Brightman must have forgotten the New Testament when he wrote (p. 136) that in "the traditional view" God "stands apart from the [human] struggle in spotless white." Was there not "a Lamb slain from the foundation of the world"? (Rev. 5. 6, 9, 12; 13. 8.)

¹³ *A Faith That Enquires*, p. 234.

¹⁴ Cf. F. J. McConnell, *The Christlike God*, espec. chap. v, on "The Divine Power"; also *Is God Limited?* *passim*. There is much false supposition as to the proper meaning of omnipotence. No responsible Christian thinker, with very few exceptions, ever defined it as meaning that "God could do anything." The omnipotence repudiated by even so well-informed a scholar as Brightman (*op. cit.*) is largely hypothetical. Galloway, *Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 483-485, gives a statement of the case that it would be difficult to improve upon.

¹⁵ Such men as Huxley, Sellars, Holmes, Lippmann, Krutch, Joad, Schmidt, Barnes, and Haydon find in these concomitants of life an insuperable objection to the traditional theism. *But the concomitants remain on any theory*. Haydon proposes "the organization of life by scientific method" (*op. cit.*, p. 196) as a substitute for a "Cosmic Companion" (Sellars, *Religion Coming of Age*, pp. 202ff.), and the idea is accepted by others. But no such organization will ever avail to lift men above the possibility of experiences which will invest life with a tragic element—and the more tragic because the "Great Companion" will be dead.

¹⁶ See Buckham, *The Humanity of God*, pp. 142-146, for a pertinent discussion of this question.

¹⁷ *The Hound of Heaven*, stanza iv.

¹⁸ See Hocking, *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, rev. ed., chaps. i-iii, and espec. chap. v, on "Education." Henry Drummond's great chapter on "The Struggle for the Life

of Others" in *The Ascent of Man* is still worth reading. "That an Other-regarding principle should sooner or later appear on the world's stage was a necessity if the world was ever to become a moral world. And as everything in the moral world has what may be called a physical basis to begin with, it is not surprising to find in the mere physiological process of Reproduction a physical forecast of the higher relations, or, more accurately, to find the higher relations manifesting themselves at first through physical relations," etc. (p. 285).

¹⁹ Behaviorism of the type represented by J. B. Watson appears to overlook precisely this fact. See, for example, *Behaviorism*, chaps. vii and viii, on "Emotions." It is assumed in the entire discussion that an account of the physiology of the emotions gives the last word about them. As though a description of how a thing comes to be gives also what the thing *is*!

²⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 188. Ward's remark, in *The Philosophy of Value*, p. 83, note 42, that "Jones was, of all men, hypothetical," simply shows to what an extent critical obsessions may warp the judgment.

²¹ *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, lect. vi.

²² *The Faith of a Moralist*, vol. i, pp. 3-38. Cf. Pringle-Pattison's observation, in *The Idea of God*, p. 45, that the claim that the world of values and the world of facts have no organic relation to each other is "the one intolerable conclusion."

²³ *Poetics*, vi, 1449b, 24.

²⁴ *The World and Its Meaning*, pp. 160-165. Patrick's thesis is that "the end actually determines the means." For his definition of "what God means to us," see p. 176. Even Bergson, in *Creative Evolution*, in explaining the process whereby the *élan vital* supersedes the "instinctive" with the "intelligent," is compelled to speak about the *élan*, notwithstanding his alleged rejection of "finalism" elsewhere, in personal and purposive terms. See pp. 88-97, 101-105, Eng. trans.

²⁵ *Science and the Modern World*, p. 257. It is proper to add, however, that Whitehead does not accept the usual idea of God, whom he describes as "the Principle of Concretion" (p. 250)—the phrase taken over by Wieman in *The Wrestle of Religion with Truth*, chap. xi. The phrase is curiously reminiscent of Haeckel's "integration of protoplasm." Whitehead's account of "The Nature of God," in *Religion in the Making*, pp. 149-160, is difficult to reconcile with the definition given above.

²⁶ Cf. Spinoza, *Ethics*, def. vi. God, says Spinoza, as Infinite Being must have an infinite number of attributes. It would follow that such a Being would be capable of doing an infinite number of things.

²⁷ *The Christian Faith*, p. 469. Curtis' entire chapter on "Men Outside the New Race" has never made a popular appeal, but it is a striking example of the courage of a great Christian thinker to "follow whither the argument leads," even although personally he would fain have resisted the conclusion.

CHAPTER IV
THE MORAL SHADOW

THE ARGUMENT

EXPERIENCE involves the transformation of the possible into the actual. The possibility of moral evil necessarily goes with human life: sin is the responsible actualizing of this possibility. There can be freedom only as there may be slavery; right judgments only as there may be wrong judgments; holiness only as there may be sinfulness. What is sought in each case is the freedom, the truth, the holiness, but it is being sought in conditions that render it certain that there will be instead slavery, error, sinfulness. There is much wrong for which there is no ascertainable responsibility, and there is responsible wrong that still is not sin. The moral shadow exists only as God exists, since sin is the denial of God's right to rule. The representative of God in every man is the man's own moral ideal, and relative to that ideal the man may succeed or fail. Complete success, however, is impossible. That is to say, sin is an inevitability in the human life-process, although not all sins are inevitable. Sin is therefore no surprise to God. He allows for it not only as possibility, but also as fact. He is therefore in a real sense implicated in it: the burden of the world's sin is both God's and man's.

CHAPTER IV

THE MORAL SHADOW

WHAT has so far been written leads to the conclusion that no process may be properly judged until it is complete, or at least until there is some idea of what its completion will be. The world is to be conceived as process. As such, it must be supposed to have a beginning, and to be moving toward a goal or end. This does not necessarily preclude the presence of goals or ends by the way: rather than this, it implies them. Each attained step in a process is a goal or end relative to what goes before it, even though it is at the same time a condition to what comes after it. This view of the world-process as purposive is allowed even by a philosopher like Whitehead, who, paradoxically enough, as it would seem, nevertheless feels no need of an eternal purposive Mind.¹ Any process is a way of getting something done: at least, it is always productive of a result, whether the result is "intended" or not. The purpose pervades the process as immanent idea. Teleology—the process viewed in the light of its result—is therefore not only a justifiable method of interpretation: it is, as Galloway has so clearly shown, the only method that takes due account of every element in the situation.²

On the other hand, a knowledge of the meaning and purpose of the whole throws light on the parts. A

process is a series of related events. Each event is therefore both something in itself and part of a larger whole. The event falls where it does and as it does because of the requirements of the whole process and its purpose. Whether a house is built according to a plan or not, it is still true that what is *purposed* is a house, and that this purpose controls all that is done. If there is a world-purpose at all, an intended result of the world-process, then that purpose must be held to exercise a determinative influence on its own conditions. The whole sets the place and meaning of the part: hence the Hegelian principle, "The truth is in the whole." A nest in a tree is a thing in itself, but the reason for it is the nestlings; just as, in turn, the nestlings have their reason in something else—the perpetuation of the species. Boyhood is not simply a preparation for manhood: it is a period with its own joys, its own responsibilities, its own satisfactions, and a boyhood that never issues in manhood cannot therefore be said to have no justification. And yet in the normal span of life boyhood is but a part, and self-contained though it may be held to be, it still has relations backward to infancy and forward to manhood. Hence we make certain expectations of boyhood, and we surround it with certain opportunities and privileges, because we know that "the boy is father of the man." Conceive the whole of life as process, and boyhood as an event, or, preferably, a lesser process within the larger process, and both lesser and larger are seen to be mutually dependent. Without the one there could not be the other. Nevertheless, the final interpretive principle is supplied by the larger. Even boyhood must be judged in the

light of the whole life-purpose, and not simply in the light of its own intrinsic restrictions.

The analogy has its limitations, but it may perhaps help us to grasp the principle, full of importance for an adequate philosophy, that there are certain features of life which are what they are precisely because they are required by what life is for. "The various "natural calamities," for example, that so often perplex us are clearly enough events determined by natural process.³ Properly speaking, there is nothing "unnatural" about cyclones or earthquakes or famine or drought. All have their own ascertainable causes, and are expressions of "the reign of law." The very fact of any event, no matter what it may be, is the evidence that it was provided for in the scheme of things. This does not mean—at least, not where a will is involved—that as *actuality* it was determined, but only that as *possibility* it was demanded. In living things, hunger is fundamental. Starvation is never more than a few days away: so slender is the thread by which life hangs. Hunger is what says to life, "Keep moving." It promotes activity, and the mere act of satisfying it adds to the zest of life. Nevertheless, it may not be possible to appease the hunger, in which case suffering and death ensue. That suffering and death are as much provided for in the process as anything else. Similarly of the whole instinctive equipment of man. It is relative to the very purpose of his being, and yet it may lead to his destruction. The nature that is friendly is also the nature that is hostile. Any gift that life possesses is always a possible danger—but who would have it otherwise? "The greatest gains," wrote Bergson,

"lie along the path of the greatest risks"—but the danger of failure is correspondingly great.⁴ The ascent and the descent are complementary. The price of the joy of climbing is the possibility of the shame of sinking. He who can climb the highest can fall the lowest. If we want complete security, we must eliminate from life the alternative, and if that were done life, for man, would lose its chief charm. The charm of life, in part, is in its being a continuous adventure into the unknown. But adventures are always costly, and the adventure of life is the costliest of all. William James said that he was willing to "take the world as really dangerous," by which he meant that he was willing to regard it as a place in which there were "real losses and real losers."⁵ The cost of life may be death. The cost of freedom may be chains. The cost of holiness may be sinfulness. It is this last fact that calls for fuller consideration. The world and human life are evidently so constituted that sin appears among the inevitabilities.

It was said in the last Chapter that pain is the price of the possibility of pleasure, and that pain is inevitable. Just as inevitable is error, understood here in the sense of a mistake of judgment. Given nerves, and there will be pain; given reason, and there will be error. Reason that never erred because it could not would have to be omniscient and at the same time belong to a perfectly holy being. Such omniscient reason is not something to be achieved: it is the necessary attribute of uncreated and creative Mind, and there can be only one mind like that. Reason under a law of growth cannot avoid error, since

error is one of the necessary conditions of the growth. To refuse to attempt something new until you were assured that you could do it perfectly would be to remain in a state of permanent inaction. We learn to do—by making mistakes, by doing wrongly. There is, of course, an “instinctive skill.” In fact, Hocking defines an instinct as a skill automatic, untaught, and unteachable.⁶ But then reason and judgment do not enter into such skills at all. Besides, in man instinctive skill is not much, after all, and what there is derives much of its significance from the fact that it becomes the basis for acquired skills. Any acquired skill is fallible, and it was acquired only at the cost of much effort, by the method of “trial and error.” One can find the right way to go only by venturing along a way that may be wrong—and often-times will be wrong. One learns to stand only by risking falls—and some falling is inevitable. Reason is prone to error, but that is the cost of whatever proneness it may have for truth. This is not to deny the possibility of the acquisition of such a mastery of truth or fact as amounts to virtual infallibility in the use of it. But the mastery is over a very limited field: wisdom at one point is no guarantee of wisdom at another. What can be more astonishing than the judgment of savants when they leave their own fields? Deep and wide is the shadow thrown across the path of human history by errors of judgment or by deficient knowledge. “If only I had known!” But that, after all, is only the debit side of the account. There is a credit side as well, and when the account is cast, while the debit can never be otherwise than it is, the “business” of life—if the

metaphor may be continued—is seen to be on a paying basis in the values which it has produced. On the one hand are wrong judgments and wrong decisions with their devastating consequences; on the other hand are right judgments and right decisions, which initiate actions designed to offset the consequences of the wrong. The same mentality functions in both cases. If there is to be that kind of mentality, then there must be that kind of twofold result. The only world in which there could be no error would be a world in which there was no free intelligence. We must take life as it is, and those who are most saddened by the spectacle of it seem nevertheless to find some compensations. Who ever heard of a sick pessimist refusing the services of a physician? The blunders of the past are obvious, and we may expect that there will be others just as serious. It is easy enough to bemoan history, but it was that kind of history or none at all.⁷ Given man, with his capacities and limitations, and the rest follows. The custom of such men as Bertrand Russell, of savagely criticising the past while yet apparently advocating a metaphysical theory which supposes that the past could not have been otherwise than it was, is a clear fallacy.⁸ The determinist who is also a critic is certainly in a strange case. Error is possible, and conditions being as they are the materializing of the possibility is inevitable. But since life itself is justifiable, history, which is life in action, is also justifiable. Not that it is justifiable in all its details—anything but that—but that *the thing itself* is. History is process controlled by purpose, and there necessarily enters into the process whatever the pur-

pose requires. The purpose requires that men shall be fallible because it requires that they shall be free. Intelligence that is free and inexperienced and under necessity of learning is bound to go astray. As a matter of theory, it might be admitted—and Walter Lippmann, in somewhat naïvely inquiring why God “did not make men good in the first place” and so avoid the necessity of experience, seems to suppose its possibility, although he finally rejects God altogether⁹—it might be admitted that God could have created a universe in which there were no conflicts, and that in this perfect setting he could have placed intelligent beings whose minds would have functioned automatically and infallibly. Perhaps “angels” are such beings. But if they are, what man who appreciates the meaning of his own manhood would want to be an angel? It were better to be able to make mistakes and to make them than not to make them because we were not able. Indeed, both Plato’s “myth” of the pre-existent souls who “dropped to earth” from “the top of the dome of heaven,” becoming entangled in time and sense, because they could not maintain their native status,¹⁰ and the late Jewish doctrine of “fallen angels”—both alike suggest that even created virtue had no guarantee of permanence. There may, perhaps, be times when, like Huxley, we would fain be wound up like a clock and assured of infallibility for the next twenty-four hours.¹¹ But Huxley would have been the first to rebel against the condition. What satisfaction would he have found in conducting, for example, an experiment in biology or chemistry or physics, if he had known that the right result was assured in every case the first time?

What we want is not to *be* infallible, but to be able to *find* infallibilities and then use them. The value of infallibilities is in the fact that they may become the instruments of free intelligence. The relations of angles are necessitated and infallible: the pleasure of the mathematician is in discovering and using these relationships. But the discovery and the use are the action of mind working on its own account. The free conquers the necessary by learning its law and then bending it to its own uses, and there can be no greater triumph than that. The knowledge of how to control fire is worth a great many burned fingers. There could not be the free if there were not the fixed, and the final reason for the fixed is that the free might use it.

Error is not necessarily sin. In fact, the most disastrous error is quite compatible with moral integrity and spiritual purity. It is easy at this point to become lost in fine distinctions, but the distinctions are here. Perfection of reason would not of itself guarantee sinlessness, nor is sinfulness exclusively the result of the imperfection of reason. One may know what to do and still be unwilling to do it, just as one may be quite wrong in what one is doing and yet at the same time may be *willing* the right. In other words, the category of simple error cannot be made sufficiently comprehensive to include all the varieties of human failure. The bookkeeper who, weary at his desk, unintentionally carries forward a false balance has certainly erred, and the fact is likely before long to come to light, but he has not sinned. There is inculpable error, and there is culpable error. Inculpable error is certainly not sin,

nor yet is *all* culpable error. Whether culpable error is sin or not depends on its relation to what we most conveniently describe as "the moral order." The question of morals does not enter some fields of human endeavor where yet culpable error is a possibility. The moral order has a narrower range than the total human order, a narrower range even than error. This is why, in addition to the category of error, we need the category, much more restricted, of sin. Sin is the intention to commit a moral wrong. Just where the line falls in every case between moral wrong and wrong that is not moral may be difficult, perhaps impossible, to determine, but this does not destroy the fact that the two classes of wrong are different. Sin is always culpable: so-called sin that is not culpable becomes simple error. To say with a recent writer that there can be sin for which no one is guilty is either to be afraid to challenge a hoary theological dogma, or it is to use the same word to describe facts of a radically different character.¹² Sin is responsible and blameworthy fault in the realm of the moral—the moral, for the purpose of this definition, being necessarily conceived as expressing or representing the nature and will of God. There is enough sin in the world even when it is limited to fault of this kind: it seems hardly worth while to increase it by the simple device of expanding a definition. Nor is sin to be determined simply by certain visible consequences. One can be sorry for an error, and one can suffer for it and see the suffering extend to others, and yet the error may not have the status of sin. And one may know in his heart how deeply he sinned, at the same time that the knowledge is hidden from

every other human being. Sin is not a matter of mere publicity: Lady Macbeth and Arthur Dimmesdale knew that, and it is proved by confessions to priests and ministers every day. The realization of sin, of course, may not come until after the deed is committed. But even this would not be possible but for the self-identity of the sinner. By virtue of that fact he is able to attribute to himself *to-day* as sinful the deed he did *yesterday* in complete moral indifference. A deed implies a doer, and the doer is always continuous with himself. The fact may have given rise to much morbidness, but the fact is indispensable to moral history, as to all other. Kant describes remorse, repentance, and their concomitants as a voluntary and vicarious suffering of "the new man" for "the old man."¹³ We can accept this view of the case, while yet repudiating as psychologically and metaphysically unsound Kant's curious theory that a complete break with all the past precedes every new moral volition. We must agree, however, that actual sin is always relative to the total given situation, which is why it is never possible to judge sin simply by its "descriptive characters" alone, as Hocking would say,¹⁴ nor yet by its "organic consequences," as Bowne would say.¹⁵ Neither may sin be judged by reference to some sharply defined objective standard, as Jesus so often reminded the legalists and casuists of his day.¹⁶

Sin involves man's general power to conceive an ideal, recognize obligation to it, and judge himself in its light. A being lacking this power could not sin. There can be sin only where there can be a difference between what is and what might be or ought to be.

If a given purpose, motive, volition, or deed could not possibly have been otherwise than it is, sin is there an impossibility. The essence of sin is in an unnecessary and therefore responsible discrepancy between a certain kind of actual and a certain kind of ideal. The emphasis is on the "certain kind." Not all failure to reach an ideal is sin: the nature of the ideal must be considered. An ideal is essential to all human progress. There is, we must believe, a progress which is the result of a *vis a tergo*—a push from behind: the only voice heard speaking in the present is then the voice of the past. Purely naturalistic and mechanistic evolution might be so described—although, curiously enough, certain mechanists are beginning to argue for the determining influence exerted on the present by the future.¹⁷ At least so far as human life is concerned, that there is a progress due to a pull from in front is one of the most certain of facts. The immediate action is determined with reference to something that is yet in the future—something that is as yet purely ideal. The voice that is heard speaking in the present is, then, not only the voice of the past but also the voice of the future. There is no reason why the result may not still be called "evolution," but it will be evolution as co-operating with free intelligence—a quite different thing, as Conklin has shown, from evolution in which free intelligence plays no part.¹⁸ This power to conceive an ideal and then to work for it is what has lifted man above his "natural" level—meaning here by "natural" that condition which would be his were we to count out the results of his own deliberate choice or conscious effort at self-improve-

ment. Failure to realize the projected ideal, on both its individual and its social side, has been plentiful enough, but not all of this failure can be called sin in any proper sense. For one thing, uncontrollable forces may operate to prevent the realization; for another, ideals differ immensely in their nature, and some of them have no moral bearing whatever, except as loyalty to *any* ideal is morally meaningful. The significant thing about the ideal in relation to human activity is not so much that there may be failure to realize it completely as that it is the reason for whatever progress is made. The betterment of life is the result of the effort to incorporate the ideal in the actual. Human history may very well be, on the one hand, an illustration of the operation of impersonal, biological and sociological laws; but it is also, on the other hand, an illustration of the lifting force of the ideal engendered, as all ideals must be, out of the contact of free intelligence with the actualities of life, and thereby made the motive or reason of action.¹⁹ Every ideal bears witness to a felt need, and inspires the search for a method of its satisfaction.

Ideals, however, call not only for a power of appropriate action—(it is required of an ideal that it be regarded as falling within the region of possibility)—but also for a power of self-judgment. Man is forever appraising his own achievement with a resultant sentence of approbation or blame. Idealization, free effort, self-criticism—these necessarily belong together. They are required by the very idea and purpose of human life. All that we mean by progress—apart from the impersonal influences already referred

to—is conditioned on man being able to make a distinction between what is and what might be, and acting according to that “might be.” Responsible failure relative to this “might be” yields “wrong” in the generic sense. When the “might be” is conceived as falling in the order of the moral, that is to say, as having to do with inward states—dispositions, attitudes, character—and the relations through which they are expressed, its failure yields “sin.” For any ideal of this sort is in effect a person’s God: it represents his invasion by the eternal. It is the evidence of the existence of an authority that he does not make, but finds. Failure at this point is therefore failure respecting the believed will of God. That is to say, it is sin.

The possibility of sin, it is being argued, naturally goes with the basal structure of human life, as the possibility of pain goes with nerves and the possibility of error goes with reason. That the possibility of sin has been turned into actuality goes without saying. There is no more need to prove that man is a sinner than to prove that he is a sufferer or a blunderer. Even if we grant, as we very well may, that there is much about human life that is difficult to classify morally, there can be little doubt about the central issue. The central issue is whether a given individual recognizes an “ought” which, falling within the order of the moral, represents a *Reality* independent of his own will and existence, whether he believes he is obligated to it, and then whether he fails to respect the felt obligation. It may freely be admitted that there has been much alleged sin which was not actual sin, that there has been much un-

necessary self-torture, and that there has been much unwarranted social ostracism, ecclesiastical censure, and the like, based on false judgments of human actions. "The new psychology" is giving us ample room for serious reflection at this point.²⁰ But even if much so-called sin is "sickness"—Julian Huxley says "like the measles," and something to be as little ashamed of and as little proud of²¹—and therefore not sin at all, no man who is entirely frank will want to acquit himself altogether of moral culpability. And even when he is not to blame, it is just as well if he does not insist on the fact too strenuously. Conscience is often enough abused, but it can hardly be abolished on that ground alone. A man wholly conscienceless would have ceased to be a man. His power to lay on himself a demand is the last thing he could lose. It belongs to any man to find himself in situations in which there is more than one possibility. In such a situation he cannot but choose. Sometimes the choice carries with it no particular moral connotation: failure will be charged up simply to error of judgment or to the use of a faulty standard. But sometimes the choice is morally significant. The store that one enters to make a purchase is ordinarily chosen, but it is hardly a moral choice: but the purpose not to pay for what one selects in the store certainly falls in the category of the moral. Socrates notwithstanding, it is possible to decide against what at the time one believes is best—and the believed best is always a right.²² Such a choice is a self-revelation. It proves the presence of conflict at the very center of the life, conflict issuing in moral defeat. The chooser has betrayed himself; he acted below his own possible

level; as Royce would say, he was "disloyal to his cause."²³ In making the choice, the chooser has played false to his own most characteristic quality, namely, the power to do a right thing in the same situation in which a wrong thing also was possible, but a power whose final reason is not that the wrong might be done but the right. We are meant to believe, but we are not meant to believe the false; and we are meant to choose, but we are not meant to choose the wrong.

No insistence on the wide variability of the standard of judgment among different people, or on the social method whereby the standard is attained, or on the changes that take place in the standard of a given individual during his lifetime, must be allowed to obscure the fact that a man may fail of his standard, and may know that he has failed, and may hold himself responsible for the failure. A man's knowable best has the significance of an absolute—at least of a temporary absolute. We do not need to embarrass our claim by championing some highly debatable theory of an intuitive knowledge of right and wrong. We can, if need be, even accept evolutionary ethics, so far as it concerns the theory of the origin and development of moral ideas, provided only that we shall claim that a being who is not moral in fundamental nature and capacity could not learn to be moral. The behaviorist claims that all the wide range of human conduct and experience is a natural development of "six prepotent reflexes."²⁴ But even so, *he has to assume that prepotency*. He will, of course, account for it on purely biological grounds. The theist, on the other hand, while not denying the

surface facts, will read them to mean that the difference between rational and ethical man and the earlier stages of the process whereby he has come to be is due to an increasing self-manifestation of a creative Mind or Spirit. To say that the theistic explanation is not reasonable, but that the behavioristic explanation is—this is simply to “play the fool with language,” to use a characteristic phrase of Dean Inge. Experience involves a subject, and the nature of the subject determines the nature and the possible range of the experience: we follow Kant there. But though a given person may be but a bare remove from the brute, though his environment may be wholly lacking in the essentials of fine living, though he may be heir to a social situation which would seem to foster all that was low and debasing, there nevertheless belongs to him the power to create out of certain elements of his heritage, his environment, and his instruction, an authority which, so far as he himself is concerned, he will recognize as absolute. *That* is what he ought to obey, or *that* is what he ought to do, or *that* is what he ought to be. It cannot be said too often or too emphatically—the significant thing is not so much the actual character of the “that” as the bare fact of it; not so much the embodiment of it in specific deeds as the purpose or the power to order the life on its principle. For every man there is a highest. It may, as a matter of fact, be very low, judged by another man’s highest. But a highest that is in itself low is the promise of a highest that shall be higher. “We build the ladder by which we rise.” A given highest may even be far lower than it would have been had the man always been true to his light:

this, indeed, is probably the case with all of us, since involved in complete loyalty to the highest is the obligation to utilize every opportunity to make the highest still higher—and who will say that he has invariably done that? But it is easy to become confused by these fine distinctions, and then to allow the confusion to become an excuse for giving up the whole problem. Too often in discussions of sin so many qualifications are introduced, so many distinctions are made, so many questions are raised as to the bearing of this and that, that the final result is doubt as to whether any clear ideas on the subject can be reached at all. The abstract needs continual correction by the concrete, just as the concrete needs to be viewed as illustrations of the abstract. We shall therefore be satisfied with such statements as the following, statements that cover equally the concrete fact and the abstract principle, namely, that sin is inner disloyalty to what is taken to be right and therefore obligatory, or that it is the failure of the will to indorse a moral judgment. It belongs to a human being to be capable of such disloyalty and failure. From the lowest savage to the ripest Christian saint none is exempt from the possibility. To deny this were simply to close one's eyes to palpable facts. But if we recognize it, we can hardly avoid raising still other questions.

For one thing, we have to ask whether actual sin is among the inevitabilities, like natural calamity, physical pain, mental suffering, and intellectual error. Moral fault, we have been saying, arises out of the general situation which calls for the necessity of an ideal if there is to be progress. But achievement so

often lags behind the ideal. It does that throughout the whole of life, and moral fault is simply one phase of a universal failure. We need have no hesitation in admitting that there is much moral fault that cannot be helped. Not all of the world's moral wreckage expresses the intent of human wills. The close articulation of life with life, and of life with the law-abiding forces of nature, brings to pass conditions and results that oftentimes seem out of all proportion to the original cause. The cause may be a moral fault, and yet a moral fault of such a character that it is impossible to apportion the responsibility. It may, indeed, oftentimes be that the central figures in a moral debacle are rather to be pitied than to be blamed: their fault is due to their being in turn the victims of the fault of others, or to their being the victims of the operation of impersonal law which puts them in a situation to which they proved morally unequal. Some people have never done some things simply because they never were where they could have done them. Nothing less than omniscience could track down all the influences that come to their issue in a great wrong; and while "to know all" is not necessarily "to forgive all," since the knowledge that justifies forbearance at one point may call for severity at another, nevertheless our ignorance should at least lead us to temper justice with mercy. The moral fault that cannot be helped is still to be included in the evil of the world—its helplessness does not neutralize it; nevertheless, it cannot properly be described as sin.²⁵ But not all moral fault is unavoidable. It is here as it is with other ideals: *some of the failure need not be*. That a person should keep

himself at a state of moral perfection from the beginning to the end of his life is impossible: nobody but a theorist spinning a purely logical web would contend that it could be done. There is no person who, on occasion, could not have done better than he did. He falls short of his own possibility. It is not only true that men *may* sin; it is also true that they *will* sin—that was certain, and God knew it, before ever a human being existed; and it is also true that they will sometimes have a feeling of helplessness, as though they were in the grip of some vast impersonal force—the belief of certain Gnostics, as well as of ancient fatalists and more modern determinists—at the very moment when they are doing what they fain would not do.²⁶ Paul's familiar words, "The good I would I do not," and the words of Ovid, "I see and approve things excellent, I follow after things base," embody a universal experience.²⁷

We cannot stop, therefore, with the simple distinction of moral fault as unavoidable and avoidable, the unavoidable being invariably blameless and the avoidable being invariably blamable. We have to go farther and say that there is such a certainty that men will be as they should not be and will do what they should not do as requires us to regard sinfulness as at once a normal and a blamable human trait. The theologians of the past, from Augustine on, who held that man was born to be a sinner and that there were specific sins for which he was directly accountable, were not wrong. No man, when he is faced with the facts, would want to acquit himself altogether of responsibility for all his moral failures, yet there is no man who could altogether have avoided moral

failure. Looking at a babe, one may say with complete confidence: "If he lives long enough, he will do wrong. He will sometimes do wrong without realizing it, but afterward will impute to himself responsibility and blame for the deed; and he will sometimes do wrong knowing at the time that it is wrong and that he need not do it; and he will also sometimes do wrong knowing at the time that it is wrong and yet feeling himself helpless to avoid doing it." No normal human career would ever invalidate such a prediction. In a word, we find that the conditions of right are established for us, and have dictatorial power over us, but that the conditions are too severe for our human nature invariably to fulfill. Kant, in his doctrine of the good will, seemed to simplify the process of the moral life. That will, he said, is good which always wills the good for no other reason than that it is the good, and the goodness of such a will remains unaffected even though circumstances prevent the volition from being carried out. But Kant did not permit his theory to cause him to lose sight of the actual facts. He therefore acknowledged the presence of "a radical evil in human nature," such as the older theology described as "depravity" or "original sin," and such as the new psychology describes as "the disintegration of selfhood."²⁸

Is there any way of relating these conclusions to belief in a God almighty, wise and good? There are, of course, those who assert that such a question need not be raised at all. The facts adduced, they say, may all be explained on a purely naturalistic basis, and "the hypothesis of God is not needed." Moral failure is "nothing to worry about," the more so that

much of it is purely imaginary. So far as it is real at all, it is but a part of human failure in general, and the general failure is simply what is to be expected in the case of a creature whose power to conceive a better naturally and necessarily runs ahead of his power to achieve it. Man has more reach than grasp. That goes with his nature. It keeps him moving forward. What is it but a simple biological device to save him from stagnation and content? To have no reach at all would be fatal: betterment would be impossible. To have reach and grasp always exactly equal would be scarcely less fatal: never to know the challenge of threatening and possible defeat would be almost as deadly as invariable and inevitable failure. Sin, if we are still to call it that, is nothing at all but a by-product of individual and social evolution. Indeed, Bertrand Russell assures us that there is "something abject" in the sense of sin, and since it makes us unhappy, and we have a right to be happy, the sooner we get rid of it the better.²⁹ The advice would have more weight if it were accompanied by some wise counsel as to how we might cease doing those things which create the sense of sin in the first place.

But while one may talk this way who sees in a human life nothing more than a biological and sociological unit, to be explained solely with reference to an impersonally conceived cosmic process, one who believes in God cannot so easily deal with the problem. Indeed, the very fact that men are so persistently haunted by the sense of sin may turn out to be one of the most incontrovertible signs of the being and the nature of God. Sin in a Godless universe

would certainly have no *ultimate* significance, although it is worth while to note that even Julian Huxley believes that sin and the sense of sin "will always be with us."³⁰ But sin in a universe held to be the creation of a God of perfect goodness, wisdom, and power must necessarily be considered relative to the character and purpose of such a God. If the Final Fact be God, if every notion of right involves God in some way, if the attainable moral standard of a given individual at a given time is *the representative of God in that individual*, then sin becomes the repudiation of God, the denial of his right to rule. The creature defies the Creator. Sin viewed in that light—even with the concession that the Creator is never taken unawares by it—necessarily takes on a much more solemn and serious character than when it is viewed as purely naturalistic.

After all, however, ought not God himself to be the one to "worry about" our sins? Is not the final responsibility his? Is it not "he that hath made us, and not we ourselves"? The problem cannot be solved quite so easily as that. We shall fully recognize the fact in due time that God is the most completely obligated being in the universe—and he accepts the obligation. Nevertheless, he is against sin, and he means us to be against it. Let it be granted that man is so constituted that it is certain that he will sin; but let it not be forgotten that he is also so constituted that if he is satisfied in his sinfulness, he finds a whole vast array of facts becoming hostile to him. It may be true that "man is made that he might be a sinner," but this is only because ultimately he is "meant to be a saint." The way to saintliness involves the same

general facts as are involved in the way to sinfulness. The psychological process of moral ascent is absolutely identical with the psychological process of moral descent. It does not take away from the moral badness of sin to say that the presence of sin is involved in God's total plan and purpose for human life. Nor is God deprived of the right of attaching penalties to sin because he has created man so that sin is inevitable. For the certainty of sin as a feature of human life does not mean that every particular sin is necessitated. Because we start life with "an outfit for the earthly road" that will not prove equal to every emergency does not provide us with an excuse for every separate time we have failed to fight the good fight and remain in possession of the field. Even if we count out all wrong that was done under apparently irresistible pressure, enough is still left about whose perfect freedom there can be no doubt. This much at least God has the right to punish, in the sense of attaching to it appropriate consequences that will fall in either the inner or the outer realm. But he has also the right to punish moral fault for which the direct human responsibility cannot be found; or if the word "punish" is objected to here, then let us say that he has the right to visit the fault with consequences which shall declare what he thinks about it. How else could the world be a system? How else could we speak of law and order? If there is, as Virgil long since expressed it, "a Mind animating the entire material frame," consequences of any sort will have the character of recording that Mind's consistency. In the same spirit, a modern thinker, Urban, manfully defending what he calls "the Great Tradi-

tion" in philosophy, namely, that the world is intelligible because it manifests a logically *a priori* Intelligence, clings to "internal consistency" as "the ultimate touchstone of all thought."³¹ In a meaningful because coherent universe, every volition and every deed must register. God makes provision for the existence of both right and wrong—responsible and irresponsible right, responsible and irresponsible wrong. Both alike enter into the intimate involutions of the life-movement. If right is to be consequential, wrong must be consequential too. The unintentional equally with the intentional bears its harvest. The unavoidable deed equally with the avoidable must illustrate the causal relationship but for which there could be no cosmos, no organisms, no processes. All this is said of a God claimed to be infinite in wisdom, goodness, and power. Is the claim thereby supported? Or is the claim thereby rendered incredible?

The answer to the question depends on whether or not we are willing to take the long look. "The truth is in the whole." Sin looked at entirely in its own light becomes an insoluble problem in the universe of such a God as we believe God to be. We must simply refuse to believe that God would sustain an order of things in which the possibility and certainty of sin is the last word. Sin is a fact: it is an evil which is part of a still wider evil. But it shares the character of all other evil in bearing witness to a perfection which we can at least conceive—and *relative to which all evil is judged to be evil*. All judgment involves a standard. Criticism is impossible without a canon. In judging something to be evil, therefore, we neces-

sarily call attention to a good. This does not mean that all good implies evil. But it does mean that the kind of good that God seeks for men cannot be except as evil is provided for in the very process of its attainment. Francis Thompson found that God "must char the wood ere he could limn with it."³² It does not follow from this, however, that on considering the dreadful cancer of the world's sin, and asking the question, "Does God *want* this?" one must answer, "Yes." Rather is one to answer: "No; God does not want this. He hates it with the perfect hatred of absolute holiness. He sets himself against it to root it out. The consequences that it leads to are the consequences that he ordains. All that happens because of sin shows what God thinks of sin, and what sin essentially is. The results of selfishness on both the subject of it and the object of it, are God's sufficient comment on selfishness. No; God does not 'want' sin. What he 'wants' is virtue, moral goodness, holiness. Only, he can have this only by having sin as well. And he would rather have sin as an inevitable concomitant of the process whereby he seeks and obtains goodness than not have the goodness because he would not have the sin." Some such answer as that is all that is open to us if God is what we believe he is, and if sin is what we believe it is, and if human goodness is worth its own cost. The only condition on which there could have been a sinless universe was that there should have been no provision for the existence of such a being as man is. But there is still the hope of a sinless universe as an ultimate goal, and God's way of getting it—shall we say the only way of getting it?—is through just such a universe as we know

now. As with man, so with God, the given deed gets its meaning from what it is aimed at. Could we but stand where God stands, and see what he sees, and know what he knows, we should—if he actually is what it seems to us he must be—understand the reason for everything. The sentiment of the pious mind, “Trust God, see all, nor be afraid,” is entirely compatible with a profound philosophy. It is a philosophy that holds that God is never surprised, and that he is never baffled by any circumstance, however dreadful. Meanwhile, however, “we have but faith, we cannot know.” There are good reasons for our faith, and that makes our faith rational. But faith outstrips its own reasons: it must do that to be faith. We contemplate the ways of God, and we would fain justify them. That, however, is something we cannot wholly do: the most we can do is to believe with good reasons that they are justifiable. Justification is still of faith, and that holds even of God. He is justified by our faith in him, and by his faith in us.

NOTES ON CHAPTER IV

¹ *Process and Reality*, pp. 343-353. Cf. the discussion of "God and the World" in pt. v, chap. xi, of the same volume. See, however, note 25 on Chapter III above.

² *Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 343-353. Galloway pertinently says that those who would banish "ends" from nature "generally reintroduce them under some other name" (p. 350).

³ See Buckham's consideration of the thesis, in *The Humanity of God*, pp. 128ff., that "events in the natural world are not the immediate acts of God." Cf. J. Arthur Thomson, *The System of Animate Nature*, vol. ii, lect. xviii.

⁴ *Creative Evolution*, Eng. trans., p. 143.

⁵ See the entire impressive statement of "pragmatic meliorism" in *Pragmatism*, p. 296.

⁶ *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, rev. ed., p. 54. Cf. McDougall's two articles on "Men or Robots?" in *Psychologies for 1925*, pp. 273ff., for a criticism of the behavioristic denial of instinctive skills.

⁷ Cf. the chapter of "Conclusions," by W. R. Inge, in *Science, Religion, and Reality*, ed. J. Needham, for evidence that history of all sorts can be critically surveyed for constructive purposes.

⁸ See, for example, Russell's chapter on "The Harm That Good Men Do," in *Skeptical Essays*, pp. 111ff., and the discussion of "free will" in *Our Knowledge of the External World*, pp. 247-256. Russell says that we are "free" in the only sense that is important, namely, that our volitions are "the result of our own desires." But if we cannot control our desires, what is such freedom worth?

⁹ *Preface to Morals*, p. 215.

¹⁰ *Phædrus*, 246-249. Cf. Taylor, *Plato*, pp. 307-309. On "fallen angels," see Kohler, *Jewish Theology*, chap. xxxi.

¹¹ See *Life and Letters of T. H. Huxley*, vol. i, pp. 352-355.

¹² Barbour, *Sin and the New Psychology*. "There is such a thing as sin for which a person is not guilty" (p. 86). The whole discussion reveals a confusion between "wrong" and "sin." Cf. the statements that "unwitting deviation" from Christ's standard is sin (p. 82), and that there can be "blameworthiness" where there is no responsibility for the deed (p. 94). Even in Hocking's fine discussion (*op. cit.*, chaps. xvi-xx) it is not always kept clear that "sin" is primarily a religious conception. The nontheistic humanist may do wrong—and admit it; but it is difficult to see how he could commit sin—and confess it. Tennant, *Concept of Sin*, p. 22, quotes approvingly Martineau's description of sin (in *Types of Ethical Theory*, second edit., vol. ii, pp. 123-124) as wrong action in relation to God.

¹³ *Religion Within the Bounds of Mere Reason*, sect. ii, the division on "The Struggle of Good and Evil." Cf. the discussion in E. Caird, *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*, vol. ii, pp. 569-573, and in Webb, *Kant's Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 120-122.

¹⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 144.

¹⁵ *Studies in Christianity*, pp. 150-151; cf. *Atonement*, p. 79.

¹⁶ *Matthew* 5. 21-42. See C. A. Anderson Scott, *New Testament Ethics*, lect. ii, for a remarkably discriminating discussion of "Jesus' Criticism of Evil."

¹⁷ Cf. the statement of W. B. Smith (of "Christ-myth" fame, and author of *Ecce Deus*), "It is To-morrow and not Yesterday that makes To-day what it is," quoted as from the *Monist* by Patrick, *The World and Its Meaning*, p. 165.

¹⁸ See *The Direction of Human Evolution*, new edit., chap. vi.

¹⁹ See Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, chap. i, on "Ethical Evolution," and cf. Kidd, *The Science of Power*, with its passionate defence of the thesis that civilization must depend on "the science of the passion for the ideal" (p. 158).

²⁰ See Moxon, *The Doctrine of Sin*, chap. viii, on "The Psychological View of Sin."

²¹ *Religion Without Revelation*, p. 366.

²² See Plato, *Protagoras*, 352. "Knowledge is a noble and commanding thing, which cannot be overcome, and will not allow a man, if he only knows the difference of good and evil, to do anything which is contrary to knowledge, but that wisdom will have strength to help him." (Jowett's trans.) Cf. Taylor, *Plato*, p. 259, note: also Windelband, *History of Ancient Philosophy*, pp. 131-133, the discussion of Socrates' formula of the identity of virtue and knowledge.

²³ See *The Problem of Christianity*, vol. i, the chapter on "Time and Guilt." Anyone who has a will of his own, says Royce, may become "a conscious and deliberate traitor" to an ideal or a cause—he may become "disloyal." Cf. also *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, and the chapter with that title in *The Sources of Religious Insight*.

²⁴ Cf. Finney's chapter on "Behaviorism and Value" in *Behaviorism: A Battle Line*, p. 180.

²⁵ The inevitability of moral fault, with, however, provision also for that type of responsible moral fault which is truly sin and constitutes guiltiness, is presented in such works as Pfeiderer, *Philosophy of Religion*, vol. iv; Tennant, *The Origin of Sin* and *The Concept of Sin*; and S. A. McDowall, *Evolution and the Need of Atonement*. For a criticism of the view, see Moxon, *op. cit.*, pp. 202-216.

²⁶ Cf. Angus, *The Religious Quests of the Græco-Roman World*, pp. 36-42; see also E. F. Scott, *Colossians, Ephesians, Philemon*, pp. 7-10, in the Moffatt New Testament Commentary, and *The Gospel and Its Tributaries*, pp. 210-212.

²⁷ *Metamorphosis*, vii, 17: "Video meliora, proboque, deteriora sequor." Cf. *Les Soirées de Saint-Petersbourg*, by T. de Maistre, vol. i, p. 190. The Count says "Vous avez lu tout comme nous,

'Mon Dieu, quelle guerre cruelle!
Je trouve deux hommes en moi.'"

To which the Knight replies: "Sans doute, et même je crois que chacun est obligé en conscience de s'écrier comme Louis XIV, *Ah! que je connais bien ces deux hommes-la!*"

²⁸ See Webb, *Kant's Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 92-115, for an exposition of Kant's theory.

²⁹ *The Conquest of Happiness*, p. 106. See also chaps. i and vii.

³⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 289.

³¹ *The Intelligible World*, p. 44.

³² *The Hound of Heaven*, stanza iv.

CHAPTER V
THE UNIVERSAL SERVANT

THE ARGUMENT

THERE properly goes with God's work as Creator a work as Saviour. God necessarily serves what he makes, and this applies to each least part as well as to the whole. God is everywhere and he is in everything. The method of his presence, and its significance, will differ according to the circumstance, but nothing can change the fact of his universal presence. The blacker the circumstance the more it calls for God, if we are to find any hope of it. God's presence as metaphysically necessary with a given event does not, however, involve always his approbation. He may be a partner in enterprises that he profoundly disapproves or even hates. This requires that we think of his purpose as involving him in suffering, and of his universe as wearing for him a certain tragic aspect. The conception of a suffering God is admittedly difficult, but it throws a light on facts which are otherwise utterly dark. For by his serving and his suffering God purposes to save. His greatness is proved not by his remoteness from our human life but by his very nearness to it. He works in all and for all because he would save all. He pays the price of his own creation, and if he calls us to share in the price, it is only in order that we may share in the blessedness.

CHAPTER V

THE UNIVERSAL SERVANT

IF the significance of sin is such as has been stated in the last Chapter, we can hardly escape the conviction that from the divine standpoint the universe bears a certain tragic aspect. The poignant utterance of "the Lord" in *Green Pastures* comes very near to ultimate truth: "This business of being God is no bed of roses!" God is not only eternal Mind: he is eternal Heart as well. The moral shadow that lies across the world falls on him as the shadow of a cross. No one will deny that we are here talking of God in very human terms, but what of it? Why is it a sign of philosophical ineptitude to "humanize" God but a sign of philosophical superiority to "mechanize" him? If the mind of man reflects the mind of God, why should not the heart of man reflect the heart of God as well? A mind too exalted to be interested in its own activities and their significance for other minds would also be too exalted for these other minds ever to care about. If we cannot on occasion speak of God as we speak of ourselves—regarding him as acting and feeling in intensely personal ways—then God may still be "a problem to us," but the problem will fall largely in the realm of the theoretical. "Does God care?" Why is that not a question as worthy of our consideration as the question, "Is God infinite or finite?" God conceived simply as Creator is not sufficient. We want to know that he is Saviour as well

as Creator. It is altogether likely that much of the modern criticism of the idea of a Creator-God is due to the failure of men to consider with it the idea of a Saviour-God. Religiously, Creator and Saviour go together, and there is no reason whatever why they should not go together philosophically. No philosophy is adequate, the world being as it is, which does not see God as at once the wearer of a crown and the bearer of a cross.¹

God serves. The implicate of any part is the whole, and if the part must serve its whole, it is just as true that the whole must serve its parts. The entire tree serves its least twig and leaf, just as these help to make the tree what it is. If nothing could be but for God, then God is the servant of all that is. We shall not say that he is not Lord as well: we shall only say that his universal lordship and his universal service are inseparable. That is a strange idea of God which supposes him to be so great that he is not interested in details. We have not hesitated to adopt in these pages a philosophy which treats the parts from the standpoint of the needs and the purpose of the whole. But it does not follow from this that we are supposing the parts to be, as in Spinoza, so many passing incidents, or as in Hegel, so many "moments of the process," and nothing more. One of the most hotly debated questions of the Middle Ages was whether the universal yielded the particular or the particular the universal; that is, whether the class-idea is the real cause of the individual members of the class, or whether the individuals are the real existences and the class-idea a mere abstraction therefrom. It is customary to regard the debate as largely a battle of

words, and to deplore the vast amount of intellectual energy that was wasted on it. But the Scholastics had their finger on a real problem, as is easily seen if we state it concretely, in terms of, say, the relations between the individual man and his society. To ask which is the more important of the two is to lose sight of the fact that there could be neither without the other. A given individual could, of course, be dispensed with, but not all individuals. In other words, the parts and the whole are supplementary. Yet so far as society is concerned, it is the parts—individual men and women—that are the specific centers of interest. The interest of the individual in society is always the interest of an individual. On the other hand, the interest of society in the individual is always wider than the individual himself: it involves a degree of social self-interest. It is therefore not at all a question of deciding which of the two is the more important—the particular or the universal, the part or the whole. It is a question, rather, of recognizing the equal necessity of them both. If there cannot be the one without the other, any claim as to value made for the one will be equally valid for the other. The whole is real as a whole and the part is real as a part, and neither can be deprived of its own reality because it does not have the reality of the other. The truth is happily expressed in Smuts' phrase, "a holistic universe," by which he means that any whole is an organization of other wholes.² The universe is a universe of universes, and every universe, whether large or small, has its own law, its own nature, its own rights and obligations.

All of which is by way of saying that the God who,

because he is the Creator of the whole and therefore the Servant of the whole, is for the same reason the Creator and the Servant of the part. If the whole cannot be but for God, then the least detail cannot be but for God. The theist seems often to be afraid to carry out the logic of his own position. He properly makes certain great affirmations about God, affirmations concerning his universality, his sufficiency, his immanent activity, and the implication of these affirmations is that nothing can be wholly independent of the divine will and purpose. But while this is the theory of the theist, he in effect will disconnect God from great areas of the universal movement. Brightman, for example, is sure that God is "supremely creative," and yet he feels compelled to concede the existence of that which cannot ultimately be related to God's will, but has its roots instead in something that God cannot quite control.³ If the sunset is the beauty of God, why is not the single beam of light? If the thunder is the voice of God, why is not the single sound wave? Speaking in terms of physics, the electron is just at present regarded as the ultimate form of being: then the theist, who believes that there is something "more ultimate" than the electron, will say that God is just as truly involved in single electrons as he is in any of their diverse forms of organization. How can he consistently say otherwise? As we have been seeing, there are forms of reality and there are aspects of our own experience which, looked at from the purely human and temporal standpoint, seem to be insoluble problems as existing in the universe of a God held to be almighty, wise, and good. But it must again be said,

that the common objection in face of certain dark facts of life, namely, "We would not do these things; then how can God do them and still be good?" quite overlooks the organic or systematic nature of existence. The "acts of God"—to quote the phrase which carries the sole reference to the Deity that "big business" ever makes—are the issue of a total given situation; they are not so many isolated, independent, and arbitrary events. Hence the truth of Bowne's observation, that in studying both nature and history we need to know, first, "the connection of events in an order of law," and, second, "their causality and interpretation."⁴ It takes courage to keep God everywhere, but without that courage the theist will hardly hold his position. Keeping God everywhere, however, is not incompatible with the claim, already considered, that there are forms of his acting which are under the determination of a purpose beyond themselves, and that such forms would therefore be different if his self-consistency did not prevent it. God is everywhere and in everything, or there is no God. Nothing can do without him. He is in the dens of iniquity as really (*but not in the same sense*) as he is in the temples of prayer. If but for him the saint could not be a saint, neither but for him could the sinner be a sinner—although again it must be said that his co-operation in the two cases differs immensely in method and character. He is in the fire that devastates the city as really as he is in all the tender ministries that follow in its wake. He is in the things that cause our tears as really as he is in the things that cause our laughter. To say that anything can happen without the co-operation of God in

some way—and, *deeply considered*, without his will—is to surrender under stress of a temporary practical situation of extreme difficulty that utter divine adequacy whose support we never need quite so much as we do “when the woes of life o’ertake us.” For if you take God altogether out of a situation, just because it is so bad, what have you done but made it even worse? When even the faithful are near to despairing, what shall the unbeliever do? This circumstance that you would so wholly separate from God—what will you say about it? Will you say that God is here suffering defeat? Will you say that something has escaped his control? Will you say that there is that which can be explained without him? Will you say that a fact, an event, an experience—call it what you will—has crept into God’s universe that is so utterly alien to him that where it is he cannot be, but must perforce withdraw himself and confess that here he is impotent? Suppose you say that, what have you accomplished: have you not made things infinitely worse? Have you not, indeed, made them hopeless? If God is defeated, how is he God? That situations exist which to us are heart-breaking, loaded down with a tragedy which creates in us an unutterable anguish of spirit—this no man may or should deny. But the only hope we can have of such situations—situations which seem to have crowded God out—will be in our faith that *they have not crowded God out after all*. The truth here may be stated almost as a paradox: God serves even his enemies. It is by that continued service that directly or indirectly, sooner or later, he purposes to bend the enmity to his own ends. “He maketh even the wrath

of man to praise him," and he maketh even the terrors of nature to be "ministers of his, to do his will." All this does not mean that God is incapable of moral discrimination. It does not mean that one thing, whether a human deed, a human condition, or a natural event affecting one life or many, is all the same to him as any other: that would be a strange inference. "He maketh his rain to fall and his sun to shine on the just and the unjust alike," not because it is a matter of indifference to him whether men are just or unjust, but because he is maintaining an order for the largest possible good of all. Not only so, but the unjust man is a potential saint, and God treats him not merely from the standpoint of what he is, but also from the standpoint of what he might be.

This involution of a good God with all that exists and with all that happens has the result of making him a partner in enterprises which, because they are evil, he must profoundly disapprove. He co-operates with men at the same time that he is purposing to "confound their fell designs." It is to be admitted that the thought is highly speculative, but it is a speculation to which we seem to be irresistibly led by our belief as to God on the one hand and the facts of life and experience on the other hand. It is impossible but that God should be present in some sense in everything, and it is incredible that he should be *approvingly* present in everything. We are therefore necessarily led to some such distinction as that between what might be called God's *natural* co-operation with men in all their enterprises and his *moral* co-operation.⁵ He must be everywhere present and active for the purpose of the cosmos conceived as the

instrument by which he seeks his ends. If he is present in the ends, he must also be present in the means. The one will be his as much as the other. But, as we have seen, involved in these purposes are contingencies, to be inevitably converted into actualities by the very nature of man as free, growing, and learning intelligence; and while these actualities may be utterly at variance with God's holy nature, he will not deal with them in any arbitrary fashion. What he helped man to create he will also help man to destroy, but he will demand the same freedom in the destruction that was present in the creation. What came by freedom must go by freedom—if it goes. Of necessity there are certain issues of the plans and actions of men, and these issues also are of the divine ordaining. The causal law is universal; it is God's law; and events illustrate it, are even impossible without it, whatever their character. In this sense, therefore, God ordains the harvest of sin—the harvest, too, of men's mere errors, the unintentional as well as the intentional. Motive is significant in the moral order, but it has no significance in the order of material consequences. The content of the harvest of sin and error does not represent God's ideal—it is not what he fain would have; but it does represent his method, and to a greater or less degree it reveals his attitude. Therefore God is not equally seen everywhere. We can be moved deeply by the solemn strains of Swinburne's "Hertha," but its fundamental fallacy is just here—in the assumption that the basic Reality is as much operative at one point as at another. Even Tennyson, in "The Higher Pantheism," with its line, "For is not He all but thou," does not

sufficiently protect the differences of quality in the divine activity. Both poems need to be read in the light of Streeter's caution that since creation is characterized by qualitative distinctions, not all things are to be regarded as equally expressive of the divine nature.⁶ Therefore, although the dark deed could not be but for God, and although its dark consequences likewise could not be but for God, it does not follow that the deed and its consequences have his approval just as they would if they were of a radically different character. While the consequences may show what he thinks of the deed, he may be far from rejoicing in them or in their cause. The Hebrew prophet conceived God under the figure of a potter, who smashes the pots which do not come up to the requirements. Man is a potter too, but he does his work, as Browning has it in "Rabbi Ben Ezra," hedged about with the "dance of plastic circumstance." He is caught in what seems to be the whirl of vast machinery—but the machinery is "just meant to give his soul its bent." Presiding over all is One who "planned a whole," who seeks "the perfect cup," and who—to change the figure and the allusion—will not hesitate, as the Pope in "The Ring and the Book" said respecting Guido, to unmake a soul if that is necessary to its remaking.⁷ The Great Potter works with us; we are his "prentice hands"; we do our work under conditions which he prescribes; the very faults we commit arise out of these conditions; yet while he continues to bear with us, and, as Paul says, to be our colaborer, he makes us feel the pressure of his hand; he does not hesitate to unmake our work, and to throw it out as "broken earthenware"—while

yet on every shard he writes his name beneath our own. He shares the responsibility for our blunder, the surest evidence he can give us that the blunder need not be irretrievable. It is again admitted that in all this we are speaking of God in a very human way—committing what to some is the unpardonable sin philosophically, namely, “anthropomorphism”—but there can be no objection to that when it brings home to the mind a great truth. Indeed, we are satisfied to take our stand with Streeter, and affirm that when we individualize and personalize God, we follow a more truly philosophical procedure than we do when we treat him as a mere impersonal Absolute.⁸

God suffers. God being what he is his involution with the order of life will further mean that his service is a suffering service. We meet here one of the most difficult of all problems. Men who reflect on the nature of God may be classified in many other respects according as they do or do not believe that God suffers. It must be granted at the outset that apparently insuperable metaphysical objections may be offered to the idea of a suffering God, and the more so as the total view of God approaches adequacy on every other count: yet it will still be contended here that without the idea of a suffering God there is no way of moralizing the cosmic movement conceived as the steady expression of a benevolent creative Will. Was it not William James who once said that when the claims of metaphysics and the claims of ethics appeared to clash, he cast his vote for ethics? What he meant was that metaphysical theory must take note of ethical fact and requirement. We may not be able to trace all our convictions about life and

experience to a point where they meet in a perfect coherence and unity, but we can at least believe that all convictions that grow naturally and of proper right out of life and experience do have such a meeting point: our inability to find it is rather, as Seeborg says, a limitation on our reasoning powers than an evidence of either the falsity of our convictions or the irrationality of the universe.⁹ With due modesty we confess our inability to state clearly the process whereby suffering can be an actual experience for a being such as we conceive God to be; but this inability is no sufficient reason for the conclusion that therefore he cannot suffer. It is much more important that our view of God shall be morally satisfactory than it is that it shall be metaphysically unimpeachable. But having said that, we must add that the view will not be unimpeachable even metaphysically if it requires us to regard God as a wholly unmoved spectator of the world's travail. Better, because far truer, that we should say that the world's travail is also *his* travail—that “in all our affliction he too is afflicted.”¹⁰ The question, “How can this be so?” is not the first question. The first question, rather, is “Is it so?” and we can affirm the fact even if we are uncertain respecting the process. A similar uncertainty is common enough elsewhere, and it does not make us skeptics. There is nobody but believes more than he can understand or that knows more than he can explain. A God who “cares,” and to whom we can therefore go in confidence, is a religious necessity, and how can he “care” and at the same time be quite passive, quite unmoved? It is by much tribulation that man enters the kingdom of

God: may we not regard it as the obverse of that truth that it is by much tribulation that God enters the kingdom of man? In a writer like Brightman, it is the firm determination not to obscure the fact of this divine tribulation that is the real reason for his unsatisfactory metaphysics.¹¹ The fact, however, may be given its full value without any surrender of the divine all-sufficiency. Knudson achieves the synthesis, as did Bowne before him, and while "the modern temper" is against it, there are many other contemporary thinkers who follow this high and difficult road in preference to the lower and easier one.

The motive for the conception of God that entirely precludes the thought of his being able to suffer is ordinarily metaphysical. It is found chiefly in writers of marked powers of abstraction. God is set forth as the wholly transcendental, lifted above all distinctions of time and place, the Absolute, the Unconditioned, the Wholly Other, and the like. It is found in Western thought where the Platonic influence has been strongly felt; it is much more widely spread in the East, where also it is much older.¹² Any conception we form of God, so we are told, is so completely relative to our own limited point of view, that it can have nothing more than a merely pragmatic value. In the phrase made famous by Vaihinger, we think and talk about things *als ob*—"as if"—although actually they are otherwise than we think and talk. So also of God. We talk of him "as if" he were this, that, and the other, but we must believe that in himself he is quite different from what we for our own purposes, or under the compulsion of our

own necessities, say about him. Is not God the one being who is *sui causa*—the cause of himself? Is he not without beginning and without ending? Are not all other things but so many “appearances” of him who is the one supreme “reality”? Is he not beyond the power of any mind to compass? Is not all language helpless to describe him adequately? In so far as he may be supposed to “contemplate” anything, what can it be but “his own perfection”; and in so far as he can be “loved,” how otherwise can it be than in a purely “intellectual” way? Suffering, since it involves some kind of inescapable limitation, is necessarily as foreign to such a being as darkness is to light. Such a view has always had a fascination for minds of a certain quality. The modern theory of a “finite” God is to be understood largely as a reaction from this severe metaphysical conception. The familiar words in *Mr. Britling* express what to many is a far more comforting and defensible idea: “A finite God who struggles in his great and comprehensive way as we struggle in our weak and silly way” is the need of the human heart and at the same time the best explanation of the course of life.¹³ If the choice were confined—as it is not—to a suffering finite God on the one hand and a non-suffering infinite God on the other hand, religious faith could not hesitate in choosing the former.

Sometimes, however, this conception of a God who not only does not suffer but is not even able to suffer—an “impassible” being—is the expression of a profoundly religious motive. This must be allowed in the face of what has just been written. In the writings of Philo, Plotinus and the early Christian Neo-

Platonists, of John Scotus Erigena, and of many of the medieval mystics, we find presented a view of God as a being of ineffable blessedness, the profound depths of whose existence contain in themselves the inexhaustible source of their own eternal calm. Inge, discussing this view, points out, however, that it is quite different from "the blind unconscious Will" of Von Hartmann and Schopenhauer.¹⁴ No one in our own time has attempted more valiantly to join together the idea of God's complete blessedness with the idea of his steady love for men and his unfailing interest in them, than Friedrich von Hügel. He regards the word "suffering" as connoting a certain deprivation of bliss which cannot be consistently attributed to God. He would therefore speak instead of the divine "sympathy," although he can maintain his point only by ignoring the derivation of the word. A God who suffers is said thereby to endure a loss of his complete perfection, and this cannot be. A God who sympathizes does not endure this loss: at the same time he is saved from that utter lack of feeling for men which, if the lack were actually there, would in its turn be the evidence to an imperfection of another sort.¹⁵

It is difficult to see why a suffering God should be held to experience a certain imperfection while yet he retains his perfection only as he sympathizes. There can be sympathy without suffering—that is clear enough. When we "rejoice with them that rejoice," we are showing a form of sympathy. So are we when we "weep with them that weep." The sympathy of joy does not involve suffering, but the sympathy of tears does: otherwise it is hardly sympathy

in any real sense. One thinks of the words of Coleridge:

"Sweet is the tear that from some Howard's eye
Drops on the cheek of one he lifts from earth;
And he that works me good with unmoved face
Does it but half: he chills me while he aids—
My benefactor, not my brother man!"¹⁶

Even so austere a thinker as Matthew Arnold, contemplating the life and work of Heine, could entertain the fancy that "the Spirit of the world," moved by the vaunts of men, allowed for a moment "a sardonic smile" to play upon his lips. And then he adds: *That smile was Heine!* The God who rebukes or encourages men, even though he does it through the words and actions of another man, is not only not indifferent to the human scene, but he has a stake in it, and whoever has a stake in anything, even although he be God, must on occasion watch with anxious eyes. Von Hügel is trying to conserve a great truth, but he conserves it at an unnecessary cost in both logic and fact. He does, indeed, as a devout Romanist, provide for a suffering *Lord* by the doctrine of incarnation, conceived as the means whereby the Eternal Son qualified himself to be "touched with the feeling of our infirmities." Assuming the doctrine, we may allow that there would be possible to the Son as incarnate experiences which would not be possible to him as not incarnate. But that is going a long way around to arrive at a truth which may be reached much more directly. Not only so, but on Von Hügel's own theological presuppositions concerning the Trinity and the Incarnation, it could be shown that divine suffering is called for to

make the presuppositions intelligible. Is not the Incarnation to be viewed as an activity of the total God-head, and is it not through the divine activity that we are to arrive at our understanding of the divine nature? How can God be revealed in Jesus if the God we see there is not, after all, God as he really is? However much we may disagree with Ames' final conception of God, he is surely right in holding that God must be interpreted through his functioning, on the principle that "a thing is what it *does*."¹⁷ Why set up this dualism between a God who is called for by the facts of life and experience, and a God who, whatever religious use may be made of the conception, is, after all, called for by more purely speculative interests? It ought to be possible so to cleanse the word "suffer" of all derogatory connotation (if it can have that) when applied to God as to remove Von Hügel's objections to the word, and at the same time include in it all that he means by "sympathy."

Certain thinkers, it has been said above, have objected to the idea of an infinitely transcendent God just because it seems to make him too remote from the hard realities of life as we know them. There can be nothing but respect for the feeling here revealed. A God so remote as to be untouched by life's realities would also be so remote that those realities could be related to him in no way at all. On the other hand, in order to be religiously adequate God must be adequate also to the total range of existence. The great defect of Höffding's brilliant treatment of the philosophy of religion is in his assertion, everywhere expressed, that it is not possible, nor need it be attempted, to find for the "facts of existence" and the

"values of religious faith and experience" a common ground.¹⁸ To make God a permanent metaphysical question-mark in order to make him a permanent moral power is simply to sustain a loss in return for no gain: it is as bad as conceiving him so abstractly as that he becomes religiously unavailable—which is Walter Lippmann's pointed criticism of the God of such philosophies as Whitehead's.¹⁹ Mere belief in a God who is wholly on the side of the good is not in itself sufficient to give us a sense of security in the world, confidence that the universe is "friendly to moral values," and a conviction of the sure triumph of our God's cause. We need besides that a belief in a God who himself initiates and sustains all that is. Then only have we a guarantee that "there shall never be one lost good." He who gives the law to the moral universe must also give the law to that wider system of relationships within which the moral universe is set, and to which the moral universe is seen finally to give the meaning. But the God who is the guarantee of his own triumph does not secure that triumph simply by a series of arbitrary decrees. Most of the criticisms of the idea of omnipotence unfortunately and wrongly assume that this is what he is supposed to do.²⁰ Instead, he secures it by being himself on the side of the good; by being in every bit of endeavor, by whomever made, to make good prevail; and by so constituting his world that sooner or later it shows evil to be evil, and works against it. What valid reason is there for supposing that a God so occupied is not, in a very real sense, a Sufferer? What gain is there, for either philosophy or religion, in a God conceived on the Aristotelian pattern, re-

garding life with eyes that do not see and with a heart that does not feel? Besides, why are the great sufferers of history not to be allowed to speak at this point? Have they not as much right to be heard as the armchair philosophers? Are not men who have known life in the raw entitled to make a demand on the Final Fact such as will give some meaning to their experience—and does not the belief, that the suffering that falls on this side of the veil has a counterpart in Whoever or Whatever is behind the veil, do this very thing? Was there not a man named Hosea, and another one named Jesus of Nazareth, and are we to discount their testimony and their conviction at the behest of some metaphysician whose chief objection to the idea of a Suffering God is that it is “gross anthropomorphism”? Well, if it comes to that, how completely is anthropomorphism escaped even by the metaphysician? It is to be assumed that the most abstract and detached of metaphysicians is still a human being. Can he think otherwise than as a man? Can he invent categories for which he owes nothing to his own experience? Is there anywhere an idea of God which did not originate in a human mind? Why is not Wieman’s or Whitehead’s “Principle of Concretion” just as anthropomorphic as Sabatier’s “Divine Father”? Why is not Ames’ “Idealized Reality” just as anthropomorphic as Augustine’s “Sovereign Will”? The conceptions themselves differ, but this does not change the fact that they are all alike relative to the human mind, and that they result from the processes of human thinking directed toward material supplied by human experience. If the conception of God as Personality is to be rejected

on the ground that it represents nothing at all but a self-projection on an eternal background, it will be replied that every other conception of God is open to a similar criticism. Matthew Arnold's definition of God as "the enduring Power, not ourselves, that makes for righteousness," depends absolutely on the human mind being as it is.²¹ In other words, the mere charge of anthropomorphism proves nothing either way. What is significant is not the process by which the conception of God is reached, but the intrinsic worth of the conception actually arrived at. As between God conceived as at once Creative Will and Suffering Love and conceived as mere Pattern, or Form, or Process, or Ideal, the greater worth belongs to the former. It explains more; it does more; it means more—and for every serious objection that can be laid against it, another objection, equally serious if not more so, can be laid against the suggested substitutes. And certainly for religious purposes, a God utterly adequate in power and holy love, who uses his power to produce other beings, and who leads them, as they are willing to be led, to holy love on their own account, becoming thereby their fellow sufferer—for religious purposes, such a conception has nothing to be said against it and everything for it. Nor do we make his suffering love more significant by lessening the range of his power. The greater God is in power, the greater he is in love. If H. G. Wells had identified his "Veiled Being" with his "God who suffers," he would have gained both philosophically and religiously. If a suffering God is the source of hope for mankind, then the greater the God who suffers the more potent his suffering. A God too great

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to suffer would not be great enough to be God, the world being as it is.

"Would I suffer for him that I love? So would'st thou—so wilt thou!

So shall crown thee the topmost, ineffablest, uttermost crown—

And thy love fill infinitude wholly, nor leave up nor down

One spot for the creature to stand in! It is by no breath,

Turn of eye, wave of hand, that salvation joins issue with death!

As thy Love is discovered almighty, almighty be proved

Thy power, that exists with and for it, of being Beloved!

He who did most shall bear most. . . . '22

To undertake to describe the process of suffering within the divine experience would be to assume an intimacy with deep matters greater than any man can have. We can believe things to be true about God even though we cannot explain that they are so. God creates: on that we have no doubt. But *how* he creates—the most we allow ourselves there is an occasional surmise. But respecting the divine suffering, we are not wanting entirely in some analogy. We know, for example, that life brings the deepest suffering to the finest natures, and it brings it because these natures see others in distressing circumstances. But they do not merely look on: they try in various ways to save those for whose sake they suffer, and these very efforts only add to their sufferings. And yet they find a gladness in their very

sufferings—a gladness arising from the knowledge that what is being endured promises to help those whose condition leads to the suffering. Josephine Butler suffered for the sake of the fallen girls and women of London. Infinitely above them herself, she suffered because of their condition; and then because her suffering love led her to associate herself with them in the most intimate way that so she might save them, the very contact of her holiness with their impurity only added to her suffering. Is it too much to say that God suffers as he *looks* at men and sees them as what they are; and that his suffering is deepened by his personal *association* with them in all the experience of their life? The fact that in all this he purposes a good does not change the character of the immediate situation nor of his relation to it. Would a mother's sufferings for her child's woes be any less real even if she could know absolutely that they were to have a happy issue? Even if universalism be the true doctrine, and there is to be a final "restitution of all things"—a return, as Origen taught, of all things to the God whence they derive, so that again God shall be "all and in all"—even if this be so, the difficulties necessarily attending the process of the return must be believed to be seen by God *as* difficulties, and not to mean the same thing to him that the blessed consummation will mean. Because God sees the whole process at once does not mean that he does not discriminate. Out of evil good may come, but his knowledge of that fact does not make the evil less real. And a holy God cannot be implicated in a process of evil without suffering. Indeed, if it be really so that, in circumstances such as

ours, the good can come to be only as there is evil, what does that do but introduce a tragic element into the very nature of things, making the divine suffering to appear at last as self-inflicted suffering? That is to say, if God freely wills a creation such as this, then he freely wills for himself the suffering that he knows it will entail. So great is his love! All the divine smiting of man—for God does smite him!—is at the same time a divine self-smiting. All the severe disciplines of life which, deeply considered, are the wisely chosen methods of a loving Father whereby he seeks to bring many sons into glory, are disciplines which the Father shares with the children. Again it is admitted that we have here been engaged in the most unabashed anthropomorphism. We have compared the divine to what is universally recognized to be the noblest characteristics of the human—self-giving at self-cost. It can be wrong to do that only if God is unaffected by the human story. And if it be that the God who is responsible for the story is not affected by it, then man is greater than the God who made him. The paradox carries its own denial. The greatest in man is the likeliest God. Philip Sidney, General Gordon, Abraham Lincoln, in actual history—in fiction, Jeannie Deans, Sidney Carton, Adam Bede—these trod the wine press in the power of a suffering love. Love made them strong, and suffering made them great. Through them we can believe in God; yes, in them we can see God—God “manifest in the flesh.” The dying Pompilia has said it for us:

“ . . . Through such souls alone
God stooping *shows sufficient of his light*
For us i’ the dark to rise by. And I rise.”

(*God saves.* God serving—God suffering: is that all? No. The Universal Servant who is the Universal Sufferer becomes thereby also the Universal Saviour. If there is a God at all, and if the universe is the free work of his hands, and if this work is such that it provides for the emergence of facts to which he must utterly oppose himself, then there is needed for that work nothing less than a divine justification. Can we find it? Can we justify the cosmic travail? It were temerity to say that we could do it completely. And yet in a sense the cosmic travail is justified in the very fact that it is travail. Travail is the promise of new life. "When she is delivered of the child, she remembereth no more the anguish, for the joy that a man is born into the world." Dare we use the figure?—creation is the birth-pangs of Deity. God would produce that which is like unto himself, and to bring forth children he must travail—even he. In him the paternal and the maternal combine. Himself begets what himself fosters. "O God, our Father, and our Mother too!" Because he is love, he would share, and if he would share, he must suffer, because only as he suffers can the sharing proceed and at last be complete. God is self-complete: therefore nothing needs to be. If, however, something is besides God, it is because God wills it; and if he wills it he must pay its price. And what a price! All the long ages of biological preparation; vast destruction as the concomitant of natural processes; forms of life monstrous, and, by our standards, repulsive and dangerous; all the pain of the world, all its suffering, all its sin and selfishness and blindness and folly—until the mind wearies of contemplating it and is near to fall-

ing from its throne. What a price! one exclaims. Yes, but what a purchase! The bare fact of life itself, with all that that means; all lovely things; all the high pomps and glories of day at dawn; all the tenderness and grace that may at any time be "the harvest of a quiet eye" bent on God's handiwork; all the long story of man's incredible achievement in the realms he has been equipped to enter—art and literature, science and song; above all, the wisdom born of the struggle against ignorance, the unselfishness born of the struggle against selfishness, the new forms of goodness called forth by the appearance of new forms of evil; the patriot's self-sacrifice, the mother's devotion, the laughter of little children; all the tender ministries of love, all holy awe, all reverence, all worship, all prayer—this, and as much more, is the purchase of that dire price. And are not such things intrinsically good in a far deeper sense than their opposites are intrinsically evil? The insight of Josiah Royce, that every evil thing because of which a good thing comes to be finds in that good its "atone-ment," impresses one as being much profounder as a reading of the facts of life and experience than the view that the existence of evil disproves the existence of a God almighty and good.²³ Nature as it is or no nature at all; history as it is or no history at all; human life as it is or no life at all—so far as we can see, these are the only alternatives we need to consider. And considering them, what shall we say? We shall say that God can justify his choice. We shall say that God can justify his method. We shall say that the disvalues that necessarily go with the method cannot discount the values: the joy of the

gain and the sadness of the loss are parts of the same organic whole—and *the whole is worth while*.

But that is not all that we shall say. We shall say also that God has never been defeated, that the world has never been lost: it was, indeed, saved before it was made. The purpose to make is not one thing, and the purpose to save another. Traditional theology sadly failed of clear thinking at this point, and Milton popularized the misconception in the majestic descriptions of "Paradise Lost." There is one divine purpose, one divine motive, one divine act. Creation is a drama with a single theme. Nowhere has God changed his mind or altered his plan.²⁴ What he is now he always was, and what he always was he always will be. There is a saying in the New Testament about "the Lamb of God slain from the foundation of the world."²⁵ What is meant by it but that the world's foundations were laid in sacrificial love—the sacrificial love of God? The deepest law of any life is sacrifice. There may be something austere about the fact, but if God has made it the law of his own life as well, the austerity is not without relief. There is a cross at the heart of the world, and there is a cross at the heart of Deity, and the two may not be separated. "We are fellow laborers, fellow sufferers, with God." The God who ordains that life shall live by life is the God from whose life all other life draws. He who himself needs nothing becomes the Great Giver, and by his giving constitutes himself the Great Sufferer, and by his suffering becomes the Great Saviour. This is grace indeed, sovereign grace: not the grace of one whose limitations vest his gift with uncertainty—not that. But the grace, rather, of one

who knew what tragedy his gift would mean to himself, and who, although he did not need to make it, nevertheless made it because his sole concern was with what his gift would sooner or later make possible for others. So that God himself is the world's sacrificial Lamb, and not only so, but he is Priest and Altar as well. "He offers himself daily." For every pang of man he too feels a pang; our woe a woe for him; our tragedy a tragedy for him; most of all, our sin a burden for him—and such a burden that it is only the reticence born of deep awe that stops us from saying (if we do stop) that he can bear it at no less a cost than that of a broken heart.

The paradoxes involved in what has been said are freely admitted, but we are not in the least inclined to apologize for them. Doubtless there are those who will regard such paradoxes as so many "sick men's dreams." Whether certain radically different "modern" interpretations of life and God are, however, any less paradoxical, is a nice point.²⁶ It is obvious enough that the language we have been using is intensely human, but how else shall we express our deepest thoughts about God save in such ways as we express our deepest thoughts about ourselves? And is it not better that one should say what one thinks, crude and realistic and "old-fashioned" though his thought may be, and say it so that it cannot be misunderstood, than that one should so qualify one's thought as to rob it of all directness and power. *God suffers to be God, and he would not be God otherwise:* even the wayfaring man can understand what is meant by that, and perchance appreciate it too. If it does not please the metaphysician, let him say

it in a better way—only, *let him say it*. For a God who cannot touch the heart of man cannot hope finally to win man's will. It stands written: "Whosoever would become great among you shall be your minister (servant); and whosoever would be first among you shall be your servant (bondservant): even as the Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many" (Matt. 20. 26-28). That is the law of the kingdom of God, and it is the law of the kingdom of God because it is the law of that God whose the kingdom is, and the interior movement of whose life finds in the increasing life of the Kingdom its own increasing embodiment and expression.

NOTES ON CHAPTER V

¹ Cf. Sellar's remark, in *Religion Coming of Age*, p. 299, that man's compensation for the loss of a "Cosmic Companion" is in his being at the same time freed from "supernatural terrors." What Sellars overlooks, as he thus repeats the ancient criticism of Lucretius (see the opening passages of *De natura rerum*), is the fact that the surrender of God makes men subject to still other "terrors" which, while they may not cause men to "writhe on the floor," are no less real than those which did. The conclusion neither of Krutch, *The Modern Temper*, nor of Bertrand Russell, *A Free Man's Worship*, seems to indicate that very much of relief or assurance is born of the surrender of God.

² See *Holism and Evolution*. Smuts summarizes his thesis on pp. 319-321. The book represents an acute attempt to avoid a merely atomistic or pluralistic view of reality on the one hand, and on the other hand a highly abstract view like Bradley's, namely, that there is only one real individual, one whole, the Absolute, of which the finite parts are simply so many "adjectives," therefore lacking in "substantial" reality. See Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, espec. chap. xxvi. "There is nothing individual," writes Bradley, "except only the Absolute" (p. 246). Cf. the criticism of Bradley's view in Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God*, lects. xiv and xv.

³ *The Problem of God*, p. 113; cf. pp. 182-186.

⁴ *The Immanence of God*, pp. 50-51.

⁵ Cf. F. J. McConnell, *The Christlike God*, chap. viii, on "The Divine Immanence." Immanence is held to mean that "God is in all things," but God being what he is, "he is in some things differently from the way he is in others" (pp. 141-142).

⁶ *Reality*, p. 141.

⁷ The Pope has refused clemency to Guido, and has ordered his execution to proceed. He recalls a dark night in Naples, nothing visible, until a sudden lightning-flash momentarily reveals the whole city:

"So may the truth be flashed out by one blow,
And Guido see, one instant, and be saved.
Else I avert my face, nor follow him
Into that sad obscure sequestered state
Where God unmakes but to remake the soul
He else made first in vain: *which must not be.*"

⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 137. Cf. Galloway, *Faith and Reason in Religion*, pp. 35-36, and more fully his *Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 492-504.

⁹ Cf. Seeberg's remark, in his *Fundamental Truths of Christianity*, on the antithesis of "the all-operativeness of God" and our own "consciousness of freedom." He says: "We will neither lower the flag of the divine power to half-mast, nor will we reduce to an illusion the consciousness of freedom" (translated from the fifth German edition).

¹⁰ *Isaiah* 63. 9.

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, chap. vii, on "God and Human Suffering." Cf. Streeter's chapter on "Creative Strife" in *Reality*; Henry Jones, *A Faith That Enquires*, lects. x and xvi; Roberts, *The Christian God*, chap. vi; and Knudson, *The Doctrine of God*, chap. ix, for a similar view, but with more satisfactory presuppositions.

¹² See the following discussions: on Philo, E. Caird, *Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, vol. ii, lect. xxi; on Plotinus, Inge, *The Philosophy of Plotinus*, vol. ii, lect. xvii; on Erigena, Bett, *Johannes Scotus Erigena*, pp. 23-28; on Eckhart, R. Jones, *Studies in Mystical Religion*, pp. 224-229; on Boehme, Brinton, *The Mystic Will*, chap. vi. On the Vedantists, see Radhakrishnan, *The Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy*, chap. xiii, and cf. Urquhart, *Pantheism and the Value of Life*, for a criticism.

¹³ H. G. Wells, *Mr. Britling Sees It Through*, p. 406.

¹⁴ *Op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 109-116.

¹⁵ See *Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion*, second series, pp. 204-213; cf. the discussion on "Christianity and Suffering," first series, pp. 110-116.

¹⁶ *Reflections on Having Left a Place of Retirement*, stanza iii.

¹⁷ See *Religion*, chap. xii. Cf. Haydon, *The Quest of the Ages*, p. 109.

¹⁸ *Philosophy of Religion*, pars. 10 and 55. Cf. W. P. Paterson, *The Nature of Religion*, pp. 377-380; Galloway, *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 467. Religious faith, says Galloway, "will not be satisfied with a purely mundane Deity." Its Object must rule the world while working in it.

¹⁹ *Preface to Morals*, pp. 26-27. Lippmann says categorically that for the purposes of religion such a God is "no God at all."

²⁰ Cf. Huxley, *Religion Without Revelation*, pp. 18-19; Joad, *The Present and Future of Religion*, chap. vi.

²¹ *Literature and Dogma*, 4th ed. (Macmillan), pp. 57-58. Note the curious similarity to Arnold's definition of fifty years ago of the result of Overstreet's recent attempt to "rethink the problem [of God] in modern terms," in *The Enduring Quest*, p. 261. Cf. Montague, *Belief Unbound*, sec. iii.

²² Browning, *Saul*, stanza xviii.

²³ Royce's thesis is that the world in which evil deeds are transformed by the deeds of love which they call forth is a better world than a world would be in which evil deeds could not be done. See *The Problem of Christianity*, vol. i, pp. 306-310. Contrast with Royce the "argument" of Joad, *The Present and Future of Religion*, that although this evil world could not have originated with a God of absolute perfection (p. 133), it nevertheless is moving toward such a God as "the goal and end of its pil-

grimage" (p. 277). Cf. the notion of S. Alexander, *Space, Time, and Deity*, vol. ii, p. 361, that such God as now actually exists is "straining toward deity," since if he really possessed it he would be "finite and not infinite"!

²⁴ James Orr, in spite of his Calvinism and his literalistic view of Scripture, saw this very clearly. See his *Christian View of God and the World*, pp. 279-284. "God's plan," he writes, "is in reality one." For a criticism of Orr, see Curtis, *The Christian Faith*, pp. 236-237.

²⁵ See Glover, *Jesus in the Experience of Men*, chap. viii.

²⁶ Cf. Harris, *Pro Fide*, 4th edit., p. xxxvi, for remarks on such fantastic theories as those of S. Alexander, and other "finitists." Harris, speaking of Alexander's claim that "God is not a creator but a creature," says that he finds it difficult to treat seriously "a theory which not merely violates but actually *reverses* the Law of Causation."

CHAPTER VI
THE MIND AND ITS SYMBOLS

THE ARGUMENT

MIND consists in the power to convey and to apprehend meaning. The conveyance and apprehension is not mediate but immediate: it takes place through symbols. Mind can reveal its presence only by acting, and the acting calls for interpretation. The environment of mind is therefore symbolic. Some of these symbols are directly traceable to the action of other minds like our own. Others, however, are the preconditions of such action: in the environment of mind, as in its very nature, are certain stabilities that provide the framework within which meaning is set. Mind needs the "given" if it is itself to give. If these stabilities may be used to produce symbols whereby mind conveys meaning, then they are themselves symbolic apart from that use. Just as we find within our experience, therefore, bridges to other minds like our own, so we find bridges to Another Mind, also like our own, but infinitely greater. The thinker cannot make his own mind intelligible except as he believes in other minds with which he holds commerce. But neither can he make intelligible this commerce of mind with mind by means of what is "given" unless in that "given" and in all it makes possible he sees the action of a Mind wholly original. Symbols are words denoting minds, and the symbolism of the whole is the language of God.

CHAPTER VI

THE MIND AND ITS SYMBOLS

UNDERLYING all that is being said of a theological character in this book is the philosophy which regards one mind as necessarily implying another. Mind cannot be self-explaining. Whatever explanation is offered of mind, the explanation is itself the act of mind, and therefore assumes the very thing that is to be explained. On the other hand, to account for mind by something less than itself can hardly be defended as a rational proceeding. Men often mistake mere prejudices for good reasons, although it is a little difficult to understand why they should have such strong prejudices against themselves. They seem determined to rule mind as a real entity out of the universe, both as their own most characteristic possession, and as the Final Reality which makes the universe possible. In most cases, however, all that they really do is to express dissatisfaction with some theory as to the origin, nature, structure, or operation of mind. Such dissatisfaction is legitimate enough: it is, indeed, one of the finest evidences to the reality of the very mind whose nature sets the problem. But it is altogether another matter to want to deny the reality of that which men *mean* when they say "mind." If there is a function, there is obviously that which functions. Sellars, for example, while he accepts whole-heartedly "the functional notion of mind," nevertheless recognizes that

a "function" calls for "a living organism" of some sort.¹ Whether we could accept his description of the organism as adequate is, of course, another question. The law is universal: "By their fruits ye shall know them." Mind is known by its working. There are, however, those who would disagree with this putting of the case: they would prefer to say that the mind is the working. Psychology, it is claimed, does not need the hypothesis of "soul" any more than the physical sciences "need the hypothesis of God." The concern of the first is with "behavior," and of the second with "pointer readings," as Eddington would say.² But a final explanation of the behavior and the readings can be given only as both are seen to be related to a back-lying fact whose nature is given in the behavior and in the readings. The old distinction between essence and manifestation, or between substance and qualities, does not need to be rejected just because it is old.³ The most obvious of all facts is that man knows himself as a thinking creature. He can call back that which once was but no longer is; he can anticipate that which is not yet, but some day may be or will be. He can make past and future as though they were present. No psychological theory can change facts such as these: reflex arcs, brain-paths, energy discharges, psychoses, neuroses, and the like, are but terms teased out of modern man as he faces the sheer stark mystery of himself. However he accounts for his thinking capacity, he has it; and the more elaborate his attempts to rob it of all cosmic significance, the more that significance is made apparent. What else but mind could be at the pains of denying mind?—and the question is perti-

ment irrespective of the *word* that may be used for describing mental activity. Bridges' criticism is very much to the point when he draws attention to the surreptitious way in which the behaviorist and the mechanist make use of the very concepts, ideas, and presuppositions of the personalistic and spiritualistic theory which they have set themselves to destroy.⁴ How can there be any judgment passed on anything except as there is free intelligence; and if free intelligence is the precondition of all criticism, how can we operate with exclusively behavioristic and mechanistic categories?

Nor are we able to debase mind by the simple device of calling attention to the long and slow processes by which it has come to be. An account of the history of a fact cannot change the fundamental character of the fact itself. It is a curious temper that supposes that because mind, speaking with respect to its historical appearance, is an "emergent," it loses caste. Is mind that comes by way of a process any less impressive than mind that should come by sudden but inexplicable fiat—if, indeed, mind could come that way at all! We simply have to affirm that the history of mind no more degrades mind than the completed cathedral is degraded by the fact that it was a century or more in the building. Mind is like every other perfected organism, in that it wonderfully illuminates its own history: it invests the blind gropings of the almost insensate forms of long-distant ages with the character of genuine premonition. *That* was for *this*, and so *this* explains and interprets *that*. The principle holds, the principle of teleological continuity, whether we are considering the evolution of

mind throughout long ages, or whether we are considering its development in a given life at the present time.⁵

We have said that mind can be accounted for only by other mind. Mind at the human stage needs a twofold environment: it needs the environment of nature, and it needs the environment of society. It bears in itself the unmistakable stamp of this twofold environment: it is not only a part of all the other minds it has ever met, but it is also a part of every place where it has ever been. Mind cannot meet a mind and it cannot meet a fact—using for the time being a quite arbitrary distinction—without being to some extent affected thereby. That gives to every individual mind a certain universal significance, causing it to suggest a world greater than itself, to reveal more than it actually is. But one of the most serious mistakes made in the consideration of this fact is the inference that mind is therefore nothing at all but a growing deposit of experience, an increasing accumulation of impressions, a mere passive echo of voices calling from without, having no independent existence of its own.⁶ The error here is the more insidious because the surface facts seem to support it. To a superficial view it is clear enough that a mind is simply something that goes with a body: no bodies, no minds. The problem is therefore entirely one of understanding how bodies are produced and how they function. But because the condition to the *development* of a mind is first the production of a human infant, and then the surrounding of the infant with nature and society, it by no means follows that a mind is thereby being *created*. The presupposition

of mental development is—something to develop. No appeal of nature and no appeal of society could ever evoke a response if there were not already existent that which had the power to make the response. It is not to be denied that mind appears to have beginnings inchoate and inarticulate, but lowly beginnings do not yield the standard for estimating their own outcomes. Human minds obviously go with human bodies, but our ascertaining that this is the natural order and connection still leaves us with the fact that the *prius* of mind must still be mind, and not something called “matter.”⁷ To admit that there is in the universe to-day a reality called mind—the power of thought and all that that implies—and then to affirm that once upon a time there was no such thing as mind *anywhere*, is incredible merely as a philosophical doctrine. No one who was not the victim of a violent prejudice could claim that such a doctrine was more reasonable than that of theism, which affirms an eternal Mind as the ground and cause of all lesser minds. The theory of mind held by Durant Drake is admittedly “realistic,” and in a way even “materialistic,” in that it asserts that mind is made “of the same matter” as everything else, but Drake himself admits that the “sting” is taken out of the theory by the claim that the original matter or “stuff” is in both cases “psychic.” He accounts for “the physical aspect” of the “stuff” as being merely “the pattern according to which it is arranged.”⁸ And just as the *prius* of mind is other mind—which ought easily to be allowed by any man who makes the basic reality “psychic”—so mind is the *prius* of mental action in a given case. The processes whereby

we awaken mind, as we say, or stimulate it, all assume the possibility of the activity we desire to see. We desire a result which we believe we are able to bring about. All experience may be regarded as education, and education involves the educatee. It needs to be categorically affirmed that we do not *make* minds: we simply give minds a chance to grow. But growth is a co-operative enterprise. Even the behaviorist admits, as was mentioned above, that reflexes could not be "conditioned" unless they were already possessed of "prepotency."⁹ The term, like the "patterns" of the neo-realists, bears a meaning suspiciously like that of the "native forms" of the so-called *a priori* philosophers. In each case it is at least implied that growth calls for a working together of a subject and certain supplied conditions. This in turn involves the fact of a certain mutuality: the conditions are such as the subject—mind—can respond to; mind is such as to be able to respond to the conditions.

Experience, therefore, as we have said before, appears as interpretation. It is the discovery of meaning by that which is able to make the discovery. Neither the process nor the result is a mere "as if." The process is a process of reality; the result is a real and true result. Human experience is not one long-drawn-out self-delusion. Mind expresses reality and it discovers reality. If we cannot say that, why waste our time reflecting on life? If mind itself has no final significance, then neither have any of its conclusions. If we are to treat everything—facts, events, experiences, ideas—simply "as if," then we have to treat the "as if" philosophy also simply "as if" it

were true! The circle would be as vicious as any ever constructed by David Hume—although a mind less acute than that of Immanuel Kant could point out where the fallacy lay.¹⁰

Now, a discovered meaning implies not only a mind that discovers it but also the action of mind in that in which or by which meaning is discovered. Here we meet the central claim in the idealism of "the Great Tradition." The claim can hardly be questioned so far as *social* experience is concerned. Social experience means the intercourse of mind with mind, and it is carried on not directly and immediately, but by means of mutually understandable instrumentalities. Immediate knowledge of mind by mind is impossible. For one mind to reach another mind it must act, and the mind to be reached must respond to the action. The ensuing "understanding" of the one mind by the other is an interpretation—an interpretation of the meaning of certain "signs." A mind purely passive—if there could be such—would be a mind entirely unknowable and unknowing. Meaning may be conveyed by the most trivial acts—a motion of the head, a shrug of the shoulders, a gesture with the hand, a glance of the eye, a frown, a smile. But such acts may also be employed to convey a *false* meaning—a meaning opposite to that which they are usually understood to bear. Even a false meaning, however, is a meaning, and it implies a mind just as much as a true meaning does. All this being so, it becomes impossible that the actor shall be entirely equated with the act.¹¹ How can mind be nothing but behavior when every bit of behavior bears a meaning, and when behavior may be simulated so that the

meaning it appears to have and is taken to have is not at all its real meaning? There is more to any act than the act itself: any human act bears a message, and it bears that message because it is more or less the expression of a mind. The act is the actor manifested, but it is not the actor himself. Were it not for something in the actor, the act and its meaning could not be. We are therefore justified in saying that every act by which it is intended to express and convey meaning is an "incarnation." Even the act that is merely reflexive or that has become habitual has the same significance. A deed is a word; it is the utterance of mind.¹²

But such "words," such "utterances," usually have reference to other minds. It could not, however, be maintained that this reference is always there. Doubtless there are forms of human action which have meaning for the actor alone. He is not thinking of anybody else. He is expressing his own thought or fancy or necessity under an inward urge and primarily for his own sake. His deed, shall we say, is a pure monologue: he is "talking to himself." Doubtless too there are times when mind bodies forth itself in form for the sheer satisfaction of beholding its own handiwork. It wants to clothe its own ideas so that it may see them. It does something, or it makes something, and in the deed or in the production it sees itself. This too is monologue. The familiar illustration is that of the medieval cathedral builders who spent years on intricate details of carving with no reason for supposing that their work would ever be seen by human eyes. Yet even here, if the legends are true, there was the thought of the

work as a service offered to God: that is to say, the piece of carving represented the effort of a human mind to hold commerce with the divine. Hence the medieval doctrine: *laborare est orare*, a theme expressed in moving verse by Arthur Hugh Clough.¹³ And certainly the builder's satisfaction in his work would not have been decreased, but, rather, increased, had he learned of another mind to whom it had conveyed its message. Any piece of self-expression, therefore, be it never so subjective in its original reason, is always a *possible* datum for another mind. It may turn out to be a word which, although not meant to be heard, was heard, and conveyed a meaning. The "Song" of Pippa, as she passed by first one and then another on her brief but glorious holiday, was the spontaneous utterance of her own sheer joy in the fortune that gave her such a day: in no case was it intended for the ears of those it fell on, yet falling as it did on these various ears, it spoke a message that was understood. Even Sebald, borne along on the strength of an unhallowed passion, is suddenly halted in his tracks as he hears it: "God's in his heaven." He can rise to his feet, and turn his back upon his temptress, as he cries, "That little peasant's voice has righted all again." No one would have been more surprised than Pippa herself, as she lay down that night, weary but happy, in her little room, to know what her song had meant to so many human lives, yet the meaning it had for them it had *legitimately*. Nor did Wordsworth's "Solitary Reaper" suppose that her "plaintive numbers" were being overheard, or that the music of her song would linger in another's heart "long after it was heard no

more." Allowing therefore, as we must, that there may be human activity which has significance only for the actor, and in which there is no intention to convey a meaning to another, it still remains that the activity *may* become the medium for the fellowship of mind with mind.

In regard, however, to actions that are definitely social and intended so to be, there can be no doubt about their mediatorial character. There is every purpose to *share* an idea. One mind would establish contact with another mind. Olin A. Curtis built his theology on the principle that personality is under a law of self-expression, but self-expression motivated by the purpose of self-sharing.¹⁴ Mind expresses meaning through an act in order that the meaning might be seized by another mind. Such seizure is of the very essence of fellowship. Mind touches mind at the point of give and take. If it were not for this "point," minds would be as blind and "windowless" as Leibniz' monads—and minds like that would be perfectly impotent in all other respects. A mind whose expressed meanings were never accepted and approved by others would eventually collapse under the burden of a dreadful isolation: it would die of "solitary confinement." It is quite possible to describe a spoken sentence in terms of physics—expended energy, sound waves of varying velocity, and the like. But when physics had said all it could say about the spoken sentence, it still would have gotten no farther than the machinery. It never could measure in its own distinctive terms the *idea* in the sentence. A similar amount of energy and a similar combination of sound waves could carry an utterly

different idea, and the science of physics could never detect the difference. Not until an Italian sonnet can be reduced to the form within which it is so rigidly held can physics wholly explain any meaningful human action. In the words of D. G. Rossetti,

"A sonnet is a moment's monument—
Memorial from the Soul's eternity
To one dead deathless hour. . . .
A sonnet is a coin: its face reveals
The Soul—its converse, to what Power 'tis
due."¹⁵

Then how can a sonnet be simply so much form or sound? Forms or sounds in this sense are symbols. They are windows opening on vistas of varying characters and dimensions. They have a certain sacramental quality, being the visible signs of an invisible thought, the means whereby the thought signified may be shared with another mind. It is at this point that so-called "realistic" theories of knowledge are fatally weak: they fail to provide for the essential difference between the apprehension of the printed page as *datum* and the apprehension of the printed page as symbolic of meaning beyond itself. "In the core of one pearl," as Browning expressed it, lies "all the shade and the shine of the sea." And in the heart of one word may lie a whole philosophy, garnered of the tears and the laughter of many generations of men. Let that word be "love," and what more needs to be said? Love only a word? only so much sound? only a *flatus vocis*, as certain Scholastics would have said? Well, then, destroy the word utterly: let it be brought to pass that the word itself

shall never again be spoken or written, in the English language or in any other. Have you then destroyed love—*the thing itself*? The question is self-answering. Thought is more than its forms of expression. Mind is more than its own activity.

The principle we are considering, that deeds are conveyers of ideas, holds equally of the more objective and permanent achievements of man. Civilization is embodied thought. History is idea at work. All art, all music, all drama, all architecture—what are all these but mind giving itself form, form which alone makes possible the spread of idea. An unembodied thought is as impotent as unconfined and undirected energy. Energy is effective in the degree in which it is confined and directed, and thought is effective in the degree in which it submits to bondage—the bondage of form. Any institution, any organization, is an idea thrown into a more or less stable mold, but it is at the same time the means whereby the idea becomes shared by many minds. Hocking calls attention to the suggestive fact that ideas are forms of reality with the unique quality of not growing less, but increasing, according as they are shared.¹⁶ Even processes that appear to be destructive are under the control of idea. When men undertake to destroy an institution or to disrupt an organization, it is always in the interests of an idea which they desire to see take the place of another idea with which they have ceased to agree. All criticism resolves itself into a conflict of ideas. Whenever one thing is replaced by another—be it a tool, a method, a product, a building—the moving force in the change is an idea of the thing aimed at. Even when change

represents no specific human will, but appears as resulting impersonally from "the law of change," it will still be true that the change embodies—if we may again use Eucken's terms—"over-historical" and "over-personal" norms, which in their turn bespeak a Universal Spiritual Life.¹⁷ Even "relics," whatever their character, are relics bearing an idea, and they would be quite without significance were the idea not able, through them, to reach the contemporary mind. Gray in a country churchyard, Keats with a Grecian urn, Rossetti before a Ninevite god in the British Museum, Francis Thompson looking at "her portrait," anybody at the tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Washington, or London, or Paris—what goes on here but the commerce of mind with mind? Deep is calling unto deep. The gravestone, the urn, the god, the portrait, the tomb—what are they but so many "words" (*logoi*)—ideas and thoughts given some semblance of permanence lest they should perish from among men. The past can speak to the present only as the past can clothe itself in symbols: there is no other way. The past, as past, is always dead. If it is to continue to exist at all, it must exist as present, and it can exist as present only as there are minds in which or for which it can exist. The past can be effective, therefore, only as it is captured in idea. This is, in effect, the meaning of von Hügel when he says that our experience involves duration, while yet the elements of the experience interpenetrate each other in a certain "simultaneity."¹⁸ Here too we find the reason for Lotze's insistence that the law of the "physical" is not applicable to the "psychical."¹⁹ As forms of being, the

"physical" and the "psychical" are alike real, but what holds good of the one does not hold good of the other. What matter "the poet's teeming brain," the artist's lovely dreams, the musician's rhapsodies, unless they can be translated into the language of sound or color or form, and through that medium fulfill their larger destiny in becoming the possession of other minds? "Spirit with spirit can meet"—so we are assured by Tennyson, who also bids the meeting spirits to speak. But the speaking is necessarily "by means of," as we have already said. In Greek fashion, therefore, we shall regard mind as involving alike the power to understand and the power to express. Reason (*nous*) and utterance (*logos*) go together. The unexpressed thought—this has been our argument—is incomplete and unshared. The expressed thought is complete; it has uttered itself, and may be both shared and multiplied. The forth-going mind meets a response, and the response is the evidence that the mind is not alone—"a pin-point rock" in a shoreless ocean—but is surrounded by realities like itself.

Here, then, is the basis of all social fellowship. Idea can become incarnate. Mind can build a bridge to mind. But have we not here the philosophy also of a Universal Mind? There are features of our experience which are to us the evidence of minds like ourselves. But what about those other features of our experience the cause of which we cannot so explain? You read a poem, and by means of the poem your mind and the poet's mind share the same idea. Then you look at a tree. Is the poem the work of mind, and the tree not? That is perhaps one of the

greatest questions we can ask. In the works of man we see the works of mind, but in the works that are not man's—but *which are the indispensable bases for all of man's works*—we too often suppose that no mind is present and active. Is that good logic? Why should the picture of a landscape be held to bear witness to mind, but not the landscape but for which there could have been no picture at all? Are the copies more significant than the originals? We infer the creative human mind from all that it brings to pass. But what the human mind brings to pass it does so by means of material that is supplied to it and under conditions and within limitations that it cannot ignore. Why is not the *environment* within which man does that creative work which is mind in action just as much the action of mind as any adaptations and adjustments made within the environment?²⁰

These are deep matters, and we may not easily dismiss them. Perhaps it begins to appear that man must deny mind to himself if he is not willing to see everywhere the marks of a greater Mind than his own. Social experience requires instrumentalities. These instrumentalities not only include other minds and their various activities and creations, but they require also "nature." Man does nothing *de novo* or *in vacuo*. He is helpless, indeed, would be nonexistent, except as there is more than himself—so much "given." The experience of any given mind is concerned with facts, events, and processes which cannot be traced exclusively either to itself or to the action of other minds like itself. Other minds may and must, on occasion, *employ* these facts, events, and

processes, but they cannot wholly account for them. The mind that is helpless without conditions can hardly account for the conditions that so absolutely command it. Mind *deals* with the conditioning environment, learns how more or less to *control* it, but the dealing and the controlling must proceed according to the nature of the "given." No man may "do what he likes." This is the truth in the mechanistic theory of life, and in a "neo-mechanist"—as he prefers to call himself—like Joseph Needham, the truth can be harmonized with the present position after the method of Lotze, namely, by the claim that the mechanism that is universal in extent is yet subordinate in significance.²¹

How shall we explain these fixed and independent features of our environment—independent in the sense that their being and their nature are not to be traced to any human will, while yet they dictate to any and every human will the conditions on which alone they can be controlled? Whether we speak of them as things or as laws or as relationships, they confront us as so many absolutes, preventing us from living lives of mere phantasy, begetting in us the conviction of independent reality, making us creatures of law and order, disciplining both our thought and our will, prescribing to us the way in which alone we can walk securely. To attempt to ignore these absolute and coercive elements of experience is simply to invite disaster. This is why the world is a *cosmos*, characterized by orderliness and dependabilities—dependabilities which seem often to work against us, but which will work with us if we will work with them. Even those who deny an omnipotent God will

at least allow that the *concept* of omnipotence is valid. There is omnipotence although there is no God. Indeed, the nontheists like Bertrand Russell dwell at length on the heartlessness of the "unconscious power" to whose "trampling march" life is hopelessly subject.²² We lift up our eyes to the hills: they are there to-day as they were in our childhood. Matthew Arnold wrote of "the tree, the tree," standing "bare on its lonely ridge" in the distance, as he and "Thyrsis" had seen it so often "in old days." Mind, with its vast capacity of memory, and imagination, and creativity, and anticipation, would be indeed "an ineffectual angel, beating in the void its luminous wings in vain," but for the constraints it can never escape—the constraints of *reality*. It is because there are stabilities round about us and beneath us—like "everlasting arms"—that we can think rationally, live ethically, lay our plans, achieve our purposes. We look out upon a world and there is working within us a world which, with all its changes, is forever *the same*: the stars, the sunsets, the mountains, the tides, the seasons, fail not. Grass grows and water flows. Mind is environed by permanence.

What *are* these stabilities, we ask again—these laws, these processes, these relationships, or whatever else we choose to call them, which prescribe the limits within which we live, move, and have our being? The "common-sense realist" would make short work of the question. He would say that things are exactly what they seem to be, and there is no problem. "Nature, there it stands!" Colors are colors, sounds are sounds, solids are solids, laws are laws, distances are distances. If he chance to have

heard of William of Occam, he will call into use his famous "razor," and will declare that this prying into what is so obviously the simple facts of the case to find some "deeper" meaning was an altogether "unnecessary multiplication of principles," leading to dire confusion of the mind of "the plain man."²³ But the matter is not so simple as all that. Probably the greatest shock the novice in philosophy gets is when he first comes to realize—unless the fact prove to be to him a *pons asinorum*!—that the things he has been wont to take for granted, that seem so obvious, so immediate, so self-sufficient, are in reality mental constructs, and therefore not immediate at all, but mediate. "Scientific materialism" would, of course, take the side of "the plain man" here—which only shows how unscientific it is. Far more adequate, because explaining more, is the view that every recognized fact, every understood process, every stated law, everything, in short, that is not manifestly attributable to minds like our own, bears none the less that same symbolic character which we *know* is borne by whatever minds like our own have helped to produce. Using the previous illustration, we say that it takes a mind to account for a sentence, and it takes a mind to understand it. The sentence is a symbol by which meaning travels from mind to mind. And how otherwise can we finally describe those stabilities, whether of fact, of process, or of law, which we subsume under the word "nature"? There is meaning in the printed page, and there is meaning in the star-strewn firmament: he who says that speaks more rationally than he who denies it. There is not a single thing that can be said, either scientifically or psychologically,

about a printed page or a marble statue or a painted canvas or a Gothic arch that cannot be said about those natural stabilities and unchangeable laws and co-operating processes without which neither the page nor the statue nor the picture nor the arch would be possible. Intelligence may mold "the given" to its own purposes: this is freely admitted on every side. Yet many who admit this refuse to see in "the given" anything but a mere "neutrality."²⁴ Mind is under control, yes, but of what? Of something that is not mind and that in nowise resembles mind—this is the alleged conclusion. But if a cathedral is a work of mind, why are not all those forces which set the possibilities of the architect and the builder, and but for which there could be no cathedral at all—why are these not the work of mind too? Minds appear at this point and that in what has been called a "manifold" or a "continuum." It is clearly impossible to separate the mind from its setting: has not mind "emerged" from this very setting? Then are not the mind and the setting organic to each other? Shall we not understand the setting from the nature of the mind it has fostered and sent forth? In which case the setting cannot be a mere neutrality, a blind mechanism, a self-sufficing somewhat, "indifferent to the fate of the values" which its own product, rational mind, cherishes.

We shall say, then, that the being, nature, and action of minds such as we know our own to be are utterly inexplicable except as there be a Universal Mind—God—who is as truly manifested in what we "find" as we are in what we do with this "found" or by means of it. Our fellowship with each other is a

perpetual discovery of mind to mind through symbols. The condition to these symbols is that there shall be still other realities which are quite independent, for their existence and nature, of the symbol-making and symbol-using mind. If the lesser is symbolic, why is not the greater? If the contingent is meaningful, why is not the absolute? An Eternal Mind—an Eternal Word revealing the thought of Eternal Mind in an endless variety of lesser words or symbols—are we not in good right led to this as the final explanation of our own minds, their experience of each other through mutual action, and the dependence of both the minds and the experience on the stabilities of nature?

Difficult to believe in God? Perhaps. But he who disbelieves has never completely considered his own alternative. Or if he has done so, and if he still insists on it, he ought not to charge against belief in God that it is difficult, seeing that he accepts something which, when its implications are thought through, is seen to labor under the difficulty of being profoundly irrational.

NOTES ON CHAPTER VI

¹ See *Religion Coming of Age*, p. 138. Sellars, of course, denies the existence of mind except as a "function" of the "physical" organism. Cf. Patrick, *The World and Its Meaning*, chap. xvii, and the same author's later book, *What is the Mind?* the second representing a semi-behavioristic view which, however, may be given an idealistic interpretation. The author expressly says (p. 181) that the view is not intended in any way to lessen the powers of the mind, whether intellectual, moral, religious, or æsthetic.

² See *The Nature of the Physical World*, chap. xii. These "readings" are, as a matter of fact, says Eddington, not the final reality, at all: they are so many "symbols," still awaiting deeper insight (pp. 268-272).

³ The Neo-Scholastics are contending vigorously for the validity of the concept of "substance." See McWilliams, *Cosmology*, chap. xviii; Sheen, *Religion Without God*, chap. vii, also pp. 151-155, 292-296; Mercier, *A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, pt. ii, chap ii, arts. 1-4. Cf. Wicksteed, *Reactions Between Dogma and Philosophy*, lect. vi, on "The Doctrine of the Soul"—an examination of the teaching of Thomas Aquinas.

⁴ See *Taking the Name of Science in Vain*, p. 18.

⁵ Cf. Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God*, lect. vi. No recent thinker has grasped more clearly and stated more persuasively the organic relation of mind to the whole nature-process while yet holding firmly to its deeper significance. Man as rational and ethical intelligence is conceived as culminating "a continuous process of immanent development" (p. 111).

⁶ Dewey's theory comes very close to this. He assumes on the part of the physical organism certain "biological aptitudes." These, interacting with the environment,

give rise to "a system of beliefs, desires, and purposes," and individual concrete mind consists in just this formed system. See *Human Nature and Conduct*, preface, p. iii, for a concise statement.

⁷ The principle implied here is substantially that of the older "Occasionalism," developed by later Cartesians like Geulinx and Malebranche to deal with the problem of the relation between mind and body growing out of Descartes' sixth *Meditation*. In its modern form, the principle appears as *Epigenesis*, and was adopted by Borden P. Bowne as congruous with "volitional causality." Cf. *Personalism*, chap. iv. Lotze, *Microcosmus*, vol. i, p. 280, accepted the principle, and states it as follows: "Our knowledge of nature is at best but an accurate study of the *occasions* on which—by means of a mechanism whose inner moving springs we do not understand—phenomena are manifested, each attached by universal laws to an occasion belonging exclusively to itself, and each with an equally constant regularity changing with a change in that occasion."

⁸ *Mind, and Its Place in Nature*, espec. p. 243.

⁹ See above, Chapter IV, note 24.

¹⁰ See Urban, *The Intelligible World*, for a brief judgment on the "as if" philosophy. He regards it as "essential sophistication" (p. 32), and declares that there could be no greater tragedy than that what we treated as most valuable we should at the same time know to be untrue and unreal (p. 74).

¹¹ Cf. Haldane, *The Philosophy of Humanism*, pp. 52-53. Haldane argues that in any act of intelligence the intelligence itself necessarily transcends the act (p. 57).

¹² See E. Caird, *The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, vols. i and ii, for a consideration of the relation between "reason" (*nous*) and "word" (*logos*) in Greek and early Christian thought. For the theory in recent philosophy, see Haldar, *Neo-Hegelianism*, a study of the work of such men as T. H. Green, the Cairds, Wal-

lace, Ritchie, Bradley, Bosanquet, John Watson, Henry Jones, Muirhead, J. S. MacKenzie, Haldane, and McTaggart.

¹³ See *Qui Laborat, Orat.*

¹⁴ See *The Christian Faith*, chaps. xviii and xxxiv. Curtis states his position concisely on pp. 507-508.

¹⁵ *The House of Life*, "The Sonnet," introduction.

¹⁶ See *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, rev. edit., pp. 229-232. Hocking shows how one's power increases according as one's ideas prevail in other minds.

¹⁷ See *The Truth of Religion*, Eng. trans., pts. iii and v. Cf. W. Tudor Jones, *An Interpretation of Rudolf Eucken's Philosophy*, chap. iv.

¹⁸ See *Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion*, first series, pp. 69-70.

¹⁹ *Op. cit.*, vol. i, bk. ii, chap. i, on "The Existence of the Soul."

²⁰ See Vaughan, *The Significance of Personality*, chap. iii, on "The Humanity of God," for a readable exposition of this whole point of view. Cf. Wilson, *The Self and Its World*, and Bell, *Sharing in Creation*, *passim*.

²¹ See Needham's article on "Mechanistic Biology and the Religious Consciousness" in the volume, *Science, Religion, and Reality*, ed. Needham; also his *Skeptical Biologist*, espec. the chapter on "Materialism and Religion," pp. 217ff.

²² Cf. Krutch, *The Modern Temper*, chap. i, on "The Genesis of a Mood." This chapter sets the tone for the whole book, which comes to its climax in the definition of human life as "merely a physiological process with only a physiological meaning" (p. 235).

²³ *Entia non multiplicanda sunt præter necessitatem*—Occam's "razor."

²⁴ "Neutrality" here is not used in the sense that meets us in certain modern realists like Durant Drake, namely, that our environment consists of so many "neutral en-

tities," which may be either "physical" or "psychical," as occasion may require (see *Mind, and Its Place in Nature*, chap. viii, and cf. Patrick, *The World and Its Meaning*, pp. 366-372, and literature there cited). It is used, rather, to describe the claim that although the world is "the home of values," there is no teleological or purposive relation between these "values" and the conditions in which they may be won. These conditions, relative to the values, are simply "neutral." Krutch is logical enough when he infers from this that the fundamental fact is "an unresolvable discord" (*op. cit.*, p. 247). The non-theistic humanists who keep "meaning" while surrendering "purpose" are simply not logical.

CHAPTER VII
EVALUATION AND RELIGION

THE ARGUMENT

THE relative features of the ethical life go naturally with life as a process of discovery, but implicit in the relative ethic is the absolute ethic. This absolute ethic is in that very principle that controls the changing ethic and is the real reason for the change. Evaluation is inseparable from life, because life necessarily creates situation whence emerge conflicting claims of higher and lower, and the claims must be settled. The necessity of the evaluation witnesses to a reality which exists independently of the situation, and but for which the situation itself could not be. The evaluation may ignore the claim of the higher, since it is of the nature of a moral absolute that it shall be freely chosen. To ignore it, however, is not to destroy it. Man cannot destroy what he does not create. The evaluating impulse, therefore, witnesses to an Eternal Moral Order which man exists to illustrate, confirm, and obey. Moral progress is that order becoming more and more fully embodied in human history. The order in its turn involves God. Moral evaluation is metaphysical revelation. Religion seeks that God whose nature and will are revealed in the moral order. It is in his will that we are to find our peace.

CHAPTER VII

EVALUATION AND RELIGION

WE have been saying that mind consists in a power of interpretation and a power of fellowship. To this is now to be added a power of evaluation. It is of the very nature of human experience that conflicting claims shall be encountered. A choice becomes inevitable, and a choice means that one claim is held to have a higher sanction than another. Höffding's much-discussed axiom concerning religion and the conservation of value is nothing at all but a way of saying that man is a creature who recognizes experiences as higher and lower, and who believes that the principle of the higher has permanence and that his own obligation is to this principle. Amid all the difference of opinion as to what constitutes a high and a low in a given situation, the conviction that there are real highs and real lows remains, and with it the conviction that the recognized high should have the right of way. Ethics may be relative to changing situations, but presupposed in the changing ethic is an absolute ethic. It is clear that ethical progress means the substitution, as a basis for human action, of a traditional conception by another conception believed to be "better," and the substitution is made because the better is recognized as authoritative. The better carries the quality of "oughtness." Here is the absolute element in ethics, and it is present in all ethical judgments.¹ To make relativity universal is

as impossible in the realm of value as it is in the realm of fact. A universe of relativities would mean a universe in which were no dependabilities, and in such a universe it could not be known that there were even relativities. Parts may be relative to other parts of the given whole, but eventually we come to the ultimate whole, and the ultimate whole cannot be relative. It is an absolute—absolute as a fact, absolute in its essential nature, absolute in the law of its acting. There must, therefore, be absolute features to human experience. The “ideas” of Plato and the “forms” of Aristotle and the “categories” of Kant are more than mere empty abstractions. Even thinkers of the type of Durant Drake, Whitehead, and Wieman recognize that the order of experience is under some kind of absolute control—the control of “patterns.”² Whatever be the nature of that which exerts the control, the control itself is so palpable that even the most confirmed dreamer cannot but recognize it. The reference here is not only to the concrete actualities with which we are surrounded, but also to those “molds” within which, entirely apart from our choice and volition, experience is necessarily cast.

It is necessary to distinguish, however, between absolutes that control our action in this more automatic fashion and absolutes that may or may not control our total life-attitudes. The existence of the first is indisputable enough. The second is open to the charge of being more or less arbitrary and imaginary. To try to treat “things,” practically or theoretically, other than as their essential nature permits, is to invite speedy disaster. “Pain” is an effective teacher,

perhaps more so even than "pleasure," and pain is an instrument for securing obedience to absolutes.³ But there are other absolutes which manifest themselves only as they are permitted to do so: or at least, their effective action depends upon something besides themselves. It is the height of paradox to talk about dependent absolutes, and yet it is the paradox of great truth. In any usual sense of the word, there is nothing conditional about the laws of gravity or the laws of sound or the laws of nutrition or the laws of any of the other manifold natural processes.

"And with joy the stars perform their shining,
And the sea its long moon-silvered roll;
For self-poised they live, nor pine with noting
All the fever of some differing soul."⁴

The operation of "the natural" is independent of human wills. These stabilities have therefore nothing to do, except by indirection, with "judgments of value." The most we can say of them is that they help provide the conditions within which values may be manifested or from which they may be won. The terms, "manifested" and "won," as here used, are significant. They suggest a wide rift in modern thought. There are those who claim that values are a purely human creation, in that they depend wholly upon man and have no meaning, even no existence, apart from him. This would seem to be at least implied in Dewey's theory of "experimental empiricism."⁵ On the other hand, Sorley and A. E. Taylor regard values not as human creations but as human discoveries.⁶ These men stand squarely on the fact that there are certain great realities which condition human experi-

ence, and that the quality of a man's experience is determined by his attitude toward these realities. These realities exist in their own right. They would still be realities even if there were no creation. Men exist with reference to them, and are constituted so as to be able to lay hold upon them and make them their own. They cannot be seen or touched, but invisibility does not mean unreality. "The things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal." The most potent forces in human experience are those which operate from within the veil, but whose operation calls for our consent—at least, in some measure. We learn of their existence by the very process and experience of life itself. This, of course, is the way in which all absolutes are learned; but there is an element of freedom and choice respecting some of them which does not hold respecting some others. The absolutes which control the physical organism, and those which control certain forms of mental judgment, are not the same as those which control what we call character, or the inner spiritual experience, or the relations of men within the social grouping. Men are neither as "the pieces on a chessboard" nor as the helpless ball which must go "as strikes the player." They are subjects of other than external forces. They may act "in view of"—and the implications of that fact may not be ignored in any attempt to read life truly. These absolutes that work from within and with our co-operation are just *as* absolute as any others. Indeed, it may appear in the end that these are the only actual absolutes, and that the absolutes that determine nature and mental judgments have been devised

for the sake of the moral absolutes, and to provide an arena for their manifestation. The existence of the moral absolutes is learned much more slowly, however, than that of the others; the results of ignoring them are much less immediately evident; and whether they shall be obeyed even when they are recognized is much more a question for the will to determine.

These considerations set our problem. How shall we characterize honesty, truthfulness, generosity, sympathy, justice, love, self-sacrifice, purity, humility, holiness, and similar graces and virtues which have come to light as mankind has pursued its way, and which increasingly point the direction of its future? Are they, as was intimated above, merely human creations? Are they just so many devices which men have worked out to ease the friction of living together? There is not one of them that can enforce itself with the same drastic suddenness and completeness that, say, gravity can, or in a different way even "the laws of thought." Fire burns; falls injure; water drowns; but dishonesty may "pay," and even when it does not it may still be scoffed. No man is *compelled* to be honest or truthful or generous or sympathetic or loving in the same sense that he is compelled to breathe or to eat or to drink or to avoid falling bodies or to have always something under him or to treat four as the equal of two and two. One experience of the burning power of fire or of the suffocating power of water or of the sense of utter helplessness in falling from a height is a lesson which, if it be survived, the human mind never forgets. But not so readily does it learn those other laws whose sanctions depend not so much on the working of the

objective order—although sooner or later they may have these sanctions also—as upon a court whose seat is in the innermost shrine of the soul. A merely prudent and pragmatic morality, crudely expressed in the modern saying that “anything is right if you can get away with it,” is aimed directly at the fundamental virtue of sincerity. As to this, Walter Lippmann’s observations on “Love in the Great Society” are very much to the point: knowing how to avoid the “social consequences” of unrestrained passion does not mean that *all* consequences are avoided.⁷ Nor if they were entirely avoided, we shall add, would it mean that license was thereby justified. That man is to be pitied indeed to whom honesty is merely a policy, and generosity merely a road to influence, and justice merely a social gesture, and purity merely a regard for prudence. Not in this way does life attain its true stature. It belongs to the very nature of mind to find itself sooner or later aware of a *claim*. All moral philosophies, all ethical codes, yes! and all religions, low or high, have reference to the nature and the significance of this claim. These things are very much more than the evidence to man’s need of a “defense mechanism” against the stark and irresponsive impersonality of the universe that momentarily threatens him. They bear witness to man—that is evident; but they also bear witness to that larger whole of which man is a part. The moral order is as real as any other order: as was suggested above, it may even be the fundamental order, and all other orders simply its derivatives. Be that as it may, a man knows that in escaping the judgment of his fellows he does not escape self-judgment; and he knows

that when he turns a deaf ear to that self-judgment—as he may and does—*the judgment still stands*. The moral judgment is not rendered invalid by its apparent inability on occasion to enforce itself. There are no permanent “cities of refuge” in the moral order. The right that one appears to have escaped by turning down another path is quite likely to be met on the new path, even although it be under a new form. There are moral inescapabilities, and evasion of them is only postponement. Jonah took ship for Tarshish in the west because he would not go to Nineveh in the east, but he found that there were no straight lines, and though he sailed due west the pull of the east was there and it eventually brought him to Nineveh. “Whither shall I go from thy Spirit? Or whither shall I flee from thy presence?” Still the unwearied “Hound” follows—follows “with unhurrying chase and unperturbed pace,” with “deliberate speed, majestic instancy.” That particular judgments as to right and wrong, high and low, desirable and undesirable, are always open to investigation and revision, is, of course, plain enough. There could be no moral history otherwise. This, indeed, is of the very essence of moral value—that it can preserve itself only by a steady and drastic criticism of its own detailed manifestations. Growth involves at once a surrender of something that is old and the acceptance of something that is new, but both the surrender and the acceptance result from one and the same principle.

But what is this principle? How may we characterize it? What is the *living core* of these diverse manifestations? This claim that stands over against

the awakened mind, the claim that life should be pitched according to the highest, the claim that the accepted highest shall continually be replaced by a discovered higher—what does it signify? The fact of it is as patent as any fact in human experience. It registers itself in life in a thousand ways. Its province is the realm of the inner assents, and a man's inner assents in the end make him what he is. Much that he does and much that he has contact with will be quite incidental. What will not be incidental is *why* he does it—the motive, the spirit, the purpose—and what he takes away from the contact. For these incidentals provide the field for the operation of the permanents and the absolutes. There is no situation in which a man may not maintain and reveal his fundamental attitudes, and these attitudes necessarily involve either an indorsement or a rejection of an inescapable claim. It is with reference to that claim that he exists at all. His power to recognize it is his distinctive characteristic. What he does about it becomes determinative of his entire being. It constitutes an *a priori* which rules over him from the beginning, independent of his will for its existence, in nowise destroyed because he may choose to ignore it, but calling to his will for co-operation. It is not an *a posteriori* which he painfully builds up, and which has no other significance than that it is his creation. Though he learn of it by experience, the learning is a discovery of a reality already existent—even eternally existent. The conception arrived at by Aristotle, that the end is the fulfillment of the meaning of the beginning, and is therefore present as immanent principle throughout the whole process of

its historical development—this conception still registers an insight which mere empiricism has not been able to invalidate.⁸ It is hardly possible to imagine a more shallow philosophy than that which sees in moral values nothing more than useful social devices. It is as shallow as the science which takes the “pointer readings” and the measurements as themselves ultimates instead of as expressions of a reality still more profound. Values, whether we characterize them as social, or as moral, or as religious, may properly enough be required to have temporal sanctions, but not to have temporal origins. And even the sanctions must eventually be seen to be more than temporal. Why should a man make one choice rather than another when the choice he refuses has attached to it every desirable consideration—*except one*—and the choice he accepts has attached to it no desirable consideration—*except one*? In being swayed by this one consideration, namely, the purpose to be true to an insistent claim that arises from within, and which nobody else in the world but himself need know how he treated—in being thus swayed the man becomes the evidence to the existence of a moral absolute, which because it is moral is conditioned on his will in order to become positively effective in his life, but which because it is moral is also inescapable if the man would come to his true self. Kant’s “categorical imperative” does not lose its categorical character because it goes unheeded, and it would still be rightful lord even although it were universally disobeyed, but an absolute lord with some obedient subjects is after all more impressive than an absolute lord without subjects of any kind.⁹ Then if man cannot escape

the moral absolute, that is to say, if he can never reach the place where he will not know that an authoritative Voice is speaking to him, that absolute, that Voice, cannot be held to be his own creation. What man makes man can destroy. But there are indestructibilities not only in the realm of nature but also in the realm of spirit. Man must learn to subject himself to whatever is indestructible. Even in seeming to use it for his own good he must still obey it. And the correlate of obedience is lordship. Whatever conditions man's well-being is man's overlord. There exists a principle, a law, an order, or whatever else we like to call it, and man is intended to be its subject. Every "conscientious scruple" is the proof of it. We have even the paradox that the denial of the existence of an objective moral law, when made for reasons held in all good faith and sincerity, will be the clearest evidence of that which is being denied. Denials may be emphatic affirmations, and none the less emphatic because indirect.

In these considerations we find the answer to the question whether values are of the real stuff of the universe or whether they are protective devices which man himself has arbitrarily hit upon in order to make his existence temporarily tolerable. Every choice of a higher against a lower is made in a definite situation. To say that the situation is "real," falling, as Höffding would say, within "the manifold of existence," but that the principle of the choice is only "ideal," perhaps nothing but a fiction of the imagination—this looks very much like sheer philosophical stubbornness. Perhaps it will turn out that if we believe some things "just because we want to," we

may not believe some other things "just because we do not want to." Why does it not follow that if a "real" situation can be controlled by an "ideal" principle, the principle is at least no less existential than the situation? Byron may have "taught us little" in some respects, as Matthew Arnold seemed to think, but he understood the power of an idea:

"Eternal Spirit of the chainless Mind!
Brightest in dungeons, Liberty! thou art,
For there thy habitation is the heart—
The heart which love of thee alone can bind;
And when thy sons to fetters are consigned—
To fetters, and the damp vault's dayless gloom,
Their country conquers with their martyrdom,
And Freedom's fame finds wings on every wind."¹⁰

Were the "fetters" real, but the "spirit" which led the prisoner to endure them unreal? *Without that spirit there would have been no fetters.* The unseen was giving meaning to the seen, as it always does. So that what is said to be "only ideal" appears to be more truly existential than the situation in which it is operative, since the situation may utterly pass away while yet the ideal principle remains. When in a situation calling for honesty a man chooses to be dishonest, has he thereby destroyed honesty? If there were not a single honest man in the whole world—not even Diogenes being left!—would there then be no honesty *anywhere*? Does justice depend upon men being just, or love depend upon men loving, or purity depend upon men being pure? There was a time when there was no race of men. Then men appeared, and history began to be made. Was that history entirely "hit and miss," or was it under the

influence of something pre-existent—a pre-existent of which the history was so much revelation and illustration? Plato's argument in the *Symposium* for Absolute Beauty is as nearly valid as philosophical argument can ever hope to be;¹¹ and the argument is just as valid for Truth and Goodness. As a statement of empiric fact, it would be true enough to say that to have justice we must have just men; but since the demand for justice is a demand growing out of the process of life itself, we must say that life is rooted in the principle of justice, and therefore that the principle antedates particular lives. But in that case, it must also be said that values are intrinsic to reality: they are of the very stuff of existence.¹² When that first evolving man stayed his hand as he was about to steal the meal of another, that was not the absolute origination of justice in the universe: rather it was the beginning of the revelation of justice as a force to be reckoned with in human life and history. Morals have plainly enough undergone a historical evolution, but the evolution has been only the more complete recognition and operation of the moral principle. If it comes to that, evolution of any sort is not creation but revelation. Such popular phrases as "creative evolution" and "emergent evolution" are, as a matter of fact, philosophically misleading, whatever may have been the original intention of Bergson and Lloyd Morgan. This point has been stressed by both MacWilliam and Harris.¹³ The theist would better use the phrase "revelational evolution." Nothing can appear in time but it has antecedents out of time. The fact that man can and does evaluate, giving some things the right of way over others; the fact

that he can "swear to his own hurt and change not"; the fact that he can recognize an invisible authority and bow to it; the fact that he can order his life with reference to realities whose effectiveness for his life depends on his own co-operation—all this calls for explanation. What is being said here is nothing at all original—it has been said thousands of times before, and it is to be hoped that it will be said many thousand times again—namely, that all this is most fairly explained as being the evidence to a moral order whose constituents are not only "just as absolute" as the constituents of the so-called natural order, but in a sense more so, since the final reason for the natural order is in the moral order.

In the preceding chapter, we spoke of the relation between "mind" and "word." Things, we said, are symbols, proving the fact of thought. Man is under the control of stabilities which provide the setting for his own purposeful activity. These stabilities, we said, become in their turn intelligible according as they also are viewed as the work of a Universal Mind. Can we say less than this concerning those moral stabilities which hem us round about just as truly as we are hemmed around by natural forces and natural facts? If "dead spirits rule us from their urns," is it not by virtue of some great reality which these spirits once represented, and whose appeal we cannot resist? Mind, we say, is revealed in its action: then the highest action is the highest revelation.¹⁴ Man worships only the best; where he obeys, there he worships; and his worshiped and obeyed best is for him divine. He throws it back into the eternities: it is supreme, an absolute. But in all this there is

choice, and choice involves an evaluation. Whatever is really chosen is chosen for reasons: a good of some sort is desired. Who desires a good until he has first judged it to be a good? Such a judgment means an evaluation. What we evaluate as a good it becomes "right" for us to seek or to serve. We are held by "oughtness." Whether or not we shall actually seek and serve the right is for us to determine, but it is not for us to determine the right of the right to rule. The right rules us, and in one way or another we prove it every day.

God is in that right. The legislation we cannot escape bespeaks the Legislator. It is the utterance of his own thought, determined by that thought as surely as the thought is determined by his own essential nature. Because it proceeds most deeply from within himself it is therefore his most majestic, most revealing, most authentic utterance. It is the veritable Word of God. If man is most truly himself according as he evaluates and according as he submits himself to the control of the value that he deems the highest, and if in all this he is but discovering the deeper meaning of the world and of his own existence, then the fact of God is given in the fact of value as nearly as any fact can be said to be given in another. No; men's conviction that the voice of conscience is the voice of God has not misled them. The moral coward is condemned because men feel that somehow he is traitor to the cause of the universe itself. A deliberate lie disgraces even the very stars. We shame the universe when we shame that for which the universe was created. As in the ancient prophecy, "the mountains and the hills break forth into sing-

ing, and all the trees of the field clap their hands," when men "incline their ear unto the Lord," and "walk in his ways"; but when men are indifferent in the presence of the divine, and treat with scorn those who cry "Hosanna!" then "the very stones cry out against them." Water is always as wine to those who know the secret of the Lord, and who, like the astonished group at Cana of Galilee, "do whatever he saith unto them." We speak in parables. More plainly, what we mean is that the realization of the purpose at the same time glorifies the process. The natural is the means to the moral; the moral attained is the natural consummated. And if we go so far in our philosophy as to say that "nature" is mind's interpretation of Other Mind, then we shall also say that in men's recognition of moral value, or of the moral order, or of spiritual law—call it what you will—there is at the same time the recognition of a reality which can no more be explained without reference to a Universal Mind than any social experience can be explained without reference to at least two minds under a relation of reciprocity. Of all signs, the most significant are those which are the least arresting because they are the least obvious, a fact urged with telling effect by Turner against the mechanists' denial of Creative Mind.¹⁵ Who ever saw a machine that did not require a mind to account for it? The historical process, the natural process, the universe itself—all are mechanistic, but they are, we are told, the expression of no Thought, the utterance of no Mind. The only machine that explains itself is the machine within which many other machines are being made—*by minds!* This is our

boasted humanistic logic. Verily, while the gnat is strained out, the camel is swallowed, humps and all! The sacramental can always be profaned, and that is most easily profaned that is most sacred. What must struggle harder than the moral? what defeat may be more easily concealed—for the time being—than a moral defeat? yet what gain can ultimately compensate for a moral loss?

Man, then, is most truly man when he is most consciously under the control of that whose appeal is purely moral. The deepest meaning of the universe is revealed in a moral victory, in religious experience. The final revelation of the being and the character of God is in the inner sanctuary of man. There dwells the true Shekinah. Religion consists in the discovery of that Shekinah. That is to say, religion is man finding "the Beyond that is Within." The very far is the very near. "Immanuel: God-with-us," most truly expresses the religious ideal, and for uncounted numbers of people it describes the experiential religious fact. Others profess adherence to a religion in which this element is lacking, and to which it is not even necessary. The reflections on the significance of evaluation which have been indulged in above point, however, toward the theistic conclusion as given in the very fact of value. Religion, which is inseparable from the evaluating process, confirms that conclusion on an empirical basis. Value, religion, God—these belong together. Either one involves the other two.

Religion is a persistent accompaniment of human life. No difficulty in defining religion, and no range of diversity in beliefs and practices held to be religious, can destroy the fact that religion is universal.

Attempts to minimize the significance of the fact have been frequent enough, and they will probably continue. Religion has more than once been classified among the superstitions of the race, and the conclusion has been drawn that like all other superstitions it will eventually be outgrown. But because superstitions have been connected with religion does not make religion a superstition *in its basic idea and purpose*. If it did, many other human interests would be in the same case, even science itself. Religion, as such, is one of the major concerns of mankind, and it will continue to be so because its real roots are in human nature itself. Its excesses are granted, but these are always remediable. Lucretius in his attack on religion, "our enemy," as he calls it, has had numerous successors, who, like him, have charged up to religion "deeds sinful and impious."¹⁶ How there could be sinfulness and impiety in a world in which there was no God and no independent, objective, eternal Moral Law, does not appear! One of the amazing developments of our time, however, is the fact that a large number of men who have surrendered the theistic faith are still insisting that they may keep a religion. A reputable thinker like Schmidt can look into the future and be quite sure that theism is to go but equally sure that religion is to stay. Another like Joad can write very dolefully of the present state of religion but is astonishingly cheerful about its future. It seems that the chief handicap for religion to-day is God: get rid of God, and religion will go forward with a bound. Haydon, for example, says that "What God meant he can no longer mean," and he talks of a God whose "reality"

lies in the far future; yet for all that no "humanist" has written a more moving plea for religion than Haydon has.¹⁷ These men justify their position, at least in part, on the ground that there are major religions which are nontheistic. They argue that this means that theism is not essential to religion.¹⁸ One wonders if it has ever occurred to them to compare the highest theistic religion, which is Christianity, with the highest nontheistic religion, say Confucianism; or, if one follows Legge in regarding "Heaven" as a personal Deity,¹⁹ then with Buddhism, Jainism, and certain of the classical forms of Brahmanism. The comparison made by Höffding between Buddha and Jesus becomes the more significant when the differences of the two teachers respecting God is borne in mind.²⁰ Moreover, if theistic religion is to be reminded that there is nontheistic religion, it is only fair that nontheistic religion should be reminded that there is theistic religion. Taking a majority vote as settling this question would, of course, be absurd. In fact, in matters religious a few men have usually had to carry the banner. The question of God or no God is a question of fact, and in so far as it can be settled at all it must be in the light of reason and reasons. We can hardly conclude, therefore, that because many people have had no God—or thought they had none—therefore there is no God. If the argument from the fact of belief in God to the fact of God himself is fallacious, the same would have to be said of the argument from no belief to no God. That one man should believe in God is in a way much more significant than that a thousand men should not believe. Besides, what is meant by calling cer-

tain religions nontheistic? These religious have not so much flatly denied God as that they have failed to arrive at the full conception. They certainly believe in that reality at which the theistic faith likewise is aimed. That is, they believe in the meaningfulness of life; they believe in a great invisible control; they believe in that which should have the right of way; in a word, they evaluate; and if they have not been led by their evaluations to a clear-cut idea of God, that fact may very well be due to limitations and uncertainties which in a thorough-going theism have been overcome. Does not the moral and intellectual courage which leads a man to affirm God merit as much consideration as that much more hesitant attitude which recognizes and considers the facts but cannot reach the theistic conclusion? In either case there is a choice: for which choice can the more be said? God is hardly a demonstrable fact, if by demonstration is meant that we have no alternative but to believe. To Wieman's claim that we have "sense experience" of God as we have of other "objects," the obvious reply is that that is true only of what Wieman takes God to be.²¹ God is "behind the veil, behind the veil," and we reach beyond that veil by faith. Faith means choosing, and the choice here is not made once and for always, but needs continually to be re-affirmed. Even for the most convinced, doubt is always near by. It "coucheth at the door" like a wild beast.

"With me faith means perpetual unbelief
Kept quiet like the snake 'neath Michael's foot
Who stands calm just because he feels it
writhe."²²

It is always possible that the veil does not conceal what it is believed to. Denial is therefore easier than affirmation. Or at least, doubt is easier than faith. But the easy is not necessarily the true. The exact opposite may on occasion be the case. Truth is often difficult—difficult to arrive at, difficult to accept, difficult to live by. Very many things may be said against the idea of the reality of God. That there are those who take more account of what can be said against the idea than of what can be said for it is no matter of deep surprise.

A favorite practice of some students of the subject is to endeavor to find what they regard as the element common to all religions, and then define religion in terms of this common element. The first result registered by this practice is, of course, negative. For example, since some religions have no God, therefore belief in God is not essential to religion; since some religions show no interest in the ethical, therefore the ethical is not essential to religion; since some religions make no provision for worship, therefore worship is not essential to religion, and so on. If all these alleged nonessentials were omitted from religion in a given case, the religion would hardly be recognized as such. Schmidt adopts this method of exclusion, and he is thereupon led to define religion as "devotion to the highest." He sets forth the various forms this "highest" has taken—personal well-being, a beloved personality, an institution, a cause, the search for facts, the quest for beauty, technical perfection, expertness in one's field, patriotism, prosperity, social idealism, and the like.²³ To all these, different men have given themselves with a complete

abandon, and this abandon Schmidt describes as a manifestation of the religious impulse. He does admit, however, that it is a question whether such objects of devotion are adequate to meet the deeper spiritual needs of those who engage in them. When one considers what happens to men for whom the "highest" is some of the things mentioned, the admission seems wise. The patriotism of Edith Cavell was beyond dispute, but her last words as she stood before the firing squad, and paid for her love with her life, still ring in the ears of the world: "Patriotism is not enough." Schmidt also admits that devotion to one or other of the objects mentioned may have quite undesirable results. The admission is suggestive. If devotion to what one conceives to be the highest may degrade rather than exalt the life, a radical criticism of the so-called "highest" will properly be called for. On Schmidt's own showing, therefore, devotion to the highest is not in itself necessarily justifiable. The devotion may spring—and does spring—from some deep need of human nature, but the direction it takes may be a sad perversion. What is needed, therefore, is not simply devotion to the highest, but also a highest that is worthy of the devotion. The values of life must be under the control of a supreme value, and the supreme value must be one that can make life the best that it can be. Whatever puts a check on the fullest development of the life is thereby shown to be not worthy of the first place. A devotion that makes a man narrow, or selfish, or unjust, or materialistic, cannot be defended. The purpose of religion, says Hadfield, is to "complete" the life—a statement in which many others concur;²⁴ and Hocking has shown,

in his accustomed penetrating way, how impossible it is to achieve "the integration of selfhood" on any mere method of picking and choosing.²⁵ If devotion to the highest has the significance that Schmidt attaches to it, then the highest cannot be made too high. Whether it really is the highest—not the relative but the absolute highest—will have to be determined to some extent by what the results would be if complete devotion to it were actually achieved. If it is the highest that you want, what is higher than God? And how higher can God be conceived than as a being perfect in power, wisdom, and love?

Schmidt further ventures to predict what "the religion of the future" will be. He finds that it will be scientific; that it will be concerned with the emotions; that it will be æsthetic; and that it will involve fellowship.²⁶ One may very well hope that this will be the case, but why the apparent assumption that it has not been so already, or that it is not largely so at the present time? Let all the charges be granted that the most unrelenting critic can bring against historical religion, in particular against Christianity, as in the classical case of Hume's *Natural History* and Lecky's more recent *History*—its superstitions, its traditionalism, its narrowness, its dogmatism, its crudities, and all the rest of it.²⁷ Yet certainly no informed student can suggest that this is the whole story, and if Samson's recent vicious diatribe, reminiscent of Mencken and Barnes, against Christianity, represents his sober judgment, one can only be amazed that a man who knows so little about Christianity should feel that he was qualified to discuss it.²⁸ That the religion of the future may be more

effective than the religion of the past is every way likely, and is devoutly to be wished. But why will it be so? Not because men will ever find a higher or more worthy object of devotion than any man has found hitherto. We have that highest *now*—that Perfect Being whose we are, and in whose will alone is our peace. If religion advances, it will be because men will come to see more and more clearly what that highest essentially is, and what complete devotion to such a highest properly involves.²⁹

Furthermore, it is too often overlooked that criticism of the religion of the past is in the end nothing but a criticism of human nature. While criticism of the crudities of historical religion is being so freely offered, why not be fair and criticize also the crudities in other realms of human life contemporary with the religious? Much of the criticism of religion seems to proceed on the assumption that men were perfect in all respects except the religious, or would have been perfect but for the heavy handicap of the religious imperfection. As a matter of fact, religious crudity can in general be quite closely paralleled by medical crudity and pedagogic crudity and sanitary crudity and agricultural crudity, and so on. Human life is all of a piece. There is necessarily a profound congruity between religion and the prevailing culture. If the religion influences the culture, it is just as certain that the culture influences the religion. It is to be expected that in the West of the future there will be great advances in all realms of human thought and experience, and religion will share in the advance as much as anything else. But the principle works the other way. Why expect thirtieth-century reli-

gious expression in sixteenth-century Europe? or for that matter, even in twentieth-century America? When the majority of people could neither read nor write, why be surprised at the authority and even the dogmatism of ecclesiastics? And why blame the ecclesiastics for all the illiteracy, in view of the fact that from the days of Charlemagne the church has been "the mother of educational institutions"? Or why blame the ecclesiastics for all the social backwardness, as though there were nowhere anybody else charged with social responsibility? It is a strange circumstance that critics who believe in social and moral "evolution," as one application of an absolutely universal law, should become so fervid in their denunciation of historical religion, when on their own showing the facts they so deeply deplore were but "moments of the evolving process"! The only man who has a logical right to criticize the past is the man who, accepting the principle of freedom, believes the past could have been different; yet in actual fact, it is the determinists, economic, psychological, and philosophical, who are likely to be most drastic in their criticism of history. Historical criticism for the sake of the lessons it teaches is justifiable enough—that makes experience profitable; but historical criticism that takes the form of denouncing men for conditions which, in the circumstances of the given age, were practically inevitable, shows heat rather than light.³⁰ Even our boasted twentieth century may look terribly crude to the critic of five hundred years hence! We shall hope that he will have discrimination enough to realize that masses of men move slowly, that all of us believe better than we do,

and that we tolerate some things—in theology, in industry, in the social system generally—because it is only by tolerating them for the time being that we can hope ultimately to improve them. You have to belong to what you want to reform. The most effective and constructive critics of a cause are the critics to whom the cause is most dear. Among the sum-total of life's experienced values are those which fall definitely within the sphere of religion. They center in the belief in God. The more worthily God is conceived, and the more complete the effort to organize the whole of life and its activities about him, the more there will be realized those very values which men, whether they be religious humanists or whether they be socially-minded but wholly nonreligious, claim to be so desirable. The logic of the evaluating impulse is religion; the logic of religion is God; the logic of a religion that lays hold upon God is the discovery of richer and richer values. So that again we say of value, religion, God, that they belong together—that either one involves or justifies the other two.

NOTES ON CHAPTER VII

¹ Cf. Sorley, *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, pp. 147-150; Taylor, *The Faith of a Moralist*, vol. i, lect. ix; Hobhouse, *The Rational Good*, pp. 206-210.

² See Drake, *Mind, and Its Place in Nature*, pp. 218-223; Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, pp. 174-176, cf. pp. 417-420; Wieman, *The Wrestle of Religion With Truth*, pp. 192-193. Wieman, expounding Whitehead, accepts his theory of "eternal and changeless forms."

³ Cf. Hocking, *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, rev. edit., pp. 180-182.

⁴ Matthew Arnold, *Self-Dependence*, stanza vi.

⁵ See *The Quest for Certainty*, chap. x.

⁶ See Sorley, *op. cit.*, chap. viii; Taylor, *op. cit.*, vol. i, chap. ii. Taylor especially offers a pertinent criticism of the claim that the conjunction between reality and value is merely "accidental" (p. 31).

⁷ See *A Preface to Morals*, chap. xiv. Cf. Garvie, *The Christian Ideal for Human Society*, pt. iv, chap. i; Streeter, ed., *Adventure*, sect. iii.

⁸ Urban, *The Intelligible World*, pp. 352-368, contains a good discussion of "intelligible finality" and its relation to the classical philosophical tradition.

⁹ Cf. the note on "The Kantian Conception of Free Will" in Sidgwick, *The Methods of Ethics*, 6th edit., appendix. See, also, Rashdall, *The Theory of Good and Evil*, vol. i, bk. i, chap. v.

¹⁰ Byron, *Sonnet on Chillon*.

¹¹ *Symposium*, espec. pars. 210-212. Cf. Taylor, *Plato*, pp. 229-232. In the *Symposium*, Socrates is repeating to Phædrus words once spoken to him by Diotima of Mantinea: "And the true order of going or being led by

another to the things of love, is to use the beauties of earth as steps along which he mounts upward for the sake of that other beauty, going from one to two, and from two to all fair forms, and from fair forms to fair actions, and from fair actions to fair notions, until from fair notions he arrives at the notion of absolute beauty, and at last knows what the essence of beauty is," etc. Socrates adds: "Such were the words of Diotima; and I am persuaded of their truth"

¹² Cf. Sorley, *op. cit.*, pp. 467-473. In all values, especially the ethical, we must see, says Sorley, "the manifestation of the divine purpose" (p. 473).

¹³ See MacWilliam, *Criticism of the Philosophy of Bergson*, chap. x; Harris, *Pro Fide*, 4th edit., pp. xxxi-xxxix. Cf. Turner, *A Theory of Direct Realism*, pp. 292-298; *Personality and Reality*, pp. 180-183 and *The Nature of Deity*, chap. v. The criticism of Lloyd Morgan, however, in Knudson, *The Philosophy of Personalism*, p. 355, would seem to be difficult to maintain in view of Morgan's own definite assertions in *Life, Mind, and Spirit*, p. 1, that while his view is a "most thoroughgoing naturalism," he is yet himself "confirmed in his belief in God"—assertions repeated at length in the closing chapter.

¹⁴ Cf. Lewis, *Jesus Christ and the Human Quest*, chaps. xxiii and xxiv, where the principle is applied to the Incarnation. "Any creative act is to a degree an incarnation. What God makes he thereby indwells: he may not separate himself from the work of his own hands. The degree of his manifestation is the degree in which what he makes is like unto himself. When God is confronted by an 'Other' in which he recognizes his own absolute self, and when that 'Other' appears under the form of a man, and therefore as part of God's own creation, then we have Immanuel—'God with us'" (p. 324).

¹⁵ See *Personality and Reality*, chap. v, which deals with "Mechanism and the Supreme Self." Turner's

thesis, which deserves more attention than it seems to have received, is that the more perfect and the more complex a mechanism, the more it conceals its creator but the more a creator is needed.

¹⁶ *De rerum natura*, bk. i, 80-85.

¹⁷ Schmidt, *The Coming Religion*, chap. xii; Joad, *The Present and Future of Religion*, chaps. i and ii, which contain a good deal of acid, but the much finer spirit of chap. xi indicates that his polemic is primarily against creeds, dogmas, and institutions—which, it is clear, are not themselves religion; Haydon, *The Quest of the Ages*, pp. 121-124, also chap. vii, on "The Religious Ideal," and chap. ix, on "The Practical Program of Religion."

¹⁸ Cf. Schmidt, *op. cit.*, p. 16; Huxley, *Religion Without Revelation*, p. 144. In Ames, *Religion*, pp. 176-178, where the reality of God is found in "the reality of a social process," and Wieman, *op. cit.*, chap. xi, where God is defined both as that order which pervades the universe and promotes its increasing concretion (p. 185) and as that in the world of events in adjustment to which we find our greatest good (cf. p. 14), it is difficult to see that theism in any proper sense is retained. See Lippmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-30, for some pointed remarks, directed particularly to Kirsopp Lake, on the determination of a modern school to keep the word "God" although deliberately using it in a quite unhistorical sense.

¹⁹ Quoted in Menzies, *History of Religion*, p. 113.

²⁰ *Philosophy of Religion*, Eng. trans., par. 99.

²¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 92-96.

²² Browning, *Bishop Blougram's Apology*.

²³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 24-27, 248-249.

²⁴ See *Psychology and Morals*, chaps. viii-xiii. Cf. Streeter, *Reality*, pp. 274-284, the discussion on "The Projection of the Idea of God"; Binder, *Religion as Man's Completion*, pp. 36-50; and Sockman, *Morals of To-morrow*, pp. 194-200. Sockman speaks of "the hunger of man's spiritual nature for completion," and says that

its only adequate satisfaction is in "spiritual cosmic comradeship" (p. 199).

²⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 138-142.

²⁶ *Op. cit.*, pp. 250-254.

²⁷ Hume, *Natural History of Religion* (*Works*, A. and C. Black edition, Edinburgh, 1854), vol. iv, pp. 418ff. In this Essay, Hume, quite possibly "with his tongue in his cheek," offered a comparative study of the respective merits of polytheism and monotheism, which latter he practically identifies with Christianity. In regard to five points, (1) intolerance and persecution, (2) the virtues inculcated, (3) reason and absurdity, (4) the qualities attributed to divinity, and (5) the kind of service demanded from men, the advantage is claimed to rest with polytheism. Apart from the question of Hume's motive in writing the Essay—and on another occasion he referred to Christianity as "our most holy religion"—it remains that few critics of historical Christianity have been able to add much to what Hume wrote. Lecky, *History of Rationalism* (1865), and *History of European Morals* (1869), attempted to show that both the rise and decay of moral and religious opinion in Europe—much of which he deplored—was explainable as due to natural causes.

²⁸ See *The New Humanism*, chap. xv, on "Our Keepers of the Soul." Christianity, we are told by Samson, is a "dumb Colossus of clay." It bids men "stand on their head." The priest is a "pious hypocrite." Christianity is "a policeman's religion"; it is "the religion of the prostitute," and so on.

²⁹ Montague, *Belief Unbound*, shows on the whole an admirable temper in the discussion of the idea of God, and pleads earnestly for the retention of God—though remade on the Promethean model—as a needful "cosmic support" for goodness. But even Montague slips when he calls Zeus and Jehovah mere "nightmare dreams" of the worshippers, and declares that all along it was Prome-

theus, not Zeus, who was "really God" (p. 91). This "real God," whether he were Promethean or otherwise, was what both Israel and Greece were *aiming at*, and if they fell short, what else could they have done in their circumstances?

³⁰ Huxley, *Religion Without Revelation*, makes only one direct quotation, so far as the present writer recalls, from Thomas Aquinas. He speaks of Aquinas as representing, more than any other one man, the spirit of the Christian theology of the Middle Ages. He then asks his readers not to forget that such a man, the leading Christian theologian, could write that "in order that the saints may enjoy their beatitude more richly, a perfect sight is granted them of the punishment of the damned" (p. 11). That is simply not fair. Nobody would deny that the sentiment was horrible enough, but viewed in the light of that time it becomes at least understandable—and it is very far indeed from representing the lofty ethical ideal which, in general, Aquinas set forth. See the discussion of the ethics of Aquinas in Wicksteed, *Reactions Between Dogma and Philosophy*, lect. vii.

CHAPTER VIII
RELIGION AND REVELATION

THE ARGUMENT

MAN completes the meaning of all that has gone into his making. His distinctive powers reveal something about the process which he consummates. His ability to be religious has, therefore, cosmic significance. It relates to the tendency, characteristic of life from the very beginning, to reach out for more than is yet possessed. The fact that the "more" actually came to be possessed, to the vast enrichment of life itself, is the justification of the tendency and is the sufficient reason for it. Religion is the highest form of this faith that what life deeply needs is actually provided for. Its result is to give life here and now a deeper meaning and to bring to it an increasing range. The manifold of existence within which this occurs becomes thereby more fully declared. Religion is therefore at once discovery and revelation—discovery from the human side, revelation from the divine side. The initiating power, however, is not in man: religion, while it issues in man's completion and touches him at the point of his deepest need, gets its final meaning in the fact that it is the evidence to a divine invasion. Religious experience is therefore not a monologue, but a dialogue.

CHAPTER VIII

RELIGION AND REVELATION

WE have been saying that an evaluating being like man implies the existence of the better and some power to realize it. Here is the root of all human progress. Man would build a better world than the one he knows, and he would establish himself in it. He is the subject of an unrest which, properly construed, is indeed "divine." The foundation of progress for any living organism is in something intrinsic to the very nature of the organism. There was a time when biological science made change and growth the result of purely external forces playing upon the given life. That day has gone. It now sees progress as a co-operative achievement: life and its circumstances work together to realize an end. They are therefore parts of the same whole. Circumstances have the power to evoke from life a response, but life also has the power to make the response. Each power is necessary to account for the result. Whatever anything comes to be, it is clear that it could only become that because already it had the power to do so. A "tendency" is present which waits only on the appropriate conditions in order to manifest itself. No view of things is adequate which does not take complete account of this reciprocity, and which does not show that both the life and its conditions, explained however these may be, rest back upon a common ground.¹

In the world of present reality we find religion understood as a form of human behavior and experience. It has a history, which means that it is continuous with something in the past. But the presupposition of the history is man himself. The history of religion is not something apart from the history of man. This is sometimes overlooked. Historical religion is treated as though it were a body of independent reality, a sort of fixed mass of objective fact. A little reflection, however, quickly shows that religion is inseparably connected with human life. It is what it is because man is what he is. The study of religion is the study of man. Whether one directs one's attention toward a religious institution, or a religious dogma, or a religious custom, neither the institution, nor the dogma, nor the custom has any significance except as it is connected with human life. It takes men to account for any one of them and for all of them. But if this is so, then men are the kind of beings who are able to create religious history. There is that in men of which religion is the evidence, and but for which there would be no religion. The old charge that religion was foisted upon men by a few unscrupulous priests is palpably absurd: it leaves the priests themselves quite unaccounted for. Men are able to be religious. The ability is the foundation of all its own expression and achievement, whatever the form it has taken. Even a perverted form witnesses to a possible good.

This ability is but one among many others. Human history is not only continuous: it is also amazingly diverse. It is so diverse because man himself is such a versatile creature, able to do more different things

than any other creature on the face of the earth. Respecting his physical equipment man is, as Hocking says, "as nearly as possible animal in general";² and concerning his psychic equipment he is, we may say, as nearly as possible "soul-in-general." That is to say, he not only gathers up in himself the meaning of the innumerable animal organisms but for which he would not have been at all, but he also gathers up in himself the meaning of the psychic concomitants of these organisms—since every sentient form has "soul" to some degree.³ These meanings are carried on into man's most distinctive achievements: his family life, his social life, his political life, his commerce, his art, his intellectual life—all are but the more complete expressions of powers whose historical origins we may dimly discern in the first lowly stirrings of remotest life. The ascending and advancing life has ascended and advanced in response always to something that lay within.⁴ The internal has laid hold upon something external and pulled itself forward, so to speak: the function of the external has been just this of giving the internal its chance. The inner impulse to grasp and rise has therefore received cosmic justification, just as the intricacies of the cosmic adjustments receive their explanation in the service they render to expanding life. The nature of things has always been found to contain the necessary conditions for the further expression and the more complete satisfaction of the life in its constant aspiration. Never has nature wholly denied itself in mocking its own offspring. Life has been led to feel that it *must* do certain things; and while the response to the urge has involved experimentation, with its at-

tendant risk and liability to error, the total result was progress, made possible by the very fact that there was some degree of environmental co-operation with the urge. Whatever form this progress took, whether the acquiring of the power to swim, to walk, to climb, to fly, or whether some more delicate internal adjustment, the result was to vindicate the original impulse and to prove that the world was in a measure "friendly." What was demonstrated was, shall we say, the "togetherness" of existence. The inner and the outer "worked together" to do what neither could do alone. Imagination glows and kindles before the picture—invisible life becoming slowly more "integrated," more intelligent, more forceful, more capable, and finding the universe caring sufficiently for what was going on to provide the necessary conditions. All that we mean by civilization, and eventually by the kingdom of God, is but the exhibition of this co-operative principle on an ever-widening scale.

There is still no better way of describing this process than by the word "revelation." Here we link up our thought with what was said before about "the word and the mind." We are environed with symbols, and symbols are not self-explaining. The history of life is one of two things: it is either absolute creativity, the appearing of the new without adequate antecedents or grounds; or it is a series of effects springing from a cause whose nature these effects more or less reveal. On the first supposition, the sum-total of reality is held actually to increase. But if we inquire as to the *cause* of this increase, no intelligible answer can be given. There is "more" now than

there was once, but apparently this "more" is to be accounted for simply by the fact that a certain amount of *time* has elapsed. But Bowne showed years ago that to make time a cause was to invest a mere relation with the qualities of real existence,⁵ and nothing that Alexander has said about the metaphysical and creative significance of "space-time" has weakened the force of Bowne's criticism.⁶ Others, still with this idea in mind of increase without cause, would make evolution itself "creative." They use Bergson's phrase, but without being quite fair to Bergson. Thus the affirmation of Holmes: "God is evolution."⁷ But evolution is not an entity, and if God is only evolution, that, as Haeckel once quoted Schopenhauer in a slightly different connection, "is simply a polite way of saying that there is no God."⁸ The most that can be said of evolution is that it is a method—a *modus operandi*. A method is not any sort of substantial reality, and how it can of itself be "creative" is difficult to see. How could the utterly nonexistent at last become the existent purely by virtue of a method? Even Höffding, sane thinker as he in general is, must be held to be at fault at this point, in his subscribing—at least by implication—to the idea, so reminiscent of Heracleitus, that God is eternally in "a state of becoming."⁹ The only possible way of making creation by evolutionary method a credible conception is by postulating a *reality which works by this method*. Evolution as itself the creative force, able to produce something from nothing, the sole cause of all the rich variety of existence, is not only not intelligible—it is one of the most amazing proposals ever entertained by the mind of man.

Men who profess to be unable to assent to the idea of Creative Will seem to have no least difficulty in assenting to the idea of Creative Nothing! The alternative view is that life and history shall be regarded as the manifestation in time of a reality which exists out of time, and would still exist even if there were no temporal manifestation. The creative source must be *adequate* to the created issue.¹⁰ What is created is characterized by continuity and increasing richness and variety. In the series of events, therefore, one event will be the condition, or, as Lotze would say, the "occasion" utilized by the creative source for an advance in its work of self-manifestation. Whatever comes into being or comes to pass tells something of its own origin. The simplest fact or event, or the simplest form of life, speaks of something besides itself. It is not self-explaining: it is always dependent, and the dependent is a revelation in one way or another of that upon which it depends. But as we examine this dependent, we see it becoming ever richer, ever more complex, ever more capable and more truly master of itself and its conditions, and the revelation becomes correspondingly significant. If a single sentence reveals a thought, what does an entire drama do? If the amoeba manifests an intelligent source, how much more is that source manifested in rational and ethical man? Why are we not justified in taking the highest points of the achievement of life as most fully revealing that otherwise hidden reality whence all life issues? This revelational principle is fundamental in most modern theistic philosophies of evolution.¹¹

The very fact of progress, it is here being claimed,

is to be construed as evidence that the insistent demands of life for an increasing range and depth have been found not to be imaginary. Life has reached out, even though it may be "blindly" in the sense that it had no clear idea of what it wanted, and it has found something on which it could lay hold. It has assumed that its vehement desire pointed to some sort of possible satisfaction, and it has not been disappointed. It has more and more subjugated to itself what at the time was a "beyond," and in making that "beyond" its own it has found for itself vast enrichment. What else can this mean than that there is a profound and purposeful relation between whatever that is in life which sends it on a quest and those facts, realities, and experiences to which the quest leads? The claim that life is simply compelled to act "as if" these things were so, but that in reality they are not so, or at least may not be so, is simply to reduce the whole process of experience to one vast illusion. "The illusions by which we live" may be a clever enough phrase, but if that which makes life most rich and meaningful is not what we take it to be, then, indeed are we here "as on a darkling plain, swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight." Or, to use yet another of Arnold's figures, we are afloat on an uncharted sea, crossed as it is with despotic trade-winds, ourselves without compass or rudder, threatened with freshening wind and blackening waves,

"And then the tempest strikes us; and between
The lightning bursts is seen
Only a driving wreck,
And the pale master on his spar-strewn deck

With anguished face and flying hair
Grasping the rudder hard,
Still bent to make some port, he knows not where,
Still standing for some false, impossible shore.
And sterner comes the roar
Of sea and wind, and through the deepening gloom
Fainter and fainter wreck and helmsman loom,
And he too disappears, and comes no more."¹²

Is life such a mad thing as this? We cannot but seek, and we cannot but believe that we find. That is what life is—a search and a discovery. What else can we do but believe that the discovery is of the real, and that what it leads to is real? And if this be so, then we shall take the final step and say that the very reason for the search, the very reason for the divine discontent that lies enshrined in the heart of all life, was that thereby the waiting reality might be discovered. "Every spring," says Francis Thompson, in true Platonic fashion, "is the flash-light of one Spring"—in the passing is the sign and seal of the permanent.¹³ So every first is the promise of its own last; every Alpha presages its own Omega; every arc points to "the perfect round"—*and every least outreach of the least-considered life spells God.* With all his limitations in respect of his thought of the divine nature, Aristotle stated elemental truth when he solved the ancient problem by affirming that "God is the object of the world's desire."

Religion, we are implying, is a form of this faith that what life deeply needs is somewhere provided for. The ensuing response in the enrichment and exaltation of life is evidence that the faith was not mistaken. Nobody will dispute that there have been

forms of religion which have often enough seemed to debase life rather than to exalt it. But the very excesses of religion have their own significance: they are so much testimony to the strength of men's conviction that "the life is more than meat and the body than raiment." The evils perpetrated in the name of religion were not perpetrated in the certain knowledge of their evil character. They were therefore for the most part the result of errors of judgment, explainable largely by prevailing circumstances, rather than evidences of the essential untruth of the religious purpose and spirit. And in any event—to repeat what has been said before—the excesses and the ills have not been the whole story. The most religiously-minded men to-day deplore most sincerely those features of religious history of which the skeptic makes so much. Even a convinced Roman Catholic like Von Hügel admits the necessary imperfections—including "killing for matters of religious belief"—of historical Christianity as represented in his own church.¹⁴ But these men also know that religion is not to be judged by the mistakes and blunders which have been committed in its name. They properly distinguish between the essence of religion and its manifold forms, and they claim for the essence of religion an absolute validity. What they know religion means for themselves they believe it must have meant for other men. The real "communion of saints" crosses all lines and embraces men of all faiths and of all ages. These men believe that it is utterly incredible that so universal a fact as religion should be without ultimate significance. They admit its need of continual rebirth. They admit that it

sometimes creates conditions so intolerable that eventually men arise in their might and sweep it away—or think they do. When religion is attacked on the ground of its being tyrannical and obscurant, the attack itself is made in the name of that very spirit which religion is properly intended to produce and foster. Religion, therefore, can never for long stay submerged. To say nothing else, the men who think they have disposed of it are succeeded by another generation and the new generation finds itself confronted with the same problems, asking the same questions, impelled by the same deep needs, seeking the same satisfactions, which have been among the reasons for religion at any other time. Still “the same restless paces to and fro,” still “the same vainly throbbing heart.” Particular men may become irreligious. They may argue themselves into a flat rejection of all that it represents. They may invent substitutes for it all the way from the Goddess of Licence of the French revolutionaries to the Social Service of our time. But man, using the term in its collective and universal sense, is a religious being—religious not by an imposition from without but by a demand from within. As between religion and irreligion, it is religion that is “natural” to man, and irreligion that is the result of sophistication. This is plainly enough implied in Otto’s analysis of the root of religion as in “the sense of the numinous.”¹⁵ The attacks on religion usually come from those whom culture so-called has rendered one-sided. It is the naturalness of religion that is the promise of its permanence. Not that there has been no change in its form and expression. This change is one of the best signs of its

vitality, and we may expect the change to continue in the future. Religion is as versatile as life itself. The versatility, however, rests back upon an impulse which is as native to man as the impulse that leads to art, or science, or government. We might have to agree with McDougall as against W. P. Paterson that the idea of a "religious instinct" is untenable;¹⁶ unless, as may be the case, Paterson means by "instinct" in this connection simply "propensity," and if so, he is right.¹⁷ In any event, there is always a *reason* for man's diverse activities. The reason is in man himself, in the kind of being he is, in the kind of needs he is subject of, in the kind of capacities he has. Religion is no more an "invention" than science is; it is no more a "superimposition" than government is; it is no more a "defense mechanism" than art is. The major human interests are revelations of human nature, and the two combined—the interests and the nature—are revelations of a still deeper reality. Because religion is one of these interests, we may regard it as an authentic voice in which the very nature of existence is heard speaking. Can we learn what it is saying?

Religion meets a deep human need. It is useless to contend that the countless millions of men who have lived and died in a faith—*any* faith—were nothing but the victims of a vast cosmic hoax. If "hopes were dupes," wrote Arthur Hugh Clough, it is also possible that "fears may be liars." Then why not take counsel of our hopes rather than of our fears, since we must choose between them? If those who want religion to be true are wrong, those who want it to be false may also be wrong. We have already remarked

that the "wishful thinking" argument works both ways. Since desire is fundamental to all effort, why treat desire as necessarily misleading? Desire is predictive. It is the evidence to the possibility of "more life and fuller." Höffding has shown the close relation that exists between desire and religion.¹⁸ Similarly, Galloway, in common with many others, traces it to "a felt need."¹⁹ Perhaps there has not been written in our time a more striking testimony to a man's need to believe those things to be real that makes for his peace and happiness than Bertrand Russell's essay on "A Free Man's Worship."²⁰ Yet Russell is supposed to stand before the modern world as the last word in exact, unbiased, detached thinking, and himself declares that he is a "rationalist"—an exponent of the supremacy and sufficiency of reason.²¹ Life itself confronts us with situations from which more than one possible inference may be drawn, yet only one of which can be true. A choice is therefore inescapable. The claim of the religious man that by his religion he lays hold upon enduring reality, finds peace, inspiration, motives and power for high living, must necessarily be more weighty than the arbitrary retort of the irreligious man that he does nothing of the kind. He who has ever sincerely and deeply loved knows the *meaning* of love as it can never be known to the cynic who has talked himself into the supposition—and would fain talk others—that love is a purely "physical" thing. If the cynic were right, the libertine to whom love means simply lust would be the truest lover—which is just the one thing which he is not. It is true that other human interests may seem to have an empiric support—even

a scientific proof—that religion lacks, but this lack necessarily goes with the esoteric nature of religion. One thinks of Schleiermacher's words: "Religion, as I wish to show it, in its own original characteristic form, is not accustomed to appear openly, but is only seen in secret by those who have it."²² The words are not beyond criticism from one point of view, but they express the truth that religion involves a venture whose significance lies just in the fact that it is made, and he who makes it is most sure of what it brings to pass. So that religion is empiric after all, only it is a higher empiricism than that which consists in the application of "instruments of precision" for measuring what is obtained. You cannot put inward peace under a microscope. You cannot weigh a prayer. You cannot measure moral certainty. You cannot reduce to the requirements of an exact science those attitudes and tempers and aspirations and renewed moral energies which religion has proved itself able to develop. Yet if you deny that religion has done this, you put yourself under the necessity of discounting the testimony of a cloud of witnesses of every age and clime—"a multitude which no man could number." And since when has science decided that the testimony of human experience is entirely to be rejected? In true Quaker fashion, Eddington the scientist insists on the reality of man's experience of "the divine indwelling."²³ Even John Stuart Mill, discussing Hume's argument against miracle, concedes the possibility of circumstances in which the testimony of human experience to miracle could be accepted.²⁴ Religious experience, like all other, may very properly be subjected to searching criticism, the

inward separated from the outward, the essential from the accidental, the permanent core from the changing form; but what Hegel means by the "idea" of religion, the underlying universal of which particular expressions are but the historical unfolding—this remains as the only adequate explanation of the rest. "The truth of religion" does not mean that all that has gone with religion is true, any more than "the truth of science" means that science has never had to renounce a past opinion. "The wrong-headed notions," as John Caird called them, that have been fostered by religion are amazing enough, but no more amazing than those that fall in other realms. In all cases such notions simply mean that men are fallible learners in the school of life; they do not mean that religion *per se* is based in illusion and is wholly without validity.

Religion has significance for the here and now. Men have reached into a "beyond," and laid hold upon it, or have felt a "beyond" reach out and lay hold upon them, and then have found in that "beyond" a power immediately operative, effective for the problems of everyday life. It has already been said that the religion of a given time and place will be, respecting its form, congruent with the time and place. That in an age quite generally characterized by credulity there should be an abundance of miracles associated with religion is only what we should expect. Neither Milton's "Paradise Lost" nor Dante's "Inferno" could have been written in the twentieth century. Great religious utterance, whatever form it take, demands sincerity: men must believe that what they are doing, whether writing, painting, carving, or building, em-

bodies and represents the truth, and that the truthfulness extends to the form as well as to the content. The work of both Dante and Milton possessed verisimilitude for a past age as accounts respectively of the early world and of the doom of the lost. The poems were not simply poems: they were scientific theological treatises. They were read as truth. The modern man reads them simply as poems. Their form has become for him so much symbolism. But when they are so read he sees how profoundly true they are. What the modern mind could not itself produce it may none the less appreciate and understand. If there had never been a Dante's "Inferno," and it were published to-morrow for the first time as the work of a contemporary poet, one shudders to think of what the critics would do with it—the very critics who, as things actually stand, regard it as a work of genius. But we do not thereby condemn the critics: we only imply that they appreciate the fact that what would be sincere in one age would not be sincere in another. Any age, however, even ours, will recognize the *truth* in the pictures. What was Milton really saying? He was saying that man, in the fundamental idea and purpose of him, is a son of God, who for a price sold his sonship and at an infinitely greater price must win it back. Was Milton wrong?

"O conscience! into what abyss of fears
And horrors hast thou driven me; out of which
I find no way, from deep to deeper plunged!"²⁵

And what was Dante really saying? He was saying that the man who will not pay the price of his restoration must remain forever in his chosen condition of

servitude, an alien from his true home, an echo who should be a voice, a lamentation who should be a pæan. Dante is as right as Milton.

“ We are come
Where I have told thee we shall see the souls
To misery doomed, who intellectual good
Have lost. . . . ”²⁶

The common objection, that this has to do with futurity and may therefore be regarded as only imaginative, and that it is the chronic vice of religion that its “beyond” is something that “never is, but always is to be,” loses sight of one of the most patent of all facts. Religion will have no meaning for the future which it does not already have for the present. Moral status is being created *now*. Men are being driven from their Eden *now*. Men are finding their way up their Mount of Blessedness *now*. Whenever religion becomes anticipatory, it is always with reference to the significance of some present fact. The anticipation assumes that very causal order which in any other connection than the religious may be so loudly proclaimed and so deeply revered. The “beyond” with which religion has to do is not a mere future somewhat. The term is qualitative, not temporal. It is as much a *here* as a *there*, as much a *now* as a *then*: “it is very nigh unto thee, in thy mouth and in thy heart.” It is, indeed, properly regarded as the Utterly Holy, as the Moral Absolute, and when so regarded it infinitely transcends the furthest leap of human thought. But even when the “beyond” is regarded in this transcendent way—in effect equated with God, infinite and eternal—it still remains that man is its

created and finite correlate. It and he—the divine and the human—belong to each other. Every prayer is proof of it; every unselfish deed reveals it; every twinge of conscience there finds its source. That which is so far above man none the less intimately dwells with him as the tree dwells with the rain—the rain it must have, or perish. All the offices of religion, which are but so many results of man's attempts to adjust himself to the Higher—are we to suppose that they mean nothing for the stern business of daily living? The Sublimity which Hegel said was the characteristic of Hebrew religion, the Beauty which he said was the characteristic of Greek religion, the Conformity which he said was the characteristic of Roman religion—did they not mean something for the men who practiced them?²⁷ If we add that Sanctity is the characteristic of the Christian religion, will anyone dare to affirm that there have been no saints—saints in the New Testament sense—to demonstrate that sanctity is a possible attainment in this present world of flesh and blood, here

“In the very world which is the world
Of all of us—the place where in the end
We find our happiness, or not at all.”²⁸

The empiricist who is so “radical” that he cannot bring himself to believe in anything that he cannot see with his eyes or lay hold upon with his hands or reduce to the dimensions of his own petty pragmatism—does he not see the *difference* that religion makes? or the difference that irreligion makes? He may, of course, see only impossible creeds, and still more impossible hymns, and ugly buildings, and

altars reeking with blood. He may see shepherds of the flock who are nothing but "blind mouths"—the apt figure used in Milton's "Lycidas" and explained by Ruskin with characteristic meticulous care.²⁹ He may see interminable bickerings over this and that, the glorification of passion, the indictment of the natural, war blessed by priests, social ills ascribed to Providence, and so on *ad nauseam*. But is his empiricism afflicted with such a deadly unimaginativeness that it stops with faults so palpable? Does he suppose that the rapt mystic has seen nothing, and that the prophet who declares the word of his God has heard nothing, and that the singer of the sweet songs that faith has inspired is but "the singer of an idle day"? Does he see no difference between a Gothic cathedral and a Chicago skyscraper except in the architecture? When he smiles knowingly at the emaciated ascetic who does continual penance that so he might the better subdue the flesh, does he never stop to consider what strength of conviction the man must have as to the deeper issues of life who will go to such lengths of self-discipline?—Saint Simeon Stylites on his pillar, Amandus Suso with his nailed shirt and gloves. If sex has the unrestrained right to rule which the modern cult of Venus is claiming, is not the ascetic an infinitely more impressive figure than the libertine, since the one stands where the other simply yields? Whether it be the worshipers who at morning sacrifice have left empty "the little town" of Keats' glorious ode; or whether it be a few quaintly-garbed souls sitting in an inspired silence in a Quaker "meetinghouse"; or whether it be a Salvation Army girl-lieutenant electing to spend her days

—and nights!—in London's foulest slums;³⁰ or whether it be a vast throng hushed and awed in the presence of the stupendous miracle of the mass—whichever it be, men engage in these exercises because to do so has a meaning for them here and now. If it were not so, it is incredible that these exercises, and others like them or in place of them, should continue. When all has been said against religion that can be found to be said, it still remains that religion has vitally and constructively affected life. Men have prayed, and prayer has made them strong—and why the suggested psychological theory in the case should be held to affect the reality of the fact is difficult to understand. Men have been oppressed with a sense of sinfulness, and they have sought forgiveness, and the burden has rolled away. New purposes have been born, wills have been re-enforced, passions have been subdued, imaginations have been purified, selfishness, jealousy, hatred, have been driven out and unselfishness and brotherly love put in their place, because religion came to its own in human life. This is present experience. If it be claimed that it also has promise for the future—"godliness," says the apostle, "being profitable both for the life that now is and the life that is to come"—who will deny it? But how shall religion have promise for to-morrow unless it exists and is active for to-day?

"No, no! the energy of life may be
Kept on after the grave, but not begun;
And he who flagg'd not in the earthly strife,
From strength to strength advancing—only he,
His soul well-knit, and all his battles won,
Mounts, and that hardly, to eternal life."³¹

The response that religion finds is a response of reality. Many will agree with much of what has just been said who yet will presume to deprive it of all value by reducing it to purely subjectivism. That is to say, they will not deny that religion has been a vital and even a constructive factor in human life and history, but they will explain it all as due to the force of illusory ideas. The effectiveness of religion, so they argue, depends upon the strength with which something is believed. But the power of the belief is no proof of the validity. Comfort and strength come by praying because one already believes that by praying comfort and strength will come. But that is no necessary proof that the comfort and strength are from a source over and above the man's own being. Thus Leuba, for example, makes the characteristic claim that there are no religious "experiences" that cannot be explained without resorting to "transcendent causes."³²

But perhaps the objector is in danger of being hoist by his own petard. It may turn out that if he will allow no transsubjective or objective reference in religion, he may be hard put to it to validate the objective reference in any other form of experience. A. J. Balfour was wont to present this dilemma with telling force. He showed the inconsistency of accepting as valid various postulates about the existence of the material world on the ground that this was justified by experience, and then refusing a like concession in the case of a spiritual world.³³ If the vast amount of religious testimony to the ineradicable conviction of a real Other who has answered when he was called upon is to be set aside, and this on purely

philosophical and psychological grounds, what is to prevent all other forms of response being denied objectivity on grounds similarly philosophical and psychological? Few assumptions are more naturally made than the assumption that one is continually in touch with other minds like one's own; yet no assumption is seen to yield, under analysis, more theoretical difficulties as to its validity. Thus Bertrand Russell writes that if we believe in other minds, it must be "on some ground short of demonstration."³⁴ The evidence to such other minds reduces itself in the end to certain elements of our experience, chiefly forms of sight and sound. These, as we have shown already, we treat as so many words, utterances, symbols. It is quite impossible for us to get "behind" what we see and hear, to learn the "cause" of it. We make, in effect, a vast leap "from idea to fact," namely, *another mind like our own*, in order to account for the experience. There are various ways by which we may test the worth of the assumption, yet even in testing it we are still unable to get "outside of ourselves," or to dispense with sense-data, which data in their turn we have to take to be reliable. Yet no sane person refuses to make the assumption in question. He may deny this or that theory as to the structure of mind, but he will hardly affirm that he is all alone in the universe. A distinguished nontheistic humanist has expressed himself in the poignant phrase, "You see, we have only ourselves." If he had said, "You see, I have only myself," he would have denied his own statement, since it is addressed to *you*! So that even one who cannot bring himself to believe in God because the evidence is lacking nevertheless admits that

he has experiences which cannot be made intelligible to himself on any other ground than that of the reality of other minds than his own. He takes his own experience as the evidence that he is not alone in the world. He has faith.

It would be too much to say that the case for the reality of the religious Object is as clear as this. But it would not be too much to say that there have always been men who were as certain of the fact of God as they were of the fact of their fellows, and certain for substantially the same reason—a felt response which they could take to mean only one thing, namely, a communion of mind with mind. The possibility of reducing the alleged response to so much more belief, or so much more idea, depending upon such circumstances as training, expectation, habits of association, the sheer will to believe, and the like, is not to be denied. The warning uttered by Thouless too must always be borne in mind—that the formula, “the objective validity of religious experience,” may very easily come to be a substitute for clear thinking.³⁵ For all that, it may still be urged that those men should realize what they are about who make the religious experience purely self-contained—a species of self-hypnosis. They are assenting to a principle which may easily be employed to impugn the veracity of experience in general. They are justifying the claim—a modern version of Protagoras—that all experience of an alleged “otherness,” whether it be of a so-called physical or a so-called psychical, is in the end nothing but a psychologism. They are grounding the noblest achievements of the human race in an essential illusion. Respecting the question at issue,

they are saying that in religion nothing is discovered, but that something is simply imagined. One can only ask, with Strachan, if those who take this position are prepared to go the full length of its implicit logic, and place a question mark over against all their other experiences and all their other conclusions.³⁶ Nobody would deny that all sorts of impossible and contradictory statements have been made *about* the religious experience and its Object. But differences in the characterization of the Object—differences due in large part to ascertainable conditions in the time and place—cannot be allowed to invalidate the reality of the Object; any more than differences in the individual descriptions of the experience of the Object can be allowed to invalidate the experience. Perhaps it is the realization of this fact that explains the curious tenacity with which the modern school of nontheistic humanists insist that religion must stay even although God must go. The differences between Buddha and Jesus are marked enough, but it can hardly be maintained that these differences entirely invalidate their religious testimony. The real issue, then, would seem to be not whether there is a religious experience consisting in the quickening of all the powers—since the most skeptical would admit the fact of an experience of some kind—but whether the experience is at the same time the revelation of an independent Other. If it be such a revelation, other questions at once arise. Is the “Other” One or Many? Is it Personal or Impersonal? Is it Creative or Created? Is it Absolutely Holy or is it a Struggling Prometheus? On such questions, men have differed profoundly. Otto, in his discussion of “the Wholly

Other," points out how universal is the experience of the Other *as feeling*: men divide only when they endeavor to give the feeling and its Object "clear conceptual expression."³⁷ These very differences, however, are themselves the evidence to a common experience which men have endeavored to account for—the experience of a Somewhat which they have not been able to escape, and which, indeed, so far from escaping, they have vehemently desired.

All students of the philosophy of religion agree that that characterization of the religious Object will be the most reasonable which best accounts for all the observed facts in the case. This is scientific enough. What is being said here is that, judged by this requirement, the ancient claim may still stand—that the religious Object is most truly described as an all-sufficient Someone. Worship, submission, fellowship, service, devotion, empowerment, co-operation—all these various "notes" of the religious experience, if they be allowed to have any objective reference at all, justify the belief that the nature of the religious subject—a person—is the best clew to the nature of the religious Object. It may not be an exhaustive clew, but it is at least not a misleading one. God may be very much more than what we mean by "personal," but he cannot be less if we are going to rely upon religion at all. It is true that great numbers of religious men have not followed the clew, and have understood God otherwise, but why may not this be regarded as a deficiency of interpretation rather than the final word? If we say that God is either Infinite or Finite, either All-Sufficient or Struggling, either Personal or Impersonal, either the Source of All or a

Derived Reality, either the Altogether Holy or the Morally Advancing, and if we say that the question of which of the two he is may not be fairly answered except as the testimony of religious experience is fully considered—if we say this, then we shall go on to affirm our conviction that God is Personal Spirit, to be characterized as All-Sufficient and Altogether Holy. And from the fact of God's complete adequacy for all of man's religious needs, it is an easy and natural step to the claim of his complete adequacy for the cosmic stage on which the religious drama is being worked out. The God who can produce the saint can also produce the saint's environment. God the Holy is God the Creator.

Religion is an invasion from without as well as a felt response to an approach. No account of the religious experience would be complete which failed to recognize this fact. A. E. Taylor speaks of "The Initiative of the Eternal."³⁸ Hocking in similar strain speaks of "The Divine Aggression."³⁹ Middleton Murry describes with characteristic power that moment when "the room was filled with a presence, and I knew I was not alone."⁴⁰ These men here refer to what is as nearly undeniable fact as anything can be. "I should not seek thee unless I had already found thee," said Pascal in the true Augustinian fashion. Indeed, remembering Augustine's unrelenting emphasis on divine grace, we would better say that *God finds man before man finds God*. The first sign of God is when the heart turns to God: there were no turning but for the divine prompting to turn. In the language of the Scholastics, there is a grace that precedes grace. *Gratia praeveniens* prepares the mind

and will for *gratia cooperans*: the grace that inclines us is the basis for the work of the grace that assists us. It is all very well for the skeptic to say that religion is purely subjective—a self-contained circle of ideas. What he needs to consider is the fact that again and again men have found themselves mastered by a conviction of which they could give no account, and from which they could not escape, try how they would. “Suddenly I heard a voice from heaven,” said Saul of Tarsus. “I have felt a Presence,” wrote Wordsworth—not merely a Presence which the poet went out to find, but a Presence which found the poet, and “disturbed him.” The history of religion is full of such experiences as those of Moses in the land of Midian, and Jonah as he fled to Tarshish, and Gautama under the Bo-tree, and Jesus as he submitted to John’s baptism and “straightway saw the heavens rent asunder,” and Saul of Tarsus on the way to Damascus, and Augustine in his garden, and Loyola in the sick-room—such experiences as those to which in our own time Francis Thompson and John Masefield have given such completely authentic expression, the one in “The Hound of Heaven,” the other in “The Everlasting Mercy.”⁴¹ No doubt there are psychologists who would undertake to explain all this plausibly enough on purely subjective grounds. As to that, one can but repeat what has already been said by Canon Raven—that if all the joy and power that comes of the Unseen Presence is an illusion, then God is to be thanked who amid the mockery of existence grants men so beautiful and potent a dream, and we can but hope that such illusions will continue to the end.⁴² If every fruitful idea, every revolutionizing

conviction, every enthusiasm for a holy cause, every radical transformation of character, every reintegration of the life—if all these are to be explained by “illusions,” “obsessions,” “subjectivisms,” and the like, what possible hope is there of making human experience a rational process? If we are misled in the high, but not misled in the low, then, verily, “let us eat, drink, and—” be resigned, for we are already lost. Or may we not hope that some day it will occur to “the unbelieving psychologist” that what he regards as a process of illusion because he can so glibly explain it is in reality *God’s chosen way of getting at men’s hearts*? If there is a “real” sunset, it is obvious that the only way men can know it is by an experience which is essentially subjective. It would be the height of psychological refinement to regard the experience as unreliable because the person who has it cannot, so to speak, go outside of the experience, and in some other way than by experience prove that the sunset is “there.” In other words, our knowledge of the genesis and growth of an idea is not the last word to be said about the idea. We have still to ask whether it puts us in touch with reality, and the proof that it does is in the extent to which, as William James would say, it helps us to “get about.” Idea at work is idea in process of verification: that much will be willingly conceded to pragmatism. The idea that some men have, therefore, that God has spoken to them, that he has commissioned them, that he has renewed their strength, that he has called them to high endeavor, that he must have the entire control of their lives—this idea is not lightly to be brushed aside as being purely self-induced. It is not

a question of being dogmatic: it is a question merely of stating the alternatives as the preliminary to a reasonable choice.

The basic facts are undeniable. Religious experience has had the characteristics and has produced the results herein described. These characteristics and results may mean simply that man is the sole creator of the ideas which admittedly have had such transforming power—in particular the idea of a Perfect Other with whom partnership is possible. Or they may mean that such a Perfect Other is an absolute and independent fact, whose way of making himself known to men is by means of those desires and ideas and convictions which are fundamental to the religious experience, in part as cause, in part as effect. Because the form under which God is presented to the mind is necessarily an idea, why should it follow that that is all God is—an idea? How else can God be known except as we can be brought to think about him? Mental activity is the basis of *all* experience, even of that in which the sense-data are so overwhelming as to seem to leave us no alternative, or of that which is purely instinctive or habitual. Do not the “critical realists” themselves bear us witness at this point, in their contention that the knowledge of *any* reality involves a mental construct?⁴³ Religious experience, we are claiming, is under law as much as is any other. That is to say, a definite process is required for arriving at certitude as to God. It is true that the certitude comes through idea, but why may not idea be held to be wedded to fact at this so important place just as well as at places far less important? We are not denying that there are plenty

of ideas of which men are very sure which yet lack factual reality: we are only saying that there is no factual reality which can be known otherwise than by representation in a mind. Factual realities send out their ambassadors possessed of full plenary powers, and these ambassadors are *affections of the mind*. That affection of the mind which is the certitude as to God may be entirely misleading: the credentials it presents purporting to bear the divine signature may be forgeries. But, again, they may be genuine. True, they may be badly soiled. The marks of a difficult journey may be on them. But to the question, "Whose superscription is this?" there can be but one answer. *Deus hoc fecit*. Doubtless God infinitely transcends our highest thought of him; but that our highest thought of him should be *only a thought*, so that if there were no men to think about him there would be no God to be thought about—NO!

The alternatives, then, are these: either the mere idea of a God otherwise nonexistent, or a God actually existing in his own right, and revealing himself in the very process by which men are led to believe in him, and revealing himself also in the manifold results to which the belief leads. "Choose ye this day whom ye will serve."

We conclude that religious experience, like all other valid experience, is not a monologue but a dialogue. It is not only a revelation of something within man: it is also a revelation of something without him. It is not a process whereby man lifts himself: it is a process whereby man is lifted, on condition that he will suffer it. It is the supreme achievement of the divinely conducted dialectic of man's progress. The

lowly beginnings of the experiment are in man's instinctive efforts to satisfy the most elemental of physical needs. Step by step he is led on, by the same law of "reach and grasp," always desiring that which is higher and better. But the higher implies a Highest, the better implies a Best. At last he sees it. In the heart's desire for the Highest and Best, and in the mind's power to adumbrate it, and in the will's power to pursue it, and in the impulse of his whole nature to respond to it, he sees that Highest and Best self-revealed according to the necessary law of human experience, and knows it for a personal possession. He may "make God in his own image"—what else can he do?—but the man *intends* the image to be not of himself but of Another. And what is significant is not the crudity of the image, so that the Highest is in effect low and the Best is in effect poor—not that. What is significant is the fact that man can be so greatly daring as to believe that in the mystery of his own deepest experience there is revealed something of the Primal Reality, and that this Reality is not "it" but "he"—that, in one single word, it is GOD.

NOTES ON CHAPTER VIII

¹ See Dampier-Whetham, *A History of Science*, pp. 294-303; H. H. Newman, ed., *The Nature of the World and of Man*, chap. xiii; Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid a Factor of Evolution*, *passim*; J. A. Thomson, *Concerning Evolution*, pp. 117-124, 178-191. For a philosophical interpretation of "the autonomy of life," see Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God*, lect. iv, on "The Influence of Biology."

² *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, rev. edit., p. 64.

³ Cf. Smuts, *Holism and Evolution*, chap. ix.

⁴ See Patten, *The Grand Strategy of Evolution*, pt. i, chaps. i-iii.

⁵ *Personalism*, pp. 179-196; cf. his *Philosophy of Theism*, chap. v.

⁶ See Alexander, *Space, Time, and Deity*, vol. ii, bk. iv, chap. i. Cf. Chapter II, note 19, above.

⁷ See his chapter on "A Struggling God," in *My Idea of God*, ed. J. F. Newton, p. 117.

⁸ *The Riddle of the Universe*, chap. xv, sect. ii, on "Pantheism."

⁹ See *The Philosophy of Religion*, Eng. trans., par. 55. We could agree with Höffding that created existence is never finished, but he extends the principle of change to *all* existence.

¹⁰ See Patrick, *The World and Its Meaning*, pp. 96-103, for the various ways in which this agency has been conceived.

¹¹ Cf. Ward, *The Realm of Ends*, lect. xx; J. Y. Simpson, *The Spiritual Interpretation of Nature*, chap. xvii; Hobhouse, *Development and Purpose*, pt. ii, chaps. v and vi; Leighton, *Man and the Cosmos*, bk. v, chaps. xxxvi-xxxix; Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God*, lect. xv; Henry Jones, *A Faith That Enquires*, lect. xiv; Fulton, *Nature*

and *God*, chaps. xiii and xv; Taylor, *The Faith of a Moralist*, vol. i, lect. vii.

¹² Matthew Arnold, *A Summer Night*, stanza iv.

¹³ *From the Night of Forebeing*, "An Ode After Easter":

"For all the past, read true, is prophecy,
And all the first are hauntings of some Last,
And all the springs are flash-lights of one Spring."

¹⁴ *Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion*, first series, pp. 258, 272.

¹⁵ See *The Idea of the Holy*, Eng. trans., chaps. ii-v.

¹⁶ McDougall, *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, 13th edit., chap. xvi, espec. pp. 385-390.

¹⁷ Paterson, *The Nature of Religion*, pp. 98-104.

¹⁸ *Op. cit.*, par. 47.

¹⁹ See *Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 57-58.

²⁰ Taylor, *The Faith of a Moralist*, vol. i, regards Russell's essay as "too-much-belauded" (p. 32), and as representing "a desperate way of trying to escape from temporality" (p. 308). Sellars, *Religion Coming of Age*, quotes the well-known closing paragraphs of the essay, but doubts if it still expresses Russell's outlook (p. 157).

²¹ See *Skeptical Essays*, p. 46. Cf., however, *The Conquest of Happiness*, pp. 108-109.

²² *Discourses on Religion*. Eng. trans. of the *Reden* by Oman, pp. 26-27.

²³ See *Science and the Unseen World*, Swarthmore lecture for 1929, pp. 42-48. Cf. the section on "Mystical Religion" in *The Nature of the Physical World*, pp. 338-342.

²⁴ See *Three Essays on Religion*, the Essay on "Theism," pt. iv.

²⁵ *Paradise Lost*, bk. x.

²⁶ *The Divine Comedy*, Eng. trans. by Cary, "Hell," canto iii, lines 15-18.

²⁷ See the exposition of Hegel in Sterrett, *Studies in Hegel's Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 250ff., the section on the classification of religions.

²⁸ Wordsworth, *French Revolution*, closing lines.

²⁹ See *Sesame and Lilies*, lect. i, "Of Kings' Treasuries," pars. 19-25. Ruskin has a delicious paragraph (in par. 22) on the duties of a bishop as "overseer of the flock." He writes: "The first thing that a bishop has to do is at least to put himself in a position in which, at any moment, he can obtain the history from childhood of every living soul in his diocese, and of its present state. Down in that back street, Bill and Nancy knocking each other's teeth out—does the bishop know all about it? Has he his eye upon them? Has he *had* his eye upon them? Can he circumstantially explain to us how Bill got into the habit of beating Nancy about the head? If he cannot, he is no bishop, though he had a miter as high as Salisbury steeple." This is part of the exposition of priests as "blind mouths."

³⁰ See Hugh Redwood, *God in the Slums*. Redwood was a London night-editor who in this book gives "the testimony of an ordinary man to the truth of things which for years he thought he disbelieved" (p. 127).

³¹ Matthew Arnold, *Immortality*.

³² *A Psychological Study of Religion*, pp. 272ff.

³³ See *Foundations of Belief*, p. 384; also Chapter I, note 2, above. Cf. Von Hügel, *op. cit.*, the two articles on "Religion and Illusion" and "Religion and Reality."

³⁴ See *Our Knowledge of the External World*, pp. 99-103.

³⁵ See *An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion*, pp. 266-267.

³⁶ See *The Authority of Christian Experience*, p. 36. Strachan's entire discussion of "The Subjectivity of Religious Experience" (chap. iii), while brief, is judicious and well-informed, and makes full use of the relevant literature.

³⁷ See *The Idea of the Holy*, Eng. trans., chap. v.

³⁸ *Op. cit.*, vol. i, chap. vi.

³⁹ *Op. cit.*, chap. xlvi.

⁴⁰ *God*, p. 29.

⁴¹ See Trevor Davis, *Spiritual Voices in Modern Literature*, for expositions of the spiritual meaning of these two poems.

⁴² See *A Wanderer's Way*, p. 204.

⁴³ See *Essays in Critical Realism*, art. by C. A. Strong on "The Nature of the Datum." Strong holds that "in contemplating the datum"—which is admittedly "the logical essence of the real thing" and therefore to some extent a mental construct—"we *virtually* behold the object" (p. 239).

CHAPTER IX
THE JUSTIFICATION OF FAITH

THE ARGUMENT

FAITH is not the denial of reason, but its completion at the point where the questions are most insistent. What is not logically impeccable may still be valid as a means of reaching the goal. Reality is distinguishable as Fact, Idea, and Relation, and there is that in human nature which answers to all three. The world is truthful, and man is qualified to find its truth. Much of this truth, however, is learned by a process of inference from the facts of experience and the ideas they irresistibly force, and the inferences are held to be valid if they fit into the world of fact and promote defensible experience. Such inferences involve faith. The step from the "It" of logic to the "He" of religion is admittedly a step of faith, but in view of its total concomitants it is every way justifiable. Convictions born of the faith-experience may have the same evidential character as to truth and reality as convictions born of sense-experience. The faith-object is not so immediate as the faith-experience, but considering all that the faith-experience involves, it would be to surrender reason itself if something of the certainty of the experience could not be transferred to the reality of the object.

CHAPTER IX

THE JUSTIFICATION OF FAITH

THE processes of rational reflection have led to such conclusions as that if there is the finite, there must be the infinite; if there is the contingent, there must be the necessary; if there is the relative, there must be the absolute, and so on. Conclusions of this sort have been common enough in the history of human thought. They make a good enough case logically, otherwise minds of the caliber of Plato, Augustine, Anselm, Spinoza, Hegel, and Royce would hardly have defended them. Höffding's objection, that to close "the series of concepts" or "the series of causes" with the assertion of an Uncaused Cause, involves a logical violence, is theoretically sound, but the alternative is that there is no resting place for thought, and that is intellectually much more baffling than the assertion in question.¹ Most men, however, have not been satisfied with the rather barren fare yielded by "the speculative reason." They have seen that the very nature of things—the range of man's needs on the one hand, and the severe limitations of reason on the other hand—"makes room for faith," to borrow the famous saying of Kant. They have therefore attempted to put into the "conclusion" to which their reflection has led them a wealth of content to which they have always realized that objections could be offered. The most striking and suggestive result of this attempt has been the substitution of "He" for

"It" as a characterization of the ultimate fact. Logic will give you the "It" plainly enough: some sort of "first," logical and temporal, there must be if we have a series of events. But logic does not give you the "He." This is not to discount the value of the many elaborate "theistic systems" which endeavor to make reasonable the personality of God. There is probably no question to which men have devoted more prolonged and earnest thought than just this question of the ultimate fact and how to construe it—more simply, the question of what God is as to his essential nature. It is no exaggeration to say that the majority of the world's greatest intellects, at least in the West, have found sufficient reasons to convince them that God may properly be referred to as "He." The brains of the world have been on the side of theism—if that fact has any significance. The Western world can show no "nontheist," even no "agnostic," who in sheer power of intellect was the equal of Augustine; and it has recently been demonstrated by W. P. Tolley that Augustine had arrived at the main features of his conception of God—an Eternal and Creative Spirit at once omnipotent and good—before he came noticeably under Christian intellectual influences.² Nevertheless, according as men pass from "It" to "He," they began to supplement their logic by considerations which *may or may not* justify the significance given to them. Logic may cut a direct enough path to God conceived impersonally, as an "Eternal and Absolute Somewhat." The only assumption that needs to be made is that what the mind sees to be of the very nature of the case will find support in reality: the laws of thought reflect the

laws of existence. Since, therefore, we cannot but think that something must be, we conclude that something actually and necessarily is. It is not necessary that we shall be able to say what this is: it suffices that we simply affirm the fact because reason leaves us no alternative. As a matter of fact, so substantial a thinker as Pringle-Pattison characterizes Locke's proposition, "Something must be from eternity," as "jejune," and he compares it with the "being is" of Parmenides and Spinoza.³ But this is hardly fair. Locke did not say, "Whatever is, is," which would be jejune enough. What he said was that among the things that are is something that must be and therefore always has been and always will be. This may be held to be too obvious to need saying, yet just there is the point, namely, *that what the mind must think, must be*. The assumption here cannot be challenged, since to challenge the reliability of the mind's necessary processes would be to render the challenge itself an irrational act. All criticism of mind must necessarily be made by mind: the critic is at least sure of himself as he engages in his criticizing activity.

Nevertheless, the logical understanding is perfectly within its right in declaring that the reasons which men give for predicating of God the qualities of personality may be very good reasons without being absolutely convincing reasons. This logical weakness of the so-called "theistic proofs" made up much of the burden of Kant's first *Critique*.⁴ Even Kant's own positive argument from the standpoint of "the practical reason" still leaves many people with the feeling that the devastating result of the original criticism can never be quite offset. Kant took away that

he might restore—but did he wholly restore? At the same time, a good reason, while it may not be logically impeccable, may still be *true*. There are more ways of getting at truth than by pure reason: at least, it cannot be proved that there are not. A reason that is plainly enough false can only be rejected. A reason that, because it is good, may be either true or false, may be either rejected or accepted. The rejection of a good reason, especially in such a case as we are considering, is a serious matter. It may, of course, be conscientiously rejected on the ground that while it is good it is not good enough. Doubtless this is what often happens. There are many men who fain would believe, but they are captured by the mood that meets us so often in the poetry of Matthew Arnold—as, for example, in his poem entitled “Self-Deception”:

“And on earth we wander, groping; reeling;
Powers stir in us, stir and disappear;
Ah! and he who placed our master-feeling
Failed to place that master-feeling clear.”

For such men, the reasons *against* “the God of the Great Tradition” seem more cogent than the reasons *for* him. One can have nothing but respect for this conscientious agnosticism, or even for the mental temper that issues in a flat denial of God. On the other hand, it is possible that in certain cases the rejection of good reasons for believing in God proceeds not so much from honest intellectual difficulty as from moral unwillingness. Some men may very well *prefer disbelief*. They do not *want* it to be true that there should be such a being as God is said to be.

The possibility of him confronts them with a moral challenge that they are not willing to face. It throws over life a meaning they would rather not have to consider. It puts an inevitable and disturbing question mark after many of their habits and purposes.

“‘There is no God,’ the wicked saith,
 ‘And truly it’s a blessing,
 For what he might have done with us
 It’s better only guessing.’”⁵

Such judgments can hardly be called unfair when one considers how much sheer godlessness there is in the world—practical godlessness—the utter disregard of the possibility of any moral order. This moral indifference is man’s most deadly menace, for it in effect precludes the question of God and his meaning from finding a place at the bar of reason. There is nothing uncharitable in the statement that it is possible for a man not to want something to be true which yet he knows may be true, and then for him to act in agreement with his desire. The idea of God may be so treated. If there is a will to believe, there is just as truly a will not to believe. But the will either to believe or not to believe could exist only in the presence of a situation that yields an alternative. It could hardly be said of a man surrounded by total darkness that he willed to believe it was dark or that he willed not to believe it was light. He is under the coercion of an absolute fact that leaves him no alternative if he be in his right mind. One wills to believe only when there is a certain amount of evidence which seems to look in two different directions, but not quite equally so. Or if one wills not to believe, it is be-

cause one deliberately chooses—as was once charged to be done by Socrates—to “make the worse reason the better reason.” In other words, neither belief nor unbelief—if we use the terms correctly—is possible except where there is a set of facts whose probable significance requires to be estimated.⁶

We are not called upon to believe in God without good reasons, and what some of those reasons are we have been concerned to ascertain. Nor are we called upon to submit ourselves unquestioningly at the behest of some alleged authority, documentary or ecclesiastical. Belief in God necessarily antedates all books and all institutions in which the belief is expressed or by which it is spread: it therefore has a certain independence of these alleged external authorities.⁷ In order that either the refusal or the acceptance may have moral significance, they must represent a measure of free personal decision. Affirming that two and two equal four is not a morally significant act for a normal mind, but manipulating figures with intent to deceive another person is. In respect of a good deal of reality, therefore, man may be regarded as a mechanism. He is under a coercion that he cannot withstand without surrendering his claim to be rational.

Reality is constructed of both ponderables and imponderables, of both visibles and invisibles. There may be theoretical difficulties in the way of the distinction, but they are no more than theoretical: practically, the distinction is inescapable. In fact, a convinced dualist like J. B. Pratt can show that the theoretical difficulties of denying the distinction are much more serious than those that go with affirming

it. Pratt would, indeed, argue this against all comers—against the idealist who would make the “physical” itself “psychical”; against the neo-realist who would make the “psychical” merely “a form of neural energy”; and against the self-styled critical realist who would make the “physical” and “psychical” alike derivatives of a “neutral stuff” which may assume either of the two forms.⁸ For Plato, the seen world is but the shadow of an unseen world, and it is the unseen world that is “real.” The claim may always be met by the counter-claim that the real world is the seen, and that the unseen world is the shadow. That is why one’s final philosophy must embody a faith. But whether Idea gives rise to Fact, or whether Fact gives rise to Idea, or whether Fact and Idea are two aspects of the same “event,” it still remains that the two are to be distinguished. No account of reality could possibly be called complete which held that there was nothing but Fact in the crude sense of the visible and the ponderable, or nothing but Idea in the sense of the invisible and the imponderable.

Fact and Idea, however, do not exhaust reality. The picture is complete only as we add what we mean by the word “Relation.” Reality is characterized by a certain “togetherness” which has led to the recognition of the fundamental place held by the law of interrelation and interdependence. We speak of the truth of things: by it we mean that orderly functioning of the whole which makes the whole dependable. What we have proved to hold good at one time we confidently expect will hold good at another. We are not forever being baffled as we should be by an untruthful, that is, an unreliable world. Not only so—

and here we come to the heart of the matter—but by virtue of this internal connectedness of things, we are able to pass judgments beyond the range of our actual experience and then find that further experience approves the judgment. Neither a mere medley of facts nor a mere medley of ideas would make a universe: there must be order in addition, and order is constituted in relationship. In the words of Lotze, nature is above all “internally consistent—an organism, a great economy.”⁹ It is true that further experience repeatedly requires us to revise a preformed judgment, but that does not change the significance of our original faith in the essential rationality of the universe: rather, it confirms it, for we have been taught to see our own error. “Put the question to nature: she will never answer you falsely.” All such forms of mental behavior as that of accepting the word of another, or of making deductions, or of planning for the future, are but so many indications of our belief in the universal regularity. “What is all science,” asks Schleiermacher, with his accustomed insight, “if not the existence of things in you, in your reason? What is all art and culture if not your existence in the things to which you give measure, form, and order? And how can both come to life in you except in so far as there lives immediately in you the eternal unity of Reason and Nature, the universal existence of all finite things in the Infinite?”¹⁰ It is this intimacy of relation between reason and nature that philosophers have in mind when they speak of reality as having a logical structure, or when they say that the basic law of every natural fact may be expressed by a mathematical formula—although when we think

of such a book as Whitehead's *Process and Reality* it is just as well to bear in mind Eddington's warning against the assumption that mathematics is "flawless," or that the mathematician could be "unreservedly intrusted with the Creation."¹¹ Lotze's principle, "To exist is to stand in relations," states an absolute truth if it means—as it does—that there is no existence which is not related and no relation which does not involve existences.¹²

Fact, Idea, and Relation, then, are the characteristics of reality. What now needs to be seen is that man himself is constituted with reference to all three. In a way this is palpable enough, since the discovery that reality is so characterized is necessarily a human discovery, and man can only discover that for which he already possesses the equipment. Yet the significance of what is so palpable may easily be overlooked: hence the emphasis on the present point. Man is an organ of the larger whole which, speaking superficially, has produced him. The capacities he is endowed with are therefore to be conceived as means whereby that larger whole reveals itself to him and through him. The only possible way by which we can interpret reality is through our experience of it, and, as shown elsewhere, our experience is under the control at one and the same time of our own nature, considered subjectively, and of the nature of reality, considered objectively. Every man has an equipment which lays him under the absolute coercion of what we are calling Fact. It is the region of the so-called sensible qualities of reality. He has no choice in the matter. If he fails, whether willingly or unwillingly, to be determined by it, the inevitable

result is some sort of confusion, it may even be death. There is a steady movement of the cosmos conceived as a manifold of physical forces, or as an expression of forces under physical terms, and man, like every other organism, must adjust himself to the movement, or suffer. He has the power to make this adjustment, and he has it more than any other living thing. No organism has the power to maintain itself in such a wide variety of circumstances as man. Yet even with him, the power of self-adjustment to the physical universe is under strict limitations. "Obey me or be crushed," is the warning he hears continually. He is able to heed the warning on a wide scale, and he is able to develop habitual responses which release his attention for other tasks, yet he is never free from the domination of the factual side of existence—and some day it will overwhelm him, and "to the ancient order of the dead" he will "take the tongueless vows."

But man's capacities are not exhausted in his adjustments to the factual or physical. While these adjustments are necessarily fundamental to all else that he may do, if he confined himself to them, he would be little more than an animal. Overstreet has made much of the fact that what differentiates man from the animal is just man's power to advance beyond the satisfaction of the merely physical and "wonder what life is about," rising to the challenge of "the great unknowns of life."¹³ What Benjamin Kidd calls "the individual efficient in his own behalf" is well enough, but if the efficiency ends there, then certain of the individual's most distinctive capacities remain unused. It may be difficult to describe these in language that all would agree on, but to deny that they

are there would be to render quite meaningless the whole of moral and religious history. The moment that a man allows a physical adjustment to be determined by some other consideration than the bare necessity he is under to make adjustments as a physical organism in order to remain alive, that moment he shows that there exists more than the merely factual: there is Idea as well, and there belongs to it determining power. Physical situations are not everything. Man has reference to the factual—that is plain enough. But he also has reference to what we may call the overfactual. He is the seat of Idea, and that Idea has its correlative in the very nature of existence. There is that about reality which answers to man's power to be determined by purely ideal considerations. Let us say it again—that man respecting his physical equipment is to be regarded as an organ of reality conceived for this purpose as a system of physical actualities. In this respect he is like every other living organism. But his physical equipment does not exhaust him. He can on occasion act from considerations which involve the subordination of the physical to an end conceived to be of higher worth. If this be so, then why may we not believe in the existence, independent of man and apart from his thinking, of a form of reality with which this other side of man—call it his higher side—likewise is organic? It is suggestive that many of the modern "value" philosophers, even when they are nontheistic, still feel that values must be regarded as intrinsic to reality. This is really tantamount to making the values themselves God. The procedure is illogical enough, as Ward has shown, but it at least

has the merit of treating values not as human creations but as human discoveries.¹⁴

Such intangibilities as principles, ideals, ends, and purposes therefore appear as part of the very stuff of being. This is the position of Urban, in his claim that a satisfactory concept of totality must include not only "things," but also "the meaning and value of things."¹⁵ In the nature of the case, man must construe reality in the light of his own powers. What other approach can he possibly have to it? Any demand made on a man must be a demand which his own nature makes possible and intelligible. When we affirm that man is a rational creature, we state an obvious fact, yet it is a fact whose implications for a philosophical view of the whole of things are often curiously overlooked. For a rational creature is one who sees meanings in or through those concrete actualities which are borne in upon him from all sides by reason of his sense equipment. In the "given" he has the power to see the "implied." He may do many things with that "implied." He may track it down to its last lair in an ultimate fact or thought. He may treat it as being just as real as the "given" by which it was suggested. Or he may treat the "given" in the light of the "implied," seeing the immediate present as the nexus around which swings a vast invisible universe. These are evidences of man's rationality. The exercise of it leads him into a type of experience that grows ever richer and more satisfying. Things are to him as doors, by which "he goes in and out and finds pasture." The experience is of a type that in nowise ignores the given, or treats it dishonestly. Indeed, as we are saying, but for the given

it would not be possible at all. The peak of the loftiest mountain presupposes, as Coleridge said of Mont Blanc, "sunless pillars sunk deep in earth." The pyramid consummates in the apex, but there were no apex were there no base. Only he is safe who while his head may be in the clouds has his feet on the solid ground. There is no valuable that does not root in the factual. The free is based on the coercive. The spiritual makes its impact by way of the material. All this is allowed. It is still claimed, however, that experience of the sort we are considering, rooted and grounded as it is in the factual yet immeasurably transcending it, supplies a clew to the nature of reality just as reliable as the clew which is supplied by experience of the more primary or factual type. A book is certainly a fact, recognizable as such by anyone who has learned what a book is. It belongs in the realm of sensible things so called, but there is much more to be said about the book than just that. Its descriptive features do not exhaust it. In addition to what is admittedly its factual aspect, which is coercive and restricted, it has a secondary aspect—shall we say a value-bearing aspect?—which is free, potential, and practically unlimited. A person picks up a book, but he finds it is in a language that he cannot read. Immediately the book in his hand becomes—a mere book, and no more. *He cannot make it mean to himself all that it is able to mean.* The power to call a book a book is one thing; the power to "read" a book, and thereby enter into a realm of experience, imaginative, æsthetic, spiritual, something infinitely more comprehensive than the book *per se*, is another and a quite different thing. The attempt

to reduce the two types of experience to the same category would seem to spring from nothing but unreasonable prejudice against the idea of suprasensible reality and suprasensible experience. Even if Durant Drake, attempting to analyze the nature of "objects," is right in his "identification" of mental states with cerebral states, the combination being precisely the "sense datum," he still has the problem of such mental acts as comparison, interpretation, and appreciation, for which there is obviously no counterpart, as such, in "the external world." In ascribing these, as he does, to "consciousness," and in admitting that "consciousness involves transcendence," he makes a concession that would seem to be fatal to his general realistic theory.¹⁶ Sellars too, who is quite out of sympathy with anything approaching theistic idealism, admits a problem at the point of "the ontological linkage of consciousness with the being of the cerebral processes," as he puts it¹⁷—a concession made long enough ago by Tyndall in the famous statement that "the passage from the physics of the brain to the corresponding facts of consciousness is inconceivable as a result of mechanics."¹⁸ Let there be all the emphasis possible on the primary (and in that sense fundamental) character of the tactile and the visible and the audible—not forgetting, however, that even such experiences involve a degree of "interpretation." The need of a secure anchorage to Fact has already been stressed. Even let it be supposed that things "out there" are exactly what they seem to be to eye and ear, and that the purpose of the eye is that they might be seen and that the purpose of the ear is that they might be heard. But having granted

that much to "common-sense realism," we certainly have the right to go on and say that eye and ear *suggest* more than they actually find. What is it but this that makes possible the poet, the artist, the musician? We have referred before to Rossetti's lines:

"A sonnet is a moment's monument,
Memorial from the Soul's eternity
To one dead deathless hour."

How could the lines be true—as they are true—if mental states are exactly to be equated with sense-data? An experience that is "dead" because it is past is rendered "deathless" by being enshrined in the sonnet: the sonnet becomes the sign and symbol of the experience for him who has the mind to understand. The rigid schemata of fourteen lines exists not for the sake of the form itself, but for the sake of what can be captured and held in it, first for the author, and then for the possible reader. The mind glows even at the bare thought that so much can be suggested by so little. It finds even more wonderful the fact that another mind than that of the poet can by means of the form grasp, understand, and appreciate what is suggested.

All this is by way of saying that reality is more than thinghood and that man is more than body. If it be insisted that the body and the thinghood belong together, partaking of the same essential nature, controlled by one and the same fundamental law, the claim will be allowed. But the additional claim will be made that that in man which is "more-than-body" answers to something "outside" of him—if space-terms may be thus inappropriately used—which is

"more-than-thinghood." Man's power to form ideas on the basis of things—not forgetting, again, that so-called "things" have themselves a mental quality—is intelligible only on the supposition that the ideas are as truly revelational as are the things themselves. Particular ideas are, indeed, often enough false, but the *idea-process* is as significant a clew to the nature and meaning of the whole of existence as any other aspect of human life. Are we not being told today that man has sprung out of nature—that he is, in the most literal sense, the issue of a natural process? But even so, the characteristics of the offspring will reveal something as to the nature of the parentage. Either we shall interpret man by nature or we shall interpret nature by man. If we follow the first procedure, we shall discount man's most distinctive characteristics because we do not find them in nature. If we follow the second procedure, we shall find ourselves interpreting nature in such a way that these characteristics can be accounted for. Nature cannot be the dead and impersonal thing it is so often made out to be if man is nature's child. Thus to Sellars' judgment, "I am a child of the earth," Pratt makes the only possible retort when the "I" is fully considered: "All too plain—but a child of Starry Heaven too!"¹⁹ The more that it is insisted on that man is organic to nature, the more it becomes necessary to read nature in the light of man; and when nature is read in the light of man, it becomes necessary to believe that all that we mean when we speak of the rational and the moral in man—capacities lying wholly in the realm of the imponderable and the invisible, although their expression may be concrete

enough—that all this is but the correlative of a side of reality which is not less real because it cannot be measured and not less substantial because it cannot be weighed. If man as a natural organism involves a physical universe, then man as a rational and ethical being involves a moral universe. If the physical universe is not man's creation but his discovery—and this is allowed on any theory but the most flimsy "solipsism"—then the moral universe is not his creation but his discovery: it should be no more unreasonable to assume a spiritual "givenness" than it is to assume a physical "givenness." If, too, man is so endowed that through him the physical universe may reveal its qualities, then he is also so endowed that through him the qualities of the moral universe likewise may be revealed. And all this is true independently of the question whether the "stuff" of each universe is ultimately the same.

Man, however, with all his differences, is a unitary creature. We may carry the distinction between body and mind to the point that would satisfy Pratt and McDougall, yet we should still have to say that "man is one being." The duality that characterizes him is one of the process of the experience, not one of the fundamental nature: it is impossible to conceive that forms of existence utterly disparate should influence each other or form a real unity. All the alleged differences and distinctions have one common center of reference, because in the end they all comprise the manifold of one and the same experience. There may be a difference between a broken leg and the knowledge that one's leg is broken, but the fact and the knowledge are parts of one and the same ex-

perience-process. There is no way whatever of making a *complete* separation between thought and its object, between, as Spinoza would say, the idea and the *ideatum*, between the experience and what is experienced. Any experience, whatever its character, is *because of*, and the experience is the result of the interaction of the cause and the self. "Mind is mixed with everything." What we cannot separate completely in our own experience we have no right to try to separate completely anywhere else. That is to say, if man is one being, whether he stumble ignominiously over a rock or whether he read out of that same rock a millennium of cosmic history, then that whole system of reality to which he is organic is likewise one. What for convenience sake we describe as the physical universe and the spiritual universe—Fact and Idea, Thing and Meaning—will be parts of one and the same whole of reality. That oneness—and this is the point we were making—necessarily involves Relation. The Idea that is given through Fact is related to that Fact, and if the Fact is as it is stated to be, then the Idea is "true" only as it is supported by the Fact: the Meaning is what the Thing permits. The relation here is not accidental or arbitrary, any more than is the relation of the various sides of man's own nature. Instead, the relation is organic, vital, necessary. Lotze's view carries the marks of deep philosophical reasonableness—that the world of Fact is an operation of Universal Law for the purpose of realizing the world of Value, and that the intimacy of relation between the two worlds prevents us from regarding them as two except in a purely superficial way.²⁰

But it is impossible to say this much and say no more. We have claimed that the diversities of human experience are rendered unitary by virtue of the fact that they belong to one and the same self. We shall also hold—as the proper issue of this indisputable claim—that the correlatives of these diversities, all that we mean by the things that we find but do not make, and the truth that we discover but do not create—that these combine in a unitary system of reality *because they too are the action of one and the same Self*. That Self is God, in whose thought and will Fact, and Truth, and Meaning, and Value are finally constituted, each in its own order and for its own purpose, and all of them the instrumentalities by which the Creative Self and the created self—God and man—may share in a common experience. There is nothing new about such a view of divine-human relationships. It is traditional, but even so, the tradition is properly called “great.” If for the time being it is suffering obscurity by reason of the prevailing “retirement of the intellect,” as Hocking calls it, it will yet again come to its own. It cannot be otherwise since, in the words of Chrysostom, “The true Shekinah is Man.”

In all this we have done little more than indicate the general philosophical point of view from which all the preceding chapters have been written. The view is reasonable enough—its very persistence through a long tradition is proof of that—but it is not unanswerable. It could be shown to involve a use of analogy which is itself open to criticism. By what *right* does a man construe final reality according to the process of his own experience? While we

have endeavored to give some reasons which would seem to justify the right, it must still be allowed that the reasons reveal a personal bias in the author—as all reasoning does, even the nontheistic and the humanistic!—and that it is possible to make out a good case against the argument.

But the truth of a cause does not necessarily depend upon the validity of the argument adduced in its behalf. Truth may be defended by poor reasoning, and error may be defended by good reasoning. If what has been written above is not demonstrably true, nevertheless it *may* be true. What the argument is *aimed at* may be the truest of all facts. Considering what that is—God as a conscious, creative, holy, and purposive Self—the question of its truth or error can hardly be looked upon as one of no deep moment. If God is, then God matters, and everything else matters accordingly; but if God is not, then nothing else matters *very much*. We are in a manifest dilemma. The reality of God would make all the difference in the world, but we do not know that God is real. But why may we not allow that difference to be the determining factor in the case? Why may we not say that anything that makes such a difference as God ought to be so, must be so, and, so far we are concerned, *shall be so*? For clearly enough, here is a place where we have to choose. We have evidence, but the evidence is not coercive. The final step must be taken by the mind as a venture. The step when made takes on an enormous moral significance. No other step a man takes is comparable with his choice for or against God. The choice reveals the chooser: more than that, it at once begins to

influence his whole life. To say that it makes no difference to a man whether or not he believes in God is sheer nonsense: if there is no difference, it is because there is no belief. "Man is what he *eats*," was at once the brightest and the most stupid saying of a now defunct materialism. Let us, rather, say that man is what he most deeply wants to be. He is justified by faith. What he would fain have true yields his own measure. Profoundly speaking, for those who want no God there is no God: God is an available and meaningful reality only for those who want him. He must be possessed if he is to be known and used, and he is possessed only of faith. It is easy enough to reply that wanting something to be true does not make it true, which is obvious. But it still remains that some truth is found only by way of venture—by the venture that involves the use of the relational powers of the mind. All belief—except that in the trustworthiness of the initial act of the mind—is reached through some sort of knowledge, the advance from the knowledge to the belief being possible because of the ability of mind to make inferences, draw conclusions, discover meanings, which lie beyond the range of the absolutely indubitable, but still within the range of what is desirable, or credible, or probable. That mind should have this power, and that the power should be continually in use, and yet *that the power is to be suspected at precisely that point where the issues are greatest*—this were a skepticism that even its advocates would not be willing to live by. It would condemn them—should they practice it everywhere—to a dungeon deeper and darker than any Chillon, but without even "the carol of a bird" to

break in as a light upon the brain, which Byron allowed to "the prisoner." If the ear is that there might be sound-experience, and the eye that there might be light-experience, then shall we not also say that man's power to believe beyond the range of physical evidence and experience is the *intended* means of creating knowledge of a super-sensible that is as real as the sensible. Why suppose purposiveness and reliability in the case of the one, but not in the case of the other? That is to say, if we may desire truth of a certain sort, the very desire may be the psychological avenue through which that truth must make itself known. The unprovable may, therefore, be just as true as the provable. What we freely choose may turn out to be as real as the sheer compulsions of brute fact. Convictions born of faith may have the support of total existence just as much as convictions born of sense. To borrow the paraphrase of B. W. Bacon, what enters into the heart of man to conceive may as faithfully reveal the nature of things as anything that the eye sees or the ear hears. Indeed, the truth that is chosen, while it may not have the same palpable immediacy and the same urgency as the truth that gives us no choice, may have a final significance that is vastly greater. A man deliberately giving his life for conscience' sake is revealing something about both himself and the universe that could never be revealed by a death that came in the order of nature. Jesus endures the cross and Stephen submits to being stoned, because of a faith. To say that the faith simply reveals something about the man—say the power of illusion, or at most the power of conviction—is not sufficient. It also reveals some-

thing about that total existence but for which the believing and enduring and self-giving man could not be at all.

Or if this is not so, what is the alternative? The alternative is that there appears within the structure of existence an essentially alien growth. Man has capacities for which there is no use. He has a reach beyond anything there is to grasp. He is so constituted that he can enter into what he believes is a fellowship with the Unseen, and find in that fellowship inspiration to high living, incentive to sacrificial service, power to hold steady though circumstance be never so cruel. Let those who say that this ability represents no purpose, that the exercise of it is simply a form of self-delusion, that the ensuing experience may be given a complete psychological explanation involving no objective reference of any kind—let those who so say rest content in their negations and psychologisms. Only, let them not think that unfaith is more rational than faith, or that faith is a choice and unfaith is not. The refusal to believe is still a belief, except that it is a belief of a different sort. The refusal takes place in the same world of order as the assent. Unfaith has an entail just as certainly as faith. And if it be true that “by their fruits ye shall know them,” the achievements of faith must be reckoned with: they have an evidential value which it is the sheerest perversity to discount—perversity as sheer as that which discounts the effects of unfaith.

The justification of faith, let it again be said, does not involve the necessity of justifying all that is said or done in its name. The faith-attitude is more sig-

nificant than the faith-findings. The validity of faith in God does not necessarily mean the validity of a given definition of God. Wright asks the question, "Does the objective system of values imply a Cosmic Intelligence?" and he answers his question affirmatively: what man is so obviously intended to realize or to bring to pass reflects another Mind than man's.²¹ We can agree with Wright in the answer, and yet still recognize that the answer may bear a variety of meanings. The general belief in a Creative Will or a Creative Mind—express it how we will—still leaves many questions unanswered. There is ample room for intellectual differences within the limits of the theistic faith. Definitions and descriptions of God are works of thought, and they are under the influence of a person's total culture. The pantheism of the East is nothing surprising: it is of a piece with the general Eastern tendency to minimize the significance of individual life.²² The construction of the object of faith will always reflect something of the world-view of the believer. There is a certainty about the religious experience itself which can never be transferred to its alleged cause. God always stands "in the shadow." We see him "through a glass, darkly." The obscurity does not shake our confidence in his reality, but it does render the lineaments indistinct. We are willing to confess to some uncertainty as to this detail or that, while at the same time we are certain that *God himself is there*. It is a moral certainty in distinction from a logical certainty, but if we are to put an imposing and crippling interrogation mark after all our other moral certainties, leaving only our logical certainties to be

unchallenged, how extensive would the area of our confidence be? The faith-experience itself is immediate and direct, and therefore self-sufficing for him who has it; the faith-object is mediate and derivative: for that reason there can never be quite the same certainty of the object as there is of the experience. Nevertheless, it may with good ground be urged that something of the certainty of the experience may properly be transferred to the object. We follow that procedure elsewhere: why not in religion? In a word, the total concomitants of a faith may be expected to reveal something as to the nature of its object. Failing this, existence would have to be regarded, not simply as a mystery, but as a mockery. If logic is to be used to get rid of God, let it be used to get rid of other things as well. If these other things are to be retained, notwithstanding all that logically can be said against them, then let God be retained as well.

“ Do not all charms fly
 At the mere touch of cold philosophy?
 There was an awful rainbow *once* in heaven;
 We know her woof, her texture: she is given
 In the dull catalogue of common things.
 Philosophy will clip an angel's wings,
 Conquer all mysteries by rule and line,
 Empty the haunted air and gnoméd mine—
Unweave a rainbow.”²³

But do we actually get rid of the rainbow by reducing it to its ultimate mechanical structure, and then stating this according to a mathematical formula? Hardly. The logician and the mathematical philosopher may lay bare, so to speak, the very skeleton of

existence. That is their business. But when they say, "And there is nothing more,"—well, there are some, "a few," into whose ear God has whispered, who are certain that there is more, much more, than that. If the Browning-lover will forgive the parody:

"The logicians may reason and welcome: 'tis we believers know."

* * * *

In these pages it has been contended that God is an Eternal Creative Spirit, infinite in wisdom, righteousness, and love, *about* whom something may be learned by reflective reasoning, and *of* whom much may be learned by religious faith, which in its own way is as revelational as reason. Faith and reason reach the goal only as they go hand-in-hand.

This being the case, the rights of faith become undeniable. It is those rights for which we have been pleading. The rationalist has no proper claim to all the stage. He has a claim to a share, and it has been recognized. But now in this final word it is being urged that religious faith, defined as a venture of belief and action in response to a felt need from the human side and an insistent call from the divine side, is not only of a piece with the whole life-process, but is a condition to its completion. The unbeliever is one-sided. Life, for all of its dependence, is always bigger than its own immediate world. In that fact lies the promise of all progress. The life in which there is neither desire nor power for more than it now enjoys has begun an inevitable decline. Life pushes, says Bergson: we accept his statement even if we

question much of his philosophy of it. It pushes because of an inward compulsion. But it pushes also because of the sheer necessity of saving itself from being overwhelmed by an alien force. Whether the force whose opposition compels life to its own self-preservation is so alien as Bergson would have us believe is an open question. Do not the push and the resistance belong together in the same total experience? And the first hesitant effort of the lowliest form of life to make a little larger demand on its environment than it had hitherto done—what was that but the birth of faith? It has the significance of showing that life may cultivate expectations that seem not to be warranted, and then may enter upon an experience that amply justifies the expectation. This venture has always been of the very essence of life—venture by which larger areas of reality were entered upon and possessed. If it be true that life originated in the water, there still was a different environment—air and land—in which also life could exist, if it only knew it and could learn how! The advance of life into this different environment was an act of faith, shall we say? which an uninformed hypothetical spectator would certainly have declared unwarranted and yet which finally approved itself. The history of life is the history of these approved advances. Life can increase its range only as it is bigger potentially than it is actually.

“What groweth to its height demands no higher:
The limit limits not, but the desire.”²⁴

The use of the word “faith” to describe this feature of the life-movement of the past may be criticized,

but certainly the *faith-principle* is there—the venture into the unknown in response to an inward impulse, and then the discovery that the unknown was but waiting to be possessed. Life is justified by faith and faith is justified of life. “Here we have no continuing city but we seek one to come,” and though we find one city only to be called to seek another that “we know not of,” nevertheless each successive stage of the quest is its own evidence that the quest is not in vain.

“Hope evermore and believe, O man, for e’en as thy thought

So are the things that thou see’st, e’en as thy hope and belief. . . .

Go with the sun and the stars, and yet evermore in thy spirit

Say to thyself: ‘It is good, yet is there better than it; This that I see is not all, and this that I do is but little; Nevertheless it is good, though there is better than it.’ ”²⁵

The religious experience is a real experience. It cannot be made so objectively convincing to the onlooker as the advance from lower to higher in the organic realm,—although even the onlooker, if he be not blinded by prejudice, should be able to see certain of its concomitants. A real saint at least needs to be explained. But in the religious experience, man is by way of finding both himself and God, and the discovery is of faith. Man is meant for God because without God there is a vacancy in his life that remains unoccupied. Whether the rightful Occupant shall be admitted depends upon the key being turned from within. “I stand at the door, and knock.” The

supreme religious act, man's submission to God, is consummated in solitude.²⁶ On that consummation the ages wait, because for that consummation the ages were made.

“‘What think ye of Christ,’ friend? when all’s done and said,

Like you this Christianity or not?

It may be false, but will you wish it true?

Has it your vote to be so if it can?

Trust you an instinct silenced long ago

That will break silence and enjoin you love

What mortified philosophy is hoarse,

And all in vain, with bidding you despise?

If you desire faith—then you’ve faith enough.

What else seeks God?—nay, what else seeks ourselves?”²⁷

Do you vote for God? A vote one way or the other is inevitable. You vote not merely *viva voce* or with the upraised hand, but with life itself. “As for me, the vote is ‘Aye.’” And—“the ‘Ayes’ have it.”

NOTES ON CHAPTER IX

¹ See *Philosophy of Religion*, Eng. trans., par. 10.

² See *The Idea of God in the Philosophy of Augustine*, espec. chap. i, on "The Development of Augustine's Idea of God."

³ *The Idea of God*, p. 6.

⁴ For brief discussions, see Pfeiderer, *The Development of Theology*, Eng. trans., chap. i; Watson, *The Philosophical Basis of Religion*, lect. iv, espec. pp. 97-99; Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God*, lect. ii; Sorley, *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, lect. xiii, espec. pp. 336-441.

⁵ Clough, *Dipsychus*, pt. i, scene 5, spoken by "The Spirit."

⁶ Cf. James, *The Will to Believe*, *passim*.

⁷ Cf. Oman, *Vision and Authority*, second edit., bks. i and ii; Grubb, *Authority in Religion*, *passim*.

⁸ See *Matter and Spirit*, and *Adventures in Philosophy and Religion*. To what extent the critical realists may or may not be dualists, see Durant Drake's note on p. 4 of *Essays in Critical Realism*. In his later book, *Mind, and Its Place in Nature*, Drake appears very definitely to lift himself out of any suspicion of the kind of dualism represented in Pratt. He argues for "an identification of the two sets of events"—the so-called physical and mental. See above, Chapter VI, note 24.

⁹ *Microcosmus*, Eng. trans., vol. i, p. 418. Cf. the description in vol. ii, p. 680, of the power of mind to start from some perceived fact, apply to it universal laws, and arrive at a conclusion which exactly agrees with some other perceived fact. Thought and event traveled by different routes to the same goal, evidence that both were controlled by the same ultimate truthfulness.

¹⁰ *Discourses on Religion*, Oman's trans. of the *Reden*, p. 39.

¹¹ *The Nature of the Physical World*, pp. 337, 209.

¹² *Op. cit.*, vol. ii, bk. ix, chap. i, espec. pp. 578-587.

¹³ See the Foreword of *The Enduring Quest*, pp. vii-xi.

¹⁴ See *Philosophy of Values*, espec. chap. iv.

¹⁵ See *The Intelligible World*, p. 55.

¹⁶ Cf. *Mind, and Its Place in Nature*, chaps. vii, viii, and xiv. Drake, in true realistic fashion, defines consciousness as "a function of the organism," the function consisting in "the use of psycho-neural states as cues for bodily adjustment" (p. 173). But if the psycho-neural states consist of, say, series of sounds, is the process by which consciousness becomes "aware of" a meaning in these sounds always carried over into bodily adjustment? Are not some of the highest reaches of consciousness quite independent of any situation calling for physical activity?

¹⁷ *Evolutionary Naturalism*, p. 310. See the whole of chap. xiv, on "The Mind-Body Problem."

¹⁸ See *Fragments of Science*, the lecture on "Scientific Materialism," pp. 86-87 (Appleton, 1896).

¹⁹ *Matter and Spirit*, p. 230.

²⁰ *Op. cit.*, vol. i, bk. iv, chap. i, espec. pp. 417-418.

²¹ See *The Religious Response*, chap. x. Wright, considering the Buddhistic refusal to ascribe any definite characteristics, especially the moral and the social, to that Reality "which makes the gods," properly says that at least by indirection these characteristics *are* ascribed, since the ideals of the religion will be a reflection of what it is supposed the Highest really is.

²² Cf. Urquhart, *Pantheism and the Value of Life*, bk. iii, chaps. i-v.

²³ Keats, *Lamia*.

²⁴ Francis Thompson, "To the Poet's Sitter" (Epilogue to *Her Portrait*).

²⁵ Arthur Hugh Clough, *Hope Evermore, and Believe!*

²⁶ Cf. Whitehead, *Religion in the Making*, pp. 16-17.

²⁷ Browning, *Bishop Blougram's Apology*.

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